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Braking the Merger Momentum:
Reforming Corporate Law
Governing Mega-Mergers
JAMES A. FANTOt
ABSTRACT

This Article articulatesa legal reform that is designed to
rein in the number of value-decreasingstock-for-stock megamergers-the signature transaction of the 1990s and the
beginning years of the new millennium-by causing board
members to question more critically a mega-mergerproposal
when they are asked to approve it and even to continue to
reevaluate their approval of a merger until its closing. The
Article first describes the current merger wave and
highlights reports of emerging problems in mega-mergers
and the relevant economic data indicatingthat a majority of
the transactionsare value-decreasingfor shareholders both
in the short and long term. It next examines why these
transactions are occurring and why they have been little
criticized, focusing on their economic and business
justifications, the recognizable psychological tendencies
(exacerbated in today's merger climate) affecting chief
executives, board members and investors and motivating
them to propose and approve the transactions, and the
journalisticcelebrationof (and a generalpoliticalsilence on)
the mega-mergers. The Article then analyzes the legal
foundations of the mega-mergers and observes that merger
jurisprudence developing from cases involving hostile
takeovers encouraged (i) management to engage in (and
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boards to approve with little court review) stock-for-stock
mega-mergers and (ii) the corporate law bar to reinforce
contractualprovisions in merger agreements intended to "tie
the hands"of boards that enter into the mergers. Finally, the
Article proposes a new intermediatestandardof court review
for board decisions approving stock-for-stock mega-mergers,
which should produce a new standard of board conduct in
these transactions, addresses several possible criticisms of
the standard, and advocates additional nonlegal and legal
reforms that would make the standardmore effective.
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I. INTRODUCTION

We are living in the middle of one of the most important
merger "waves" of recent history.' In 1998, the number of,
and the size of the parties involved in, major mergers
surpassed even the records for such transactions set in
1997, and then the same occurred in 1999.2 A week does not
seem to pass without the announcement of a new
"blockbuster" merger that exceeds in size and dollar value
the preceding recordholder.3 The media has greeted the
wave with euphoria, celebrating the new titanic companies
and the reasonableness of these "strategic combinations," as
well as lionizing the Chief Executive Officers ("CEOs") who
undertake them as courageous visionaries.' Politicians have
1. There have been four major merger waves in U.S. business history: the
first at the end of the nineteenth century, the second in the 1920s, the third in
the 1960s and the fourth beginning in the 1980s until the present. See RIcHARD
A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 941 (5th

ed. 1996). On the first great U.S. merger wave, see Ajeyo Baneijee & E.
Woodrow Eckard, Are mega-mergers anticompetitive? Evidence from the first
great merger wave, 29 RAND J. ECON. 803, 804-06 (1998). On the conglomerate
merger wave of the 1960s, see R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, A
Reexamination of the Conglomerate Merger Wave in the 1960s: An Internal
CapitalMarkets View, 54 J. FIN. 1131 (1999) (discussing explanations for value
creation in some conglomerate mergers).
2. See Thompson Financial Securities Data, Surging Mergers!,
http'//www.tfsd.com/news_room/archive (Jan. 6, 1999) ("[otal announced
domestic M&A transactions exceeded $1.62 trillion from more than 11,400
deals. That's in contrast to last year's then-record volume of $907 billion from
11,148 deals and more than the combined total of all announced domestic M&A
deals in the six-year period between 1990 and 1995."); Thomson Financial
Securities
Data,
The
World
is Not
Enough...
To Merge,
http://www.tfsd.com/news_room/archive (Jan. 5, 2000) ("Announced M&A
activity in the United States ended the year on a record note as more than $1.75
trillion in announced deals were recorded.").
3. One has only to compare the largest 1999 and 1998 transactions with the
transaction receiving the most attention in the 1980s, the leverage buy-out of
RJR-Nabisco for $31 billion, to see that transactions today are of a different
order of magnitude altogether. See Geoffrey Colvin, The Year of the
MegaMerger,FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1999, at 62-65 (listing the top ten 1998 mergers
all but one of which exceeded the value of the RJR-Nabisco transaction); Top 50
U.S. M&A Transactions of 1999, THE DAILY DEAL, at www.thedailydeal.coml
features/special/A14286-2000Jan26.html (Mar. 1, 2000) (presenting data
showing that six of the ten top 1999 mergers equaled or exceeded the value of
that transaction). The year 2000 saw the announcement of the largest merger
ever: the approximately $156 billion merger between AOL and Time Warner.
See Martin Peers et al., AOL, Time Warner Leap Borders to PlanA Mammoth
Merger,WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2000, at Al.

4. See, e.g., Rebecca Blumenstein, Armstrong Steers AT&T Into Uncharted
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generally been silent and unconcerned about the
phenomenon.5 Corporate and securities law scholars have
all but ignored the merger wave.6
One acquisition form clearly characterizes this merger
wave, much in the same way that the "bust up" leveragedbuyout ("LBO") transaction typified the 1980s. This is a
merger in which enormous companies, generally of
comparable size, combine in a strategic "merger of equals,"
usually through a stock-for-stock exchange.7 It is important
Waters, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1999, at A3 (discussing strategy of AT&T CEO C.
Michael Armstrong with his major acquisition of MediaOne); Carol Hymowitz,
Will AOL's Bosses Team Up to Create a Management Model?, WALL ST. J., Jan.
18, 2000, at B1 (discussing respective CEOs in AOL/Time Warner merger);
Karen Lowry Miller & Joann Muller, The Auto Baron, Bus. WK., Nov. 16, 1998,
at 83-90 (celebrating Daimler-Chrysler CEO Jtirgen Schrempp); Joann S.
Lublin & Mark Maremont, A CEO with a Motto: "Let'sMake a Deal!", WALL ST.
J., Jan. 28, 1999, at Bl (celebrating deal-making of Dennis Kozlowski, CEO of
Tyco International); David Rocks et al., The Main Event: Bernie vs. Mike, Bus.
WY., Oct. 18, 1999, at 35-38 (discussing "battle" for telecom control between
CEOs of AT&T and MCI WorldCom).
5. There may be at least one exception in the politically-charged financial
services industry. Because banks have traditionally had a "quasi-public" role of
providing the essential economic functions of payment services and payment
services, and have had close-indeed, too close-ties to politicians, politicians
are particularly vigilant to transactions in banking and other financial services.
See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 72-74 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing bank politics and "special" nature of
these financial institutions); Anthony M. Santomero, Bank Mergers: What's a
Policymaker to do?, 23 J. BANK. & FIN. 637, 641-42 (1999) (discussing potential
for political interference with current financial consolidation). Nevertheless, in
1999 Congress recently passed, and the President signed, a law eliminating the
barriers among banking, insurance and securities firms, which may spur
merger activity across these areas. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
6. For recent legal scholarship on mergers, see Steven A. Bank, Federalizing
the Tax-Free Merger: Toward An End to the Anachronistic Reliance on State
Corporation Law, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1307 (1999) (discussing proposal to end
dependence on state law for tax treatment in mergers); Steven A. Bank,
Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, Social Science Research Network, at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfin (Dec. 28, 1999) (exploring historical
justification for tax free mergers); John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A
Buy-Side Model of Lockups: Theory and Evidence, Social Science Research
Network, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfin (Feb. 3, 2000) (presenting
theoretical basis for lockups in mergers); Celia R. Taylor, "ADelicate Interplay:
Resolving the Contract and CorporateLaw Tension in Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV.
561 (1999) (discussing respective role of corporate and contract law in mergers).
7. See EDWARD D. HERLHY ET AL., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 1999: CONVERGING TowARDs THE DAWN OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM
10-11, 110-18 (1999).
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to emphasize each feature of this kind of merger at the
outset, for this transaction is the focus of the Article.
Certainly, all mergers are strategic, insofar as they reflect
the business planning of the acquiring and acquired (or
"target") firms, and reasons for mergers vary from industry
to industry. These enormous mergers, however, often
evidence bold strategies of combining different kinds of
firms and technologies or significantly expanding
businesses geographically, whether domestically or
internationally. Because, moreover, the mergers involve
huge established firms, the parties involved often present
them as "mergers of equals." This means that the
companies are roughly equal in market capitalization and
that the resulting firm will be almost in the nature of a
partnership between the two firms. That, in reality, one
firm may emerge as the dominant party in a transaction is
not important for the argument, which will focus on the
justification for the mergers. Finally, the stock form of these
transactions is significant: in these stock-for-stock
exchanges, shareholders of one company receive shares of
the other.8 The numerous reasons for this transaction form
will be explored below, but a standard justification for it is
that, given the sheer size of the companies, it would be
difficult for one company to raise the money to do a cash
merger and, in any event, a cash transaction would suggest
a "sale" as opposed to a "merger of equals."
Occasionally in the business press, a note of caution has
been struck as to this kind of transaction in the current
merger wave." Expressions of concern come from
8. See Alfred Rappaport & Mark L. Sirower, Stock or Cash? The Trade-Offs
for Buyers and Sellers in Mergers and Acquisitions, HARv. Bus. REv. 147, 14748 (Nov.-Dec. 1999) ("What is striking about acquisitions in the 1990s, however,
is the way they're being paid for. In 1988, nearly 60% of the value of large
deals-those over $100 million-was paid for entirely in cash. Less than 2% was
paid for in stock. But just ten years later, the profile is almost reversed: 50% of
the value of all large deals in 1998 was paid for entirely in stock, and only 17%
was paid for entirely in cash.").
9. See RICK ESCERICH, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC., QUARTERLY Focus:
STOCK-FOR-STOCK DEALS: BACKGROUND ON EXCHANGE RATIOS, COLLARS, AND WALKAWAY RIGHTS 12 (Apr. 22, 1998).
10. See, e.g., Dennis Carey & Dayton Ogden, A Match Made in Heaven? Find
Out Before You Merge, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1998, at A22 ("If history is a guide,
however, a substantial number of these [mergers] will become a great
disappointment to both sides within months after the partnership begins.");
Nikhil Deogun & Steven Lipin, Cautionary Tales: When Big Deals Turn Bad,
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understandable quarters. From the important antitrust
perspective, the mergers raise the specter of concentration
and abuse of market power, and, as the merger wave has
proceeded, federal antitrust authorities have increasingly
scrutinized transactions for these problems." The sheer size
of the firms resulting from mega-mergers has raised other
concerns, both tangible and intangible, relating to
consumers, employees and citizens that have always been
associated with large firms in America: for example, the
impersonal service offered by these firms, 2 the alienation of
working in these large enterprises, the ability of the firms
to influence unduly everyday and political life," and the
creation of unseemly wealth disparities as the
compensation of high executives in these firms dwarfs that
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1999, at Cl (reviewing recent merger failures); Nikhil

Deogun, Merger Wave Spurs More Stock Wipeouts: Acquirers' Shares Drop on
Average, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1999, at Cl; Greg Ip, Big Deal, Big Return? It's a
Little Complicated, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1999, at Cl (discussing general
negative performance of large firms resulting from mergers); Mitchell Lee
Marks, Egos Can Make-and Unmake-Mergers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2000, at
A26 ("But when merging CEOs can't agree on their roles, ego can be an obstacle
to long-term success. That's a big reason why less than 20% of all mergers and
acquisitions are financially successful."); George Melloan, CorporateMarriages
Aren't Made in Heaven, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1999, at A23 (But while mergers
and acquisitions always are accompanied by logical-sounding arguments about
synergies and efficiencies, the record shows that very often neither is
achieved"); Steven Rattner, Mergers:Windfalls or Pitfalls?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11,
1999, at A22 (discussing benefits of current mergers, but expressing concern
about their high price); How to Make Mergers Work, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1999, at
15 (discussing ways of avoiding failure in mergers); The Trouble with Mergers,
Cont'd, ECONOAUST, Nov. 28, 1998, at 17 ("Indeed, the motivation behind many
of the mergers is itself disturbing. All too often it is a case of imitation:
somebody else has done it, so we should too."). For a spoof on the mega-mergers,
see Let's Make an Imaginary Deal!, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1998, at Bi (describing
imaginary mega-mergers, such as "Wal-Buck" (between Wal-Mart and Sears)
and "Poke" (Coca-Cola and Pepsi)).
11. See Dan Carney, The New Math of Antitrust,Bus. WK., Feb. 28, 2000, at
35 (discussing increased Federal Trade Commission scrutiny of mergers);
Robert Pitofsky, The Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review,
Address Before Cutting Edge Antitrust Conference, at http:/www.ftc.gov/
speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm (Feb. 17, 2000) (clarifying FTC policy in merger
review).
12. See Rebecca Blumenstein & Stephanie N. Mehta, Lost in the Shuffle: As
the Telecoms Merge and Cut Costs, Service is Often a Casualty, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 19, 2000, at Al.
13. See Michael J. Mandel, All These Mergers are Great, but..., BUS. WK.,
Oct. 18, 1999, at 48 (expressing concern about the political power of megafirms).
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received by lower-ranking employees.14 The transactions
also result 15in the same social consequences and
"externalities" (e.g., massive employee layoffs, exit of firms
from communities) that so troubled policy-makers and
members of the press in the earlier, but different, LBO
merger wave of the 1980s. 6
Yet others worry about mega-mergers for reasons that
are internal to the transactions themselves because the
mergers do not produce the success predicted by their
initiators. Many of the mergers display problems almost as
soon as their completion, or sometimes even after their
announcement and before the closing, and the problems
have not been limited in kind. There have been discoveries
of massive fraud' and significant mismanagement' 8 in one

14. See, e.g., Sanders v. Wang, No. 16640, slip op. at 19 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8,
1999) (discussing compensation of senior executives at Computer Associates:
"As a practical matter, my rough calculations indicate that even under the
strictest reading of the Plan, the three Participants will together still receive
nearly $320 million. $320 million is no mere bagatelle. I find it remarkable that
defendants would have me believe that CA's shareholders would consider that
$320 million for three individuals failed to 'encourage, recognize, and reward
sustained outstanding individual performance by certain key employees.")
(footnote omitted).
15. For a "plain English" definition of this term, see TODD G. BUCHHOLZ,
FROM HERE TO ECONOMY: A SHORTCUT TO ECONOMIC LITERACY 93 (1995) ("An
externality arises when someone acts in a way that impacts other people who
have no control over the situation."). The future success of so many of the recent
mergers is explicitly based upon cost savings generated from employee layoffs
and the closing of duplicate operations. See, e.g., Steve Liesman, Exxon Mobil to
Cut 14,000 Jobs, Sees Big Savings, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1999, at A3; James P.
Miller, Smurfit Set to Cut Up to 3,600 Jobs, Take Big Charge, WALL ST. J., Nov.
25, 1998, at B13 (describing layoffs at company formed from merger between
Jefferson Smurfit and Stone Container); Emily R. Sendler, SPX Plans to Trim
Sites, Jobs in Restructuring,WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1998, at A4 (discussing plant
closings of company formed from recent merger between SPX and General
Signal); John Simons, Despite Low Unemployment, Layoffs Soar: Corporate
Mergers and Overseas Turmoil are Cited as Causes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1998,
at A2 (describing layoffs resulting from mergers). For an example of how CEOs
rarely lose in mergers, see Jennifer Reingold, Pay for Performance: One Step
Backward at Citi, Bus. WK., Mar. 29, 1999, at 40-41 (discussing growth in
executive pay at Citigroup following merger despite less than stellar
performance of company).
16. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. On the media criticisms
of the LBO transactions of the 1980s, see generally DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACIm
THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MIK[EN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION
1-39 (1995) (criticizing, among other things, press and employee concerns about
such effects as layoffs and unfair profits of leveraged-buyout financiers).
17. A prominent recent example is Cendant Corporation, which was formed
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of the merger partners. Even more importantly-for fraud

and mismanagement occur in companies not involved in
mega-mergers-many of the transactions do not realize
over the long term the goals that CEOs used to justify the
mergers in the first place. Firms fail to overcome, and, in
some cases, even to recognize, the difficulties arising from
combining different corporate cultures, management and
organizational structures.19 CEOs' predictions on realizing
"synergies" from a combination, whether, for example, by
lowering production costs or applying expertise from one
firm to another, often prove to be unfounded.
The existence of these problems in mergers should not
be surprising, because the economic data and behavioral
studies on recent mergers overwhelmingly indicate that
mergers, particularly the strategic, stock-for-stock "merger
of equals" that are the subject of this Article, are bad
investments for most of the companies involved in them and
thus value-decreasing transactions for the shareholders of
the surviving firm (a group including shareholders of the
acquired firm)." While empirical studies of the current
from a 1997 merger between HFS Inc. and CUC International Inc. It appears
that, for three years, CUC's management exaggerated the company's revenues,
a fraud that neither the company's auditors nor HFS in its acquisition due
diligence of CUC discovered. See Emily Nelson & Mark Maremont, Cendant
Cites Wider Accounting Fraud,WALL ST. J., July 15, 1998, at A3.; infra note 68.
18. See, e.g., Rick Brooks & Mitchell Pacelle, BankAmerica Net Slides
Unexpected 78%, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1998, at A3 (discussing unexpected
significant income downturn in gigantic bank holding company that was formed
from the 1998 mega-merger between BankAmerica and NationsBank); Rick
Brooks & Greg Jaffe, Coulter Quits BankAmerica President Post, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 21, 1998, at A3 (describing resignation of David A. Coulter, former CEO of
pre-merger BankAmerica, resulting from disclosure of income downturn); see
also infra note 72.
19. See, e.g., Thomas M. Burton & Elyse Tanouye, Clash of Cultures Kills
Monsanto, AHP Marriage, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1998, at B1 (describing how
American Home Products and Monsanto called off their merger "under the
strain of trying to blend two dramatically different corporate cultures and chief
executives."); Jack Milligan, "FastEddie" Pulls Up Lame, THE DAILY DEAL, at
www.thedailydeal.com/features/insightA13842-2000Jan20.html (Jan. 20, 2000)
(describing problems of serial mega-mergers of First Union); Anita Raghavan &
Paul Beckett, How Jamie Dimon Became a Casualty of Citigroup's Travails,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1998, at Al (detailing ouster of president of company
formed in 1998 from merger between Citicorp and Travelers Group and
attributing it to disagreements between executives of former companies).
20. See, e.g., Tim Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders
Benefit From Corporate Acquisitions?, 52 J. FIN. 1765, 1775 (1997) ("The
univariate evidence on mode of acquisition suggests that mergers underperform
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merger wave are incomplete, for financial economists do not
yet have all the relevant data about the long-term
performance of merged companies, studies on past merger
waves
and available data on the current mega-mergers
unmistakably
establish that the majority of these
transactions end up losing value for the surviving
company's shareholders.2 ' These studies also reveal that the
same reasons for this value loss recur throughout many
problematic
mergers.
The
reasons
include
the
overconfidence of CEOs about their ability to integrate
efficiently one large firm into another and an accompanying
failure to face dispassionately the well-known problems
involved in the combination and the uncritical reliance of
boards of directors, shareholders, and even market
professionals on CEOs who have had success in smaller
acquisitions. This behavior arises from recognizable
psychological tendencies that are exacerbated by today's
merger climate, which is characterized by rapid
technological change, sudden shifts in industry strategy,
and investor demands for high returns.
This Article articulates a legal reform that is designed
to reduce the number of the value-decreasing mega-mergers
by causing board members to question more critically the
merger proposal when they are asked to approve it and
even to continue to reevaluate their approval of a merger
until its closing. A legal solution is needed for several
reasons. First, market forces are simply not constraining
the behavior of CEOs and compliant boards of directors
regarding the mega-mergers. Capital markets have proved
to be ineffective because market analysts and even
sophisticated investors, rather than often criticizing these
transactions, have generally been caught up in the same
matching firms whereas tender offers outperform matching firms.... Mergers
are usually friendly to the target managers, but our evidence suggests that, on
average, they are not in the best interests of shareholders."); P. Raghavendra
Rau & Theo Vermaelen, Glamour, Value and the Post-acquisitionPerformance
of Acquiring Firms, 49 J. FiN. EcON. 223, 235-36 (1998) (presenting data that
show underperformance of friendly acquisitions over three years following
merger and better performance of tender offers); see also infra Part HC.
21. See infra Part IC; see also Paul A. Samuelson, The Long-Term Case for
Equities, J. PORT. MGNIT., Fall 1994, at 15, 17 (cautioning that, while in
economics history is no predictor of the future, it is also not irrelevant: "You are
a fool if you wake up each morning and say the universe was born anew today
with new rules. You are also a fool if you think that history can be read to teach
necessitous lessons").
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psychological momentum sweeping over executives and
board members and are desirous of ever-increasing stock
returns promised by the transactions. The product market
works at too slow a pace to police these transactions
because industry competition reveals the inefficiencies in
the merged firm often only months and years after the
transaction. Second, there has been little popular opposition
to the mega-mergers that could help put pressure on boards
to think critically about, and to resist, the transactions, as
opposed to rushing headlong into them. Even if laid off as a
result of the merger, employees have found other positions
in a tight labor market. United States journalists and
politicians have generally expressed little concern about the
mega-mergers.
Third and most importantly, legal reform is necessary
because corporate law and practice have not restricted, but
have promoted, these transactions. The legal standard
governing the conduct of the board of directors, whether of
the acquiring or target company, in a merger is the duty of
care, with the accompanying well-known business judgment
doctrine.22 Under this doctrine, courts essentially defer to a
board decision to enter into a merger recommended by
management (as it would to any board decision), provided
that the board satisfied its duty of care in arriving at the
decision. 3 This deferential standard of review and the
standard of board conduct that it encourages, however, are
simply not adequate to make a board critically question the
value of an industry-shaking mega-merger in the face of a
powerful and successful CEO proposing it, in uncertain
technological and business circumstances and with
investment professionals and financial journalists caught in
the merger's momentum and supporting the transaction.
Even more importantly, case law about board fiduciary
duties in mergers, which developed in response to very
different economic circumstances and to the LBOs of the
1980s and which generally focuses on board behavior in
"target" firms, has indirectly "sanctioned" the strategic
stock-for-stock merger of equals as the appropriate way for
mega-transactions to be structured. And, following courts'
guidance, sophisticated corporate lawyers have developed
22. See, e.g., 1 DENNiS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BuSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:
FmucIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DnREcToRs 631-32 (5th ed. 1998).
23. See id. at 5.
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contractual provisions to "lock" a board into, and thus to
make it very difficult for board members to reconsider, a
merger decision once the merger agreement has been
signed.
Part II first describes in more detail the merger wave of
the late 1990s and its characteristic transaction-and the
focus of the Article-the strategic merger of equals between
enormous firms conducted as a stock-for-stock exchange,
and summarizes several standard reasons for the
transaction form. It then highlights the emerging reports of
problems in these transactions that are resulting in
significant value losses for shareholders of the surviving
company. The Part next discusses relevant economic data
from previous merger waves, and the existing data from the
current wave, indicating that a majority of these
transactions are value-decreasing for shareholders both in
the short and long term.
Part III examines why these transactions are occurring
and why they have been little criticized. The Part's first
section refers to, and acknowledges the reasonableness of,
the many economic and business justifications for mergers,
such as the need for consolidation in certain industries so
as to attain a critical size to lower marginal product costs,
to further expansion of product lines' or to apply one firm's
resources or capabilities to a different business. The
uncertain global business environment of the present wave
particularly explains the prevalence of these transactions.
This has been a time of rapid industrial change and
"shocks," often occasioned by startling technological
advances in communications." These advances are
upsetting established industries and in many cases
reconfiguring them, or at least suggesting possibilities for
reconfiguration, sometimes at a bewildering pace.
24. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAmICS OF
INDUsTRIAL CAPITALISM 17 (1990) (describing the benefits of "economies of
scale," which are "those that result when the increased size of a single operating
unit producing or distributing a single product reduces the unit cost of
production or distribution," and of "economies of scope," which are "those
resulting from the use of processes within a single operating unit to produce or
distribute more than one product").
25. See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern IndustrialRevolution, Exit, and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 841 (1993) (classic
statement describing reasons for restructuring activities beginning in the
1980s).
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Moreover, the worldwide elimination or lowering of trade
barriers promotes competition and restructuring in each
industry, or in an industry in formation, that are no longer
domestic, but global. In firms and industries, it is therefore
difficult for managers and board members to know how best
to act and to react amid this constant change and
uncertainty, and there is an almost irresistible pressure for
them to do something, lest they be left behind. From a
psychological perspective, this pressure has exacerbated in
CEOs the common human reactions to uncertainty, such as
imitation of apparently successful behavior in others, and
the well-known CEO tendencies, such as overconfidence
and self-aggrandizement.26
Part III next explores the lack of critical assessment of,
and in fact the benign perspective on, the mega-mergers by
board members and investors, even the institutional
investors" who should know better because of their
familiarity with the historical economic performance of
firms. The Part argues that a board member's experience of
the same uncertainty facing a CEO makes him or her
sympathetic to the decision-making plight of executives,
willing to overlook their weaknesses, ready to accede to
their optimistic merger visions, and likely to ignore the real
possibility that a mega-transaction proposed by the CEO
will result in failure. It also contends that investors in the
securities markets are generally not penalizing mergers
and their decision-makers until after the damage has
occurred and are thus not applying well-known lessons
about the problems with mergers to other transactions."
Investors, even more so than executives, do not know the
correct response to uncertain economic and business times.
The continuation of the mega-mergers also owes much to
the "investor capitalism," which was much heralded as
making firms and managers more responsive to the
production of shareholder value." So great now is the
26. See infra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
27. See generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992) (describing the
importance of institutional investors in the public markets). See also James A.
Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and
Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 105, 121-23 (1998)
(describing growing importance of retail investor in securities markets).
28. On investor irrationality, see infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
29. See generally MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY
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investor pressure on, and expectations regarding, managers
and boards to make their firms industry leaders and to turn
in stellar financial results that they must gamble on
blockbusting transactions, lest they be quickly punished
with a fall in their share price and with the explicit or
implicit message that their firms are takeover candidates."
The very riches now apparently made on a daily basis in
the stock markets have made investors exceedingly
demanding on company performance.
Part III next explains why there has been a journalistic
"celebration" of (and a general political silence on) the
mega-mergers, as opposed to the criticism that had greeted
past restructuring, which has not provided boards of
directors with a critical counterweight to the "momentum"
for these transactions. On a simple political level, because
the mega-mergers have occurred mainly during a
Democratic administration and because many journalists
are generally sympathetic to Democrats, the media ignored
or downplayed business excesses, particularly the megamergers-a situation in sharp contrast to what usually
occurred during the business restructuring under
Republican executive control in the 1980s."' More
significantly, while investment bankers and Wall Street
lawyers are profiting greatly from the current merger
"boom,"32 even beyond the levels of the 1980s, there has
been no natural "Wall Street" villain for the media to
identify as a target of envy and condemnation in the recent,
generally good economic times. The CEOs engineering the
transactions (even those in financial services) are of a
"Main Street" character and have their bases of support
throughout the country where their firms are located, not
15-37 (1996)
(describing the shift of focus of top corporate management to maximizing
shareholder value).
30. See, e.g., Nikhil Deogun & Robert Langreth, P&G Walks Away From
Merger Talks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2000, at A3 (discussing Proctor & Gamble's
abandonment of merger talks with Warner-Lambert and American Home and
concern among investors: "In the end, P&G may have given its investors the
jitters without accomplishing much, aside from signaling that it has a hearty
appetite for a big deal, and suggesting to some investors that perhaps it feels it
needs one in order to expand").
31. See FISCHEL, supranote 16, at 4.
32. See, e.g., Thompson Financial Securities Data, supra note 2, at 4-5
(describing activity of investment banks and securities law firms in current
merger wave); see infra note 170.
MANAGERS ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA
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just in financial centers. Because, moreover, stock market
investing has become so popular, even Wall Street figures
(who include prominent former Democratic administration
figures and government officials)3 are increasingly
esteemed and envied, not despised, and Wall Street is not
seen to be the bastion of a narrowly-defined elite. The
monumental transactions (some of the largest of which
involve media companies themselves) with their visionary
CEOs also make good "copy" and even entertainment for an
audience that includes an ever widening group of investors.
Without any media "prodding" regarding the mega-mergers,
politicians have taken a "hands off' approach to the
transactions.
Part IV analyzes the legal foundations of the megamergers. It first explains why merger law, which is
primarily a subject of state corporate law,34 has traditionally
placed little burden on directors, particularly those of the
acquirer, to justify "friendly" transactions, except in special
circumstances." It then observes that recent merger
jurisprudence developing from cases involving hostile
takeovers encourages management to engage in (and
boards to approve with little court review) strategic, stockfor-stock mega-mergers. That is, Delaware case law (the
most relevant law for corporations involved in mega33. See infra note 166.
34. Because a corporation is itself a creature of state corporation law, its
combination with another corporation, either through the formation of an
entirely new legal person (a "consolidation") or with one of the merging
corporations disappearing (the traditional "merger"), is similarly governed by
this law. See JAmES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 583-84 (1997). Federal
securities law is applicable in mergers of publicly-traded firms, with the
relevant law depending upon the structure of the transaction. See 15 U.S.C. §
78n(a), (d) (1998) (requiring a firm to follow proxy rules when it solicits
shareholder votes on a matter, such as a merger transaction, and to follow
tender offer rules when it makes a public offer for securities of another firm for
cash); 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1999) (requiring registration of securities in
business combinations where acquirer offers securities to target shareholder in
a merger).
35. These are circumstances involving a change of control of a firm. See
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del.
1994) ("The decisions of this Court following Revlon reinforced the applicability
of enhanced scrutiny and the directors' obligation to seek the best value
reasonably available for the stockholders where there is a pending sale of
control, regardless of whether or not there is to be a break-up of the
corporation."); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1985); infra Part IV(B).
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mergers) imposed upon boards of targets of hostile
transactions a higher standard of review than the business
judgment deference. In this jurisprudence, the courts held
out, as an ideal, the "friendly" strategic stock-for-stock
merger. Part IV next studies how the corporate law bar,
taking their guidance from court decisions, reinforced
contractual provisions in merger agreements intended to
"tie the hands" of a board that entered into a strategic
merger so as to prevent it from engaging in any
reconsideration of a deal, once, freed from the pressure and
momentum of a transaction, its members would have the
time to rethink it.
Part V proposes a new intermediate standard of court
review for board decisions to enter into stock-for-stock
mega-mergers, which should produce a new standard of
board conduct in these transactions. Under the proposed
standard, a board must bear the burden of establishing that
it has reasonable grounds, supported by particularized
findings, for believing that (1) the mega-merger will
maximize shareholder value and (2) the transaction is the
best alternative among those currently available to the
company, most particularly not engaging in the mega
transaction and remaining an independent firm. That a
board is composed primarily of independent directors will
enhance the likelihood that a court would find that the
board satisfied this standard in entering into a merger. The
standard is designed to give the board a legal incentive to
resist the momentum of a transaction that the CEO, and
even the investment community and business media,
support, to bring to the forefront of their decision-making
the real possibility of the merger's negative consequences
and to create an opposition group within the board to the
euphoria surrounding the mega-merger. The Part
emphasizes that the standard will thus assist the board in
many cases to act against the immediate wishes of both the
executives and even the shareholders, but with the goal of
protecting long-term shareholder value. The standard,
moreover, would apply on a continuing basis so that, until
the consummation of the merger, boards would have to
reevaluate the existing value of the transaction and to
consider terminating the merger. The standard might thus
limit the "lock-in" devices currently used to bind parties to
mega-mergers, which limitation echoes a developing trend
in Delaware merger jurisprudence.
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Part V then addresses several possible criticisms of the
standard by arguing that it is neither unduly vague nor
intrusive on company decision-making. Indeed, the
enhanced standard finds support in corporate law
jurisprudence because the reasons for enhancing board
duties that courts have found persuasive in other
circumstances, such as the need to compel directors to guide
shareholders and to address their possible self-interest in a
major transaction, are particularly true in the megamerger. The proposal is simply trying to enhance the
fiduciary role of the board as an independent actor against
management, as well as, in some cases, against the
shareholders. The Part then argues that adoption of the
standard may better bring about its goal, if it is combined
with the following reforms: addressing the issue of decisionmaking on a mega-merger in consensual codes of board
behavior 36 elimination of "pooling" accounting treatment for
mergersy5 as is currently proposed,38 and enhanced scrutiny
by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "SEC") of disclosure in merger proxy statements
concerning boards' articulation of reasons for mergers and
36. An alternative to law is a code of best practices, as, for example, those
developed by various professional organizations. See, e.g., THE CONFERENCE
BOARD, CO'fMNICATING CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: A DELICATE BALANCE, A
RESEARCH REPORT 1997 (describing "best practices" that companies could adopt
in communicating their performance to investors); see also infra notes 323-25.
37.
Under the "pooling" method of accounting for a business combination,
the combination is treated not as a purchase but as a joining or
'marriage' of two previously separated entities. The amounts (roughly,
historical cost) at which assets and liabilities are recorded on the books
of the acquired company are carried forward without change in the
accounts of the acquiring company. Neither the fair value of the
acquired company's assets nor the value of its good will, is recognized.
As a consequence, the income of the combined enterprise is not
changed by the increased depreciation allowance that would result
from a revaluation of tangible assets nor by amortization of an amount
attributable to the acquired company's good will.
VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE
FINANCE A-10 to A-11 (4th ed. 1993); see also infra note 56.
38. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, PROPOSED STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: BuSINESS COMBINATIONS AND INTANGIBLE
ASSETS (Financial Accounting Series No. 201-A, Sept. 7, 1999) (proposing to
phase out the "pooling" method in favor of a uniform use of the "purchase"
method); see also L. TODD JOHNSON & BRYAN D. YOKLEY, SPECIAL REPORT:
ISSUES ASSOCIATED wrrH THE FASB PROJECT ON BusINEss COMBINATIONS
(Financial Accounting Series No. 174-A, June 1997); infra Part V(B).
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decision-making under the new standard.
II. PROBLEMS OF THE MEGA-MERGERS

A. The Mega-MergerPhenomenon
The current U.S. merger wave dates from the end of the
recession in the early 1990s 9 and continues until the
present. In the last few years, the volume of merger activity
has been significant and has been steadily growing each
year. In 1997, there were 11,148 merger transactions, with
a total value of $907 billion.° This titanic number was
surpassed in 1998, with a $1.62 trillion in value of mergers
and 11,400 transactions.4 Mergers in 1999 continued at
this record pace, with $1.75 trillion in value and 10,800
transactions.
An identifying characteristic of the current merger
wave is the sheer size of many transactions. The wave is
breaking records on deal size, both in the overall largest
deal and the largest transaction in specific industries. Nine
of the ten largest transactions in 1998 were the largest of
any deals involving a U.S. target company in any preceding
period, 3 and several 1999 deals pushed themselves onto the
top ten chart./ In the first quarter of 2000, the largest
merger in size ever was announced, with the4proposed
$156
billion combination of AOL'Time Warner. Exxon/Mobil

39. This wave may in effect be part of a larger wave of restructuring that
began in the 1970s. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 1, at 941.

40. See Thomson Financial Securities Data, supra note 2, at 1. The value
here refers to the value of the consideration offered to the shareholders of the
acquired or "target" company in the merger.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. These included (with a listing of the acquirer/target and
transaction value): Exxon/Mobil, $86 billion; Travelers/Citicorp, $73 billion;
SBC Communications/Ameritech, $72 billion; Bell Atlantic/GTE, $71 billion;
AT&T/TCI, $70 billion; NationsBank/BankAmerica, $62 billion; British
Petroleum/Amoco,
$55
billion; Daimler-Benz/Chrysler,
$40 billion;
Northwest/Wells Fargo, $34 billion; Banc One/First Chicago, $30 billion. See
The Top Ten Deals of 1998, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1999, at 68.
44. See Top 50 U.S. M&A Transactions of 1999, supra note 3 (MCI
WorldCom/Sprint, $111 billion; Pfizer/Warner-Lambert,
$84 billion;
AT&T/Media One, $57 billion; Qwest Communications/US West, $48 billion)
(discussing AT&T bid to buy MediaOne Group).
45. See Peers, supra note 3, at Al.
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(1998) was the largest oil industry merger,46 Travelers
Group/Citicorp (1998) the largest financial services merger,
NationsBank/BankAmerica (1998) the largest bank merger,
AOL/Time Warner (2000) the largest media/entertainment
merger, MCI WorldCom/Sprint (1999) the largest
telephone/communications merger, Pfizer/Warner-Lambert
(1999) the largest pharmaceutical merger.47 The list could
go on and on.
Many-and the most prominent-of these enormous
are characterized by their
business combinations
participants as "strategic" "mergers of equals" and are
conducted through a stock-for-stock merger. "Strategic" has
a special meaning here because it suggests more than
everyday business strategy, but bold vision, which proposes
to link together huge companies in different industries or to
create a behemoth in a particular industry. The "merger-ofequals" aspect of the strategic combination suggests that
two well-established, enormous firms of comparable size are
really forging a partnership or alliance. As a result,
merging firms often pay considerable attention to the
management and "social" aspects of the combined firm:
management and the board of directors from each firm are
often united in more or less equal ways, as are
headquarters and operating facilities.49 Indeed, the
egalitarian nature of the transaction is in harmony with its
typical structure. With a few notable exceptions," the
46. See Colvin, supra note 3, at 62.
47. See id. at 62-64; see also Leslie Cauley et al., AT&T Makes $54 Billion
UnsolicitedBid For MediaOne, in Challenge to Comcast, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23,
1999, at A3.
48. See supranote 7.
49. See MARTIN LIPTON ET AL., MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND TAKEOVER
PREPAREDNESS 68 (1995) ("To achieve a true [merger of equals] structure,
neither company should gain too much of an upper hand in the combined
company. Instead, after agreeing on the overriding business goals and means to
enhance shareholder value, partners to an MOE must seek to achieve a fair
balance in key management and operational areas."). Cf Gregory L. White &
Brian Coleman, Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Plan to Run Main Operations
SeparatelyAfter Merger, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1998, at B8 (providing example of
how resolving these "social" issues may become particularly difficult in crossborder mergers, as in the mega-merger between German and U.S. automakers).
50. Recent large cash transactions often involve a foreign company
acquiring a U.S. company because the former cannot use its stock as acquisition
currency, since there may be no U.S. market, or no significant U.S. market, in
the securities. See, e.g., Paul Beckett et al., Deutsche Bank, Bankers Trust Near
Pact, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at A2 (describing Deutsche Bank's cash
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transactions are not effected as cash purchases financed by
debt, so typical of the acquisitions by the financial buyers of
the 1980s. Rather, stock of one of the companies (which
may in effect ultimately prove to be more "equal" than the
other) is used as merger consideration offered to the
shareholders of the partner firm in a reverse triangular
merger.52 As a result of the transaction, shareholders of
both firms are combined-none of them is cashed out-and,
as the story goes, will benefit from the results of the vision
that brought them together in the new mega-firm.
Admittedly, certain advantages of the stock-for-stock
exchange structure help explain the prevalence of this kind
of merger. In a constantly rising stock market, which
characterizes the second half of the 1990s and the
beginning years of our new century, stock becomes an
available, even inexpensive, acquisition currency. 3 Using
stock as merger consideration avoids the significant
borrowing costs that accompany a cash acquisition of an
enormous firm, for few firms generate enough cash to
acquisition of Bankers Trust). But see Nicole Harris & Steven Lipin, Vodafone
to Buy Air Touch for $58 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1999, at A3 (describing
$58 billion merger of Vodafone (U.K.) with AirTouch (U.S.) as primarily a stockfor-stock exchange).
51. See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE
VALUE 44-90 (1998) (discussing the use of debt in 1980s acquisitions).
52. In the reverse triangular merger, the acquirer incorporates a special
acquisition subsidiary and capitalizes it with acquirer stock. This subsidiary
then effects a merger with the target corporation in which the latter is the
surviving corporation and in which the target's shareholders receive acquirer
shares in exchange for their shares. Although other transaction structures are
possible, a reverse triangle merger maintains the separate existence of the
target, which generally helps the acquisition to proceed more quickly (e.g.,
fewer consents are needed from third parties who might be able to object if the
target corporation disappeared). See generally RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 670-71 (1995).
53. See Steven Lipin, Merger Boom ReverberatesAcross Century, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 1999, at C1 ("Longtime merger banker Robert F. Greenhill says
watch the stock market for whether stock or cash is king. 'Follow the S&P priceearnings ratio,' says Mr. Greenhill, chairman of Greenhill & Co., who ran Wall
Street's first merger group at Morgan Stanley. It's the perfect predictor of
whether acquirers will use cash or stock.' "); Richard Morgan, PIE Disparities
May Fuel Corporate Buying, THE DAILY DEAL, at www.thedailydeal.com/
features/insight/A18361-2000MarlO.htm (Mar. 10, 2000) (describing how
acquirers have high p/e ratios in relation to targets); see also Rau & Vermaelen,
supra note 20, at 225, 226 (discussing the evidence that the use of stock in
acquisitions arises from the fact that it is overvalued).
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conduct a mega-acquisition without borrowing. Indeed, the
ability to use stock as consideration makes possible mergers
in industries, such as financial institutions or electronic
commerce, where firms have little debt capacity to fund
acquisitions.54 If, moreover, company management considers
that the stock market values highly, and even over-values,
its stock, it makes sense for management to use their equity
securities in mergers. "
The stock-for-stock merger also receives favorable
accounting treatment from the perspective of the
presentation of a firm's financial results. This transaction
can be treated-for now at least-as a "pooling of interests"
under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP"), if it otherwise complies with accounting rules
limiting use of this method." In a pooling, the surviving
54. Financial institutions, such as banks, are by their nature highlyleveraged: they rely upon debt in the form of deposits to fund their investments.
Accordingly, it might be difficult for them to raise cash from further debt
issuances. Moreover, as regulated institutions they have capital requirements
(i.e., that they have a certain amount of equity capital to overall liabilities),
which has the effect of discouraging kinds of acquisitions (cash and/or debt
financed) that diminish their mandated capital position. See generally HERLIHY,
supranote 7, at 30-31. Similarly, a firm with little cash flow to service the debt,
as in a company with good growth prospects but little tangible earnings, might
find that stock is the only viable means of effecting an acquisition. Cf Steven
Lipin & Stephanie N. Mehta, Global Crossing to Buy Frontier,WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 1999, at A3 (discussing how high technology companies can use their
highly-valued stock as acquisition currency); Anthony B. Perkins, AOL Beat the
Odds: Again, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000, at A22 (describing ability of AOL to
purchase Time-Warner by way of its "overhyped" stock despite the fact that
AOL's revenues are less than one-sixth of Time-Warner's).
55. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 1, at 927 (discussing considerations

arising in stock financing); see also MARK L. SIROWER, THE SYNERGY TRAP: How
COMPANIES LOSE THE ACQUISITION GAME 131-32 (1997). On acquirer and bidder
considerations in determining ratios in stock-for-stock mergers, see infra notes
282-85 and accompanying text.
56. The rules for eligibility for pooling treatment are technical and are set
out in ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, OPMION No. 16, BuSINESS COMBINATIONS

(1970) (setting out twelve requirements for pooling, which are basically
designed to ensure that the merger involves a true combination of shareholders
of the two constituent corporations and a continuing sharing of risks by each
group of shareholders). An important condition for pooling is that voting stock
of the acquirer is exchanged for nearly all (at least 90%) of the voting stock of
the target. See BRUDNEY & BRATTON, supra note 37, at A-26 (quoting Olson,

Accounting for Mergers, 3 Rev. Sec. Reg. 867-871 (1970)). These rules have been
further developed by accounting standards associations and the accounting staff
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin
No. 96, 61 Fed. Reg. 12020 (Mar. 25, 1996) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 211)
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firm is permitted to treat the acquisition for financial
statement purposes as a combination of firms, rather than
as a purchase of the "target."57 This treatment has a
beneficial effect on the acquirer's income statement. First,
the companies' income statements are combined from the
beginning of the year in which the transaction takes place,
which means that the survivor's earnings include the
income of the target for the pre-acquisition period. 8 Second
and more importantly, the combination of the two firms'
balance sheets also favorably affects the income statement.
In a typical acquisition (and even in many mega-mergers of
equals), an acquirer must pay some premium to the target
shareholders to convince them to go along with the merger.
If accounting treatment were not accorded to the
transaction, and if the "default" purchase method were
applied, the purchase price would have to be allotted to the
target's assets at their fair market value. The price
generally exceeds this fair market value because the firm is
worth more than its assets, and the price in excess of this
value is placed on the acquirer's balance sheet as an
(dealing with effect upon pooling of reacquisition of acquirer shares during
periods before and after merger); see also JOHNSON & YOKLEY, supra note 38, at
1.

57. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, METHODS OF ACCOUNTING
FOR BUSINESS COMBINATIONS: RECOMMZENDATIONS OF THE G4+1 FOR ACHIEVING
CONVERGENCE 6 (Financial Accounting Series, Dec. 15, 1998) [hereinafter

FASB, METHODS OF ACCOUNTING] ("Because no assets are considered to be
received (or disbursed) or liabilities incurred (or settled) in the combination
transaction and because the entities themselves are not seen as directly
involved in the exchange of equity interests, the combined company is viewed as
a continuation of its predecessors. Accordingly, no cognizance is given to the
values exchanged in the bargained transaction and no new basis of accounting
is called for. Instead, since the predecessors are seen as continuing, their
recorded assets and liabilities are simply carried forward to the financial
statements of the combined company, and no other assets or liabilities are
recognized as a result of the combination. Thus, the combination is accounted
for as if the only change that occurred was essentially one of legal form rather
than economic substance.").
58. See BRUDNEY & BRATTON, supra note 37, at A-14. The federal securities
laws attempt to address the potential misleading nature of this combination,
which could arise if an investor in the combined company did not realize that a
significant increase in earnings was simply due to an acquisition, not to
enhanced performance by the company. They do this by having the company
provide "pro forma" financial statements as if the company had been combined
for three years preceding the year of the acquisition. See SEC Form S-4, item 5
(Pro Forma Financial Information), available at http'/www.sec.gov/smbus/

forms/s-4htm.
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intangible "goodwill." 9 In the years after the transaction,
the income of the acquirer on its income statement is
decreased by the portion of the goodwill and the amount of
any "step-up" in the value of the tangible assets that are
attributable, as expenses, to each future year of their use
until the useful life of the asset has ended; in technical
terms, goodwill is amortized (over a period not exceeding 40
years) and assets are depreciated in accordance with set
periods depending upon the kind of asset." In sum, the
purchase method of accounting produces an earnings
"penalty" that can reduce a firm's earnings over a number
of years following the transaction.6 ' Senior managers may
take steps to avoid having a merger treated as a purchase if
they know that investors in their company focus on
earnings-as opposed to its cash results."
59. BRUDNEY & BRATTON, supra note 37, at A-10; see FASB, METHODS OF
ACCOUNTING, supra note 57, at 6-7 ("The purchase method views a business
combination from the perspective of the combining company that is deemed to
be the acquirer or purchaser. Because the exchange transaction is assumed to
result from arm's-length bargaining between independent parties, the values
exchanged are presumed to be equal with the total purchase price establishing
the total value of the assets and liabilities obtained. The purchased assets and
assumed liabilities are recognized (including those not previously recognized)
and measured based on their fair values, and any residual is accounted for as
purchased goodwill.").
60. See BRUDNEY & BRPiTON, supra note 37, at A-14. The 40-year
amortization period for goodwill was set forth in ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
BOARD, OPINION No. 17 (1970).
61. See also JOHNSON & YOKLEY, supra note 38, at 2. See generally Benjamin
C. Ayers et al., The FinancialStatement Effects of Eliminating the Pooling-ofInterests Method of Acquisition Accounting, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 1, 14 (Mar.
2000) (discussing the massive effects on firms' earnings per share numbers from
elimination of pooling method).
62. This leaves the question why this deflated earnings number should be
significant for investors because amortization and depreciation are not cash
items: they do not reduce the cash position of the acquirer in future years, for
the consideration has been paid in the merger year. The reduction in earnings
from amortization and depreciation is simply a result of accrual-based
accounting that attempts to assign expenses to the year or years in which they
occur. In certain industries, market analysts and investors primarily focus on
earnings. See generally GILSON & BLACK, supra note 52, at 569-78. Yet there
seems to be a basis in fact for managers' perception that they would do well to
avoid purchase accounting so as not to depress their stock price. See Patrick E.
Hopkins et al., Purchase,Pooling, and Equity Analysts' Valuation Judgments,
Social Science Research Network, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfin
(Oct. 27, 1999) (concluding that stock price judgments of buy-side analysts are
lower for firms using purchase accounting (where intangibles are not
immediately expensed) as opposed to pooling).
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Significant tax advantages also accompany a stock-forstock merger because the transaction is generally tax-free
to all parties involved. 3 As these transactions are
structured, target shareholders do not realize any taxable
gain on the exchange of their shares for shares of the
acquirer (except to the extent that they receive any minimal
cash in lieu of fractional shares in the transaction),' and
the tax "basis" of their existing shares carries over to the
shares that they receive in the merger.65 Neither firm,
moreover, recognizes any gain in the transaction.66 Contrast
with this the cash merger where the merger is taxable to
the target shareholders (and to the target firm, if acquirer
wants a stepped-up basis in target's assets).67 The
advantages of the stock-for-stock merger are highly
significant if, as is often the case, both the target and its
shareholders do not want to incur any tax in the merger.
While the availability of stock as acquisition currency,
the favorable pooling accounting treatment, and the taxfree nature of a share exchange help explain why megamergers have been structured as stock-for-stock exchanges,
they do not alone account for the current prevalence of
these transactions. For this explanation, we shall have to
turn to business and even to behavioral psychology. But
before exploring the foundations of the mega-mergers, it is
important first to explain why we are concerned about the
63. This tax treatment is succinctly described in Bank, supra note 6, at
1308-10 and accompanying notes.
64. In a typical stock-for-stock transaction, a target shareholder receives a
set ratio (or a ratio determined in accordance with a pre-determined formula) of
acquirer shares for his or her target shares. As a result, he or she may receive
some fraction of an acquirer share. Merger agreements generally provide that
the acquirer will not be obligated to issue any fractional shares, but will give
the target shareholder the cash value of any such fractional share.
65. For the statutory support for this proposition, see Bank, supra note 6, at
3 and accompanying notes.
66. See generally MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS,
ACQUISITIONS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS: A TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
GOVERNING TAX, LEGAL, AND ACCOUNTING CONSIDERATIONS

803 (1991)

(describing requirements for tax-free treatment).
67. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 52, at 473-77 (discussing history of tax
treatment in taxable acquisitions); see also HOwARD E. ABRAMS & RICHARD L.
DOERNBERG, FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION 191-201 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing

ability of acquirer to achieve stepped-up tax basis, but only if target firm
realizes corporate level tax). It is possible, then, for an acquirer to receive
stepped-up basis for accounting purposes (which reduces earnings), but not for
income tax purposes (if stepped-up basis were not elected in the transaction).
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transactions.
B. Emerging Problems of the Mega-Mergers
It is disturbing that many mega-mergers are beginning
to exhibit different kinds of problems that result in value
losses-sometimes startlingly large-for shareholders of the
combined firms. The most serious problems involve fraud or
significant mismanagement, generally in the target firm,
that comes to light only after completion of the merger and
that results in a serious decline in the market value of the
combined company. A prominent recent case involves
Cendant Corporation, which was formed from the merger
between CUC International Inc. and the acquisitive HFS
Inc. Subsequent to the merger, Cendant disclosed that
approximately 60% of CUC's revenue for the three years
preceding the merger was fictitious, and Cendant's stock
lost one-half its market value.' Similarly, McKesson
HBOC, a company formed in 1999 by a stock-for-stock
mega-merger between McKesson Corp. and HBO & Co.,
disclosed, several months after completion of the merger,
that HBO (the target) had been overstating its revenues, a
disclosure that caused the merged firm also to lose one-half
its market value.69 In addition, massive accounting fraud
68. See Nelson & Maremont, supra note 17, at A3; see also Amy Barrett,
Cendant: Who's to Blame?, Bus. WE., Aug. 17, 1998, at 70 (describing loose
accounting system at the former CUC); Emily Nelson & Joann S. Lublin, Walter
Forbes Steps Down At Cendant, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1998, at A3 (describing
resignation of former head of CUC who had become chairman of Cendant);
Emily Nelson & Leslie Scism, Cendant Ends Pact to Buy American Bankers,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1998, at A4 (describing Cendant's decision to pull out of a
merger agreement with American Bankers Insurance Group, given the decline
in Cendant's stock price that was to be used as merger consideration); Mitchell
Pacelle, Cendant Ex-Chairman Repays Expense Money, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2000, at A4 (describing dispute between former chairman of Cendant and
current board regarding his severance package and expenses); Mitchell Pacelle
& Elizabeth MacDonald, Ernst & Young Settles One Suit In Cendant Scandal,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1999, at B9 (discussing record-setting settlement of suits
by CUC's auditor and by the firm itself); In re Cendant Corporation Litigation,
60 F. Supp. 2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999) (describing legal claims relating to CUC); In re
Cendant Corporation Securities Litigation, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11590
(D.N.J. Aug 14, 2000) (describing Cendant's $2.8 billion settlement).
69. See Janet Rae-Dupree, Anatomy of a Shareholder Slaughter, Bus. WK.,
May 17, 1999, at 44 (describing accounting fraud and noting that both
companies grew tremendously through acquisitions); Ralph T. King Jr.,
McKesson Restates 4h Period Results, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1999, at A3 ("The
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(again in the target company) surfaced at Waste
Management Inc., a company formed by the mega-merger
between USA Waste Services Inc. (the acquirer) and Waste
Management (the target).70 And these are only the most
publicized examples."
negative surprise caused McKesson's shares to plummet 48%, wiping out about
$9 billion in the big drug distributor's market value."); Ralph T. King, Jr., Soft
Numbers: McKesson Restates Income Again as Probe of Accounting Widens,
WALL ST. J., July 15, 1999, at Al (discussing accounting fraud in firm); Ralph T.
King, Jr., McKesson's Chairman, CEO, 5 Others Step Down or Are FiredAmid
Scandal, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1999, at A3 (discussing executive fall-out from
scandal); see also Ash v. McCall, No. 17132 (Del. Ch., Sept. 15, 2000), slip op.
(dismissing claims of lack of due care and waste against McKesson board). But
see Cavaretta v. McKesson HBOC Inc., Del. Super. Ct. LEXIS 346 (No. OOC-04214-WTO, Sept. 7, 2000) (describing securities class action claims against
HBOC). The merger was, in fact, never popular with financial analysts, who
failed to see any synergies between McKesson's business (drug distribution) and
that of HBO & Co. (healthcare software). See Anita Sharpe, HBO-McKesson
Merger Plan Stirs Questions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1998, at B16.
70. See Jeff Bailey, Where it Hurts: An Accounting Scandal EndangersBig
Payout For a Retired CEO, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1999, at Al (noting that the
accounting scandal was known before the merger, but not the depth of the
problem, which involved losses of $3.5 billion in market value of the merged
firm); Jeff Bailey, Ex-Waste Management CEO Buntrock Sues Company and
Two of Its Directors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2000, at B10 (detailing litigation
between current and former management); Jeff Bailey, Star Rescuers Take On
Waste Management-And End Up Tarnished, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at Al
(discussing continued problems at company despite replacement of
management); Jeff Bailey, Waste Management Names Whitworth Acting
Chairman,Issues Revised Outlook, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1999, at A4 (discussing
board shake-up resulting from accounting scandal); Jeff Bailey, Waste
Management Sues on Acquisition, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1999, at A3 (discussing
suit against, among others, former management of Waste Management).
71. See Robert Berner & Mark Maremont, Lost Heir:As Rite Aid Grew, CEO
Seemed Unable To Manage His Empire, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1999, at Al
(discussing, among other things, accounting problems arising from
acquisitions); William C. Symonds et al., Tyco: Aggressive or Out of Line?, Bus.
WK., Nov. 1, 1999, at 160-65 (describing allegations of questionable accounting
at Tyco International, a major acquirer); Heather Timmons, Creative
Accounting at Century?, Bus. WK., Feb. 21, 2000, at 142 (discussing accounting
problems at Century Business Services, a serial acquirer). Indeed, recent reform
to board audit committees by industry groups and the SEC partly originated
from a concern over improper abuses in financial reporting in connection with
acquisitions. See Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release 42,266, 64
Fed. Reg. 73,389, 73,390 (Dec. 30, 1999) (final rule enhancing audit committee
disclosure); Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-41,987,
64 Fed. Reg. 55,648 (proposed Oct. 14, 1999) (proposing new rules and
amendments to improve disclosure related to corporate audits); REPORT AND
RECOMiENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMTTEE ON IMPROVING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDrr COMMITTEES 18 (1999) (discussing various
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of

serious

mismanagement, but not fraud, in either merger partner
that come to light only after the merger. There is the
noteworthy example of BankAmerica, which had massive
and unexpected earnings declines due to problems in the
target's management of the risks in its loan loss portfolio.72
Similarly, after engaging in numerous stock-financed
acquisitions to become a national firm, crowned by megamergers, Bank One has lost momentum-and its CEO lost
his job-because of the market perception that the company
had expanded too fast and had not adequately addressed
management problems in acquired firms.7
It could be argued that these problems, while serious,
should not be used to indict mega-mergers. Fraud is
difficult to detect; mismanagement is a perennial problem
whenever, as in all large U.S. corporations, so much control
is delegated to professional managers. More importantly,
these problems occur equally in companies that have not
engaged in mega-mergers. Rather than condemning, and
exaggerating the problems with, the transactions, it may
make more sense to caution merger participants, such as
company executives, investment bankers, accountants and
lawyers, to be aware that these difficulties might
undermine the benefits of a mega-merger, just as they can
destroy a stand-alone company. One solution would be to
recommend that deal participants pay more attention to
their "due diligence" review of companies involved in a
financial reporting abuses that trigger the Committee's work); SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 100, 64 Fed. Reg. 67154 (Dec. 1, 1999) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 211) (discussing proper accounting in connection with
restructuring).
72. See Rick Brooks & Mitchell Pacelle, BankAmerica Knew in August of
Trading Woes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1998, at A3; see also Rick Brooks et al.,
Hootie's Blow: Ousting of Coulter Isn't the Only Fractureat New BankAmerica,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1998, at Al (discussing additional dissension in the
merged company that the decline in revenues only exacerbated); Rappaport &
Sirower, supra note 8; Dean Foust, A Megabank in the Making, Bus. Wt., Sept.
13, 1999, at 144 (describing management difficulties with mergers).
73. See, e.g., Joseph Cahill, Bank One Approves Plan to RearrangeDuties of
Top Executives McCoy, Istock, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1999, at B2 (detailing
problems of firm formed from mega-merger between Bank One and First
Chicago); Joseph Cahill, Bank One Cuts Forecast a Second Time, Cancels
Conference as Stock Falls 9.3%, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1999, at B6 (questioning
managements ability to address problems facing Bank One); Joseph Cahill,
CEO McCoy Quits a Flagging Bank One, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1999, at A3
(describing early retirement of CEO responsible for creating megabank).
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mega-merger and not relax this review on account of the
sheer size of the deal and 7 4the speed with which it is
negotiated and consummated.
Yet what is particularly worrisome about the megamergers is that their problems are not limited to those that
more due diligence would help parties detect; they
undermine the very bases for the combination. A merger is
premised on the assumption that the constituent companies
can create more value together than separate: this is what
is meant by the popular merger term "synergy."75 This value
creation is based upon the ability of the companies to
combine effectively for particular value-maximizing
strategy or strategies. In other words, synergy may be
achieved through a number of well-known strategies,
whether through, among other things, lowering costs
(which can be achieved in numerous ways), expanding
production or distribution into new geographic areas, or
markets or making use of complementary technologies or
applying one firm's resources to another firm's business. 76 If
synergies cannot be achieved, the merger will usually be a
failure and even a disaster for shareholders of the combined
firm.
The nature of the mega-mergers makes even more
difficult the realization of the value-creating synergies than
would face participants in a different kind of merger (who
nonetheless encounter considerable problems in making the
transaction a success). The sheer size of the companies
involved in the mega-mergers presents an imposing
challenge of uniting disparate and far-flung operations so
as to be able to begin realizing the merger synergies.
Because, moreover, the mega-mergers of equals involve a
sharing of management, operations and culture between
the constituent corporations, or at least some power-sharing
even if a dominant party exists, one firm does not
"swallow," and immediately impose its will on, another, as
happens if there were a disparity in firm size and if the
74. See, e.g., Jennifer Reingold & Amy Barrett, M&A Frenzy May be
Scuttling Due Diligence, Bus. WY-, Aug. 17, 1998, at 72 (pointing out that in a
"merger of equals" it may be difficult for each company to do adequate due
diligence on the other because no one is in charge of the transaction).
75. See SIROWER, supra note 55, at 20 ("Synergy is the increase in
performance of the combined firm over what the two firms are already expected
or requiredto accomplish as independentfirm.") (emphasis in original).
76. See generally infra Part III(A).
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combination is viewed as a sale of one firm to another.
Rather, starting after the merger announcement executives
and employees of the combined firm must undertake the
difficult task of "meshing" the two firms' operations and
themselves into a productive whole. Not surprisingly, in the
course of the combination, unless the organization of the
new firm is stipulated at the signing of the merger
agreement (which is rarely the case), employees at all levels
from each company struggle to have their strategies, views
and especially their jobs prevail in the combined firm
because, if they are unsuccessful, they are likely to be
looking for work elsewhere.
The current wave of mega-mergers is replete with tales
of combination difficulties, which the business media
follows much in the way that the society and entertainment
pages of newspapers, magazines and Internet sites reveal
the couplings and break-ups of the social and
entertainment elite (increasingly, one and the same!). And
these tales often point to the failure of the merger to realize
its promised synergies or, what is similarly disastrous to
shareholder value, to delays in this realization. As is typical
in the hierarchical world of company life in the United
States (despite all the talk of the shift to "flat,"
nonhierarchical organizations), the media focus has been on
the failure of efforts of top executives from the two firms to
get along with one another. Generally, a typical megamerger involves a creation of a unified board of roughly
equal membership from the two constituent corporations
and the sharing of executive responsibilities by the two
CEOs, with or without an understood succession plan.77
This arrangement has proven to be unstable. The most
publicized example of executive combination difficulties
(perhaps because it is one of the largest transactions and
the largest U.S. financial services merger to date) has been
in Citigroup, formed from the mega-merger between
Travelers and Citibank. The former CEOs of Travelers and
Citibank at first co-existed uneasily; the heir apparent to
them was abruptly dismissed after the merger; lesser
executives struggled for control of different parts of the
large company's operations; a former high government
official appeared as "peacemaker" to add a third executive
to the equation; and finally, Citibank's former chief left the
77. See HERUHY, supra note 7, at 113.
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firm.78 Unfortunately, Citigroup's problems in combining
top management are typical of the mega-mergers.79
The difficulty in combining management is itself only
the tip of the iceberg, for synergies can be realized only if
firms combine at all levels. There have been many reports
about how firms formed as a result of recent mega-mergers
have not achieved their goals of immediately combining two
complex organizations. As middle managers and other
employees from the constituent corporations try to work out
their differences, costs are added to the firm, rather than
synergies being realized, and even value expected to be
78. See Raghavan & Beckett, supra note 19, at Al (discussing management
difficulties resulting in ouster of Jamie Dimon, heir apparent to Co-Chairman
Sanford I. Weill from Travelers and John Reed from Citibank); see also Paul
Beckett & Patrick McGeehan, How a New Financial Giant Struggles With Its
Message, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1998, at CI (observing that Citigroup managers
are sending different messages to employees about the firm's strategy); Charles
Gasparino & Jathon Sapsford, Citigroup'sReed to Retire Posts in April, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at A3 (describing gradual ouster of John Reed); Holman
W. Jenkins Jr., Which Way to Point the CitigroupFiringSquad Next?, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 11, 1998, at A23 (discussing management dissension); Leslie Scism,
Citigroup'sMultiple Falls Below the Level of Rivals as Skepticism About Weill
Grows, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1998, at C1 (describing loss of investor confidence
in Sanford Weill); Leslie Scism & Patrick McGeehan, A Resignation at
Citigroup Adds to Doubts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1998, at C1 (discussing loss of
market value in Citigroup stock due to the firm's management difficulties);
Gary Silverman et al., Is This Marriage Working?, Bus. WK., June 7, 1999, at
127 (discussing management tension at Citigroup). And yet the business media
continues to celebrate the acquisition acumen of Sandy Weill! See, e.g., Matt
Murray & Paul Beckett, Recipe for a Deal: Do It Fast, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,
1999, at Bi.
79. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, At Global Crossing, Not Lonely at the Top,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1999, at BI (describing complex management structure at
Global Crossing, a telecommunications firm created by numerous mergers);
Marks, supra note 10; Stephanie N. Mehta & Rebecca Blumenstein, US West
ChairmanTrujillo Rejects Merger Role, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2000, at B6 (citing
dissension among top management of merging Qwest and US West); Timothy
D. Schellhardt, A Marriage of Unequals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1999, at R8
(describing problems among senior management in combined companies when
the compensation of executives in one firm is greater than that in the other
firm); Susan Warren, Hercules's Cook Resigns, Ending Co-CEO Accord, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 1, 1998, at B14 (discussing dissension between co-CEOs of Hercules
Inc., formed from the merger between Hercules and BetzDearborn Inc., that led
to resignation of one of the CEOs). See generally Jordan D. Lewis, One Head Is
DAILY DEAL,
at www.thedailydeal.com/features/
Better Than Two,
judgment/A17773-2000Mar3.html (Mar. 3, 2000). But see Post Mortem, THE
DAILY DEAL, at www.thedailydeal.com/features/postmortem (Mar. 1, 2000)
(describing management harmony between former CEOs of AIG and
SunAmerica).
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generated by each constituent firm pre-merger is lost.8"
Amid such dissension, or even to head it off, it is not
surprising to see examples of one company ultimately
deciding to impose its "will" on its strategic partner, if only
to break out of the morass of indecision and mounting
costs.8 ' These kinds of combination problems, moreover,
sometimes surface even after a merger's announcement and
before the closing. This event does not necessarily allow
shareholders to avoid value losses, even if it results in the
merger's being called off. The stock market may penalize
firms for having made bad judgments in selecting their
potential mega-merger partner, despite the avoidance of the
value losses that would have flowed from the merger had it
been consummated 2

80. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 72, at Al (describing strife between former
employees of BankAmerica and NationsBank); Peter Elstrom, AT&T: The
Problems Keep On Coming, Bus. WK., Oct. 18, 1999, at 41 (discussing
management issues at AT&T as a result of its mega-acquisitions in cable); Matt
Murray, Missed Opening: KeyCorp Fails to Prove It Can Unlock Promise Of a
Merger of Equals,WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1998, at Al (discussing merger of equals
that has failed to live up to its promise because of integration problems). But see
Scott Thurm, Joining the Fold: Under Cisco's System, Mergers Usually Work;
That Defies the Odds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2000, at Al (explaining great efforts
taken by Cisco, when it engages in acquisitions, to harmonize the combined
firm at all levels). The companies most likely to face difficulties in "meshing"
their cultures are those formed as a result of mergers between firms from
different countries. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ball & Scott Miller, Full Speed Ahead:
Stuttgart'sControl Grows With Shakeup At DaimlerChrysler,WALL ST. J., Sept.
24, 1999, at Al (noting problems of combining systems and cultures of auto
companies from the United States and German); Jeffrey Ball, Eaton Retires As
Co-Leader Of Daimler, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2000 at A3 (describing how the
merger of equals between U.S. Chrysler and German Daimler has turned into a
dominance by the German firm); Christopher Rhoads, Deutsche Bank to Give
BT "No Autonomy", WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1998, at A3 (reporting that German
bank will control firm resulting from merger with U.S. bank).
81. See Robert Frank & Steve Liesman, While BP Prepares New U.S.
Acquisition,Amoco Counts Scars, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1999, at Al (describing
the imposition of British Petroleum's culture on the firm resulting from the
merger between BP and Amoco); Nicole Harris, Sprint CEO Loses Clout, But
Not His Ardor for MCI Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2000, at B6 (describing MCI
WorldCom's increasing dominance of Sprint in their merger-a transaction
later abandoned); Allanna Sullivan, Exxon and Mobil Are Already Devising
Their New Blend, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1999, at B4 (discussing Exxon's control of
Mobil in their merger of equals).
82. See, e.g., Thomas M. Burton & Elyse Tanouye, Clash of Cultures Kills
Monsanto, AHP Marriage,WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1998, at BI (attributing failed
merger between American Home Products and Monsanto to problems with
combining different corporate cultures).
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The above reports about problems in recent megamergers all point to a basic concern of this Article, the loss
of value to shareholders of the firms involved because of
these transactions. Yet it should be remembered that, if a
firm suffers because a merger is unsuccessful or takes too
long to succeed, others "stakeholders" in the firm could be
hurt as well, even more than harms to them contemplated
by the original justification for the merger: the employees
and communities where firms are located, to name those
primarily, although not exclusively, affected.83 When a new
mega-firm loses the high stakes gamble of doing a
successful mega-merger, it suffers. in its product markets,
which means the steady or sudden demise of the firm itself.
Because there is so little margin for error in these
transactions, even mega-mergers that are not initially
justified on the basis of synergies resulting from costcutting often end up engaging in significant cost-cutting in
order to make up for the unachieved synergies based on
other combination strategies and the mounting costs
resulting from the merger itself. This cost-cutting, as was so
typical of the restructuring of the 1980s, produces
significant employee lay-offs and closing of facilities and
headquarters. Employees have to find other positions (or to
relocate to do so), and local communities lose sources of jobs
and tax revenue. These consequences have flowed from the
mega-mergers and will likely increase in the next years as
the merged companies-often out of desperation-try to
improve their performance in order to realize the promise of
the mega-merger."6
83. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 n.16 (1999).
84. See, e.g., Paul Beckett, Citigroup to Cut 6% of Its Work Force, Take a
$900 Million Charge After Tax, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1998, at A8 (discussing
elimination of 10,400 jobs in Citicorp's merger with Travelers); Emily R.
Sendler, SPX Plans to Trim Sites, Jobs in Restructuring,WALL ST. J., Dec. 29,
1998, at A4 (describing job elimination and plant closings following merger
between SPX Corp. and General Signal Corp.); Thomas E. Weber, On Jarring
Note, AOL to Cut 350-500 of Staff,WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1999, at B4 (describing
job cuts from America Online's merger with Netscape); see supra note 15 and
infra note 171.
85 See, e.g., John Hechinger, Fleet Touts Benefits of BankBoston Deal, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 16, 1999, at A3 (describing concern by Boston civic leaders that the
city could lose a major employer and their relief when two Boston banks
merged).
86. Compare FISCHEL, supranote 16, at 33 (explaining how restructuring in
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C. Systematic Evidence About PastMerger Waves and
CurrentMega-Mergers
A final judgment on the mega-merger must await
future empirical studies.87 The systematic empirical
evidence on past mergers and the available data on the
mega-mergers, however, now supports the conclusion that a
large majority of these transactions destroy shareholder
value. It is a commonplace in financial circles 8 (as
recognized occasionally even by the business press)89 that
mega-mergers are generally value-decreasing transactions
for shareholders. Evidence from past merger waves shows
that public companies engaging in mergers underperform
their peer companies that have not followed similar
acquisition strategies. ° Indeed, the worst performers are
effect produced more jobs and more competitive firms in the long run), with
Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUMBIA. L. REv. 217, 236-37 (1998) [hereinafter
Roe, Backlash] (justifying political control of restructuring as a "second best"
solution that avoids political upheaval)
87. For example, the "final judgment" on hostile takeovers has come only in
the past few years with empirical studies measuring the performance of firms
subsequent to a takeover. See, e.g., James F. Cotter et al., Do independent
directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?, 43 J. FIN.
ECON. 195 (1997) (discussing the issue on a database involving takeovers in the
period 1989-1992).
88. See Robert G. Eccles et al., Are You Paying Too Much for That
Acquisition?,HARV. Bus. REv. 136, 136 (July-August 1999) ("Despite 30 years of
evidence demonstrating that most acquisitions don't create value for the
acquiring company's shareholders, executives continue to make more deals, and
bigger deals."); Jeffrey L. Hiday, Most Mergers Fail To Add Value, Consultants
Find, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1998, at B91 ("Most mergers don't work. Hard as
that may be to imagine in this bigger-is-better age, it is accepted wisdom in
investment-banking circles."); SniOWER, supra note 55, at 19 (" 'So many
mergers fail to deliver what they promise that there should be a presumption of
failure. The burden of proof should be on showing that anything really good is
likely to come out of one.'") (quoting Warren Hellman, former head of Lehman
Brothers) (footnote omitted).
89. See supra note 10. See also Phillip L. Zweig, The Case Against Mergers,
Bus. WK, Oct. 30, 1995 at 122-30 (special report on the problems associated
with mergers).
90. See SIROWER, supra note 55, at 145-66 (reviewing, as of 1997,
management and finance literature on the negative consequences of mergers);
Loughran & Vijh, supra note 20, at 1767; Rau & Vermaelen, supra note 20, at
235-39 (discussing underperformance of acquiring companies). See also Anup
Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, The Post-merger Performance Puzzle, 7-9, 11-39,
Social Science Research Network, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cfln (Jan. 5,
1999) (summarizing numerous studies by financial economists and concluding
that there is "strong evidence of abnormal under-performance following
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companies engaging in stock-for-stock mergers with
comparably-sized firms-the very focus of this Article. 9
Certainly, the evidence on past transactions is subject
to qualifications and refinements, as financial economists
attempt to identify the characteristics that make for a
value-enhancing merger. For example, nonconglomerate
mergers (i.e., meaning those involving merger partners in
related industries that can take advantage of economies of
scale or scope) tend to increase shareholder value, at least
in comparison to conglomerate or diversifying mergers.92
Where one firm can apply certain knowledge-based skills to
another's business and improve the performance of the
target firm enhances the possibility that the merger will
create value.93 Some evidence suggests that even stock-for-

mergers"); Mark L. Sirower & Stephen F. O'Byrne, The Measurement of PostAcquisition Performance: Toward A Value-Based Benchmarking Methodology,
11 J. CoRP. FIN. 1, 1 (Summer 1998).
91. See, e.g., Carlos P. Maquierira et al., Wealth creation versus wealth
redistributions in pure stock-for-stock mergers, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 8 (1998)
("Second, research indicates that stock-for-stock mergers have systematically
lower offer premiums for target firm stockholders, significantly negative
abnormal returns for acquiring firm stockholders, and lower net synergistic
gains created.") (footnote omitted); Rappaport & Sirower, supra note 8, at 148
("In studies covering more than 1200 major deals, researchers have consistently
found that, at the time of announcement, shareholders of acquiring companies
fare worse in stock transactions than they do in cash transactions. What's more,
the findings show that early performance differences between cash and stock
transactions become greater-much greater-over time.").
92. See Maquierira, supra note 91, at 16 ("The first significant result is that
the common stockholders in nonconglomerate mergers experience average VPEs
[excessive value] that are economically and statistically significantly higher
(8.58% versus 3.28%) than do shareholders in conglomerate mergers."); id. at 30
("Target firm shareholders always experience net wealth gains, as do bidding
firm stockholders in nonconglomerate mergers, clearly suggesting that, on
average, acquiring firm managers who execute nonconglomerate mergers are
acting in their shareholders' best interests, while those who launch
conglomerate mergers most definitely are not."); see also Lance A. Nail et al.,
How Stock-Swap Mergers Affect Shareholder (and Bondholder) Wealth: More
Evidence of the Value of Corporate"Focus,"11 J. CORP. FIN. 95 (Summer 1998).
93. See, e.g., Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung Why Firms Diversify:
Internalization vs. Agency Behavior, 3, 22 (Oct. 15, 1998), available at
www.ssrn.com (explaining that the effort to expand the use of "knowledge-based
assets," or to have them used more efficiently, explains the value-increasing
aspects of mergers in the 1979-85 period); see also Zsuzsanna Fluck & Anthony
W. Lynch, Why Do Firms Merge and Then Diversify? A Theory of Financial
Synergy, 72 J. Bus. 319 (1999) (explaining value of diversifying mergers as
financing marginally profitable projects); Hubbard & Palia, supra note 1, at
1149 (explaining diversifying mergers as efforts by firms to remedy information
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stock mergers may increase overall value when conducted
by firms that are not market favorites, that is, not the socalled "glamour" firms (i.e., those highly valued by the
market in relation to their book value). ' On the whole, the
evidence on past transactions suggests that, for a given
mega-merger to escape falling into the usual pattern of
value destruction, the participants in it must walk a
careful, fine line.
More importantly, evidence on current mega-mergers
shows that they, too, decrease value for their shareholders.95
This result is not surprising, because these transactions
often exhibit the attributes that, according to financial
economists on the basis of their studies, lead to valuedecreasing transactions. Many recent mega-mergers, for
example, are being initiated by "glamour" acquirers whose
stock is trading at high levels over book value.96 In the
ongoing merger wave, as in past mergers,97 companies grow
ever larger by serial acquisitions and their CEOs receive
from
financial
laudatory
attention
increasingly
professionals, investors and the business media for their
successful acquisition "track record" until their ultimate
defects in capital markets).
94. See Rau & Vermaelen, supra note 20, at 239 (discussing better
performance by acquirers in mergers that are "value" firms (i.e., those with high
ratios of book to market value)); see also SIROWER, supra note 55, at 88-135
(discussing general attributes suggestive of optimal, or at least less negative,
transactions, such as size of transaction, nature of consideration, relatedness of
merger partners).
95. See, e.g., Eccles, supra note 88, at 136 ("Recent research shows that
acquisitions in the 1990s have just as poor a record as they did in the 1970s.");
id. at 139 (finding that, on the basis of a sample of 131 acquisitions from 1994 to
1997, current mergers demonstrate the historical result: "that well over half of
mergers and acquisitions failed to create their expected value."); Albert Viscio et
al., What Makes Mergers Work? It May Not be What You Think, M&A LAw., Oct.
1999, at 18 ("Additionally, half of all mergers [of 117 most significant deals
closed between January 1, 1994 and July 30, 1996] failed to deliver excess
returns: 51.3% under performed industry peers.") (detailing results measuring
performance vs. industry peers two years post-closing); KPMG, UNLOCKING
SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THE KEYs To SUCCESS 5, 7-8 (1998) (taking a sample from

the "top 700 cross border deals by value between 1996 and 1998" and concluding
that, on the basis of shareholder value "one year after completion of the deal"
83% of the mergers "failed to unlock value," with 53% destroying value and 30%
producing "no discernible difference" as to value).
96. Cf Steven Lipin & Paul M. Sherer, Boom Is Back: Merger Deals Charge
Ahead, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1998, at C1 (describing rise in stock prices as an
incentive for firms to continue in the merger wave); see also supra note 53.
97. See Rau & Vermaelen, supranote 20, at 225.
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failure to realize synergies in a mega-merger finally catches
up to them."3
In light of the above data, it is important to emphasize
how value is destroyed when a merger does not achieve the
promised synergies and why, in financial terms, it is so
difficult for a merger to succeed. Because a firm's value is
based upon expectations of its future value (e.g., its growth
and prospects), its stock price reflects this value.9 In
essence, a merger promises to add value beyond that
already incorporated in the stock prices of the two merging
firms. For a mega-merger to succeed, therefore, not only
must the combined firm achieve the expected performance
of each constituent firm (itself quite a challenge, given the
size of each of the firms and the highly competitive markets
in which they operate), but it must also attain the
additional
value-the
synergies-arising
from
the
transaction. 0
This high performance level of the mega-firm must
occur in difficult circumstances that heavily weigh against
its success. Chief among them is the premium that the
shareholders of the target firm may expect and that their
management and board demand. A premium simply
represents that part of the value to be realized from the
promised synergies that is allotted to the target
shareholders.'0 ' In a mega-merger of equals, one could
argue that target shareholders should receive an amount of
acquirer stock essentially based upon the approximate
value of their shares before consummation of the merger

98. See, e.g., Nelson & Maremont, supra note 17, at A3 (observing how
Henry Silverman, CEO of Cendant, was known as a "merger-savvy executive"
who had built up the "one-time Wall Street darling that grew rapidly through
numerous acquisitions" until the CUC disaster); Scism, supra note 78, at C1
("Mr. Weill's reputation as one of Wall Street's savviest deal makers is losing
some of its crispness as investors struggle with bad news stemming from his
two latest and biggest acquisitions-last year's $9 billion purchase of Salomon
Brothers and the $50 billion merger five weeks ago of Travelers Group with
Citicorp, forming Citigroup.")(emphasis in original); Symonds, supranote 71, at
162-65 (describing Tyco's CEO's strategy of constant acquisitions); David
Weidner, Pluck of the Irish, THE DAILY DEAL, at www.thedailydeal.com/
features/postmortemAl8737-2000Mar15.html
(Mar. 15, 2000) (describing
potential problems arising from serial acquisitions of FleetBoston's CEO,

Terrance Murray).
99. See BREALEY & MYERS, supranote 1, at 57-79.
100. See generally id. at 914-16.
101. See Rappaport & Sirower, supranote 8, at 148.
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because the acquirer shares they receive will in time reflect
their proportionate value of the synergies (keyed to their
percentage ownership of the combined firm).1"2 Yet even in
this kind of transaction shareholders of the target firm may
still negotiate for some premium, if only to compensate
themselves for the real risk that the merger will not achieve
its synergies and may even destroy some of the value that
the market had previously accorded to their firm. °3 The
new firm must thus outperform the expected value of the
two separate firms and the premium given to the target
shareholders for the acquirer's shareholders to be better off
as a result of the merger.0 4 The target shareholders have
the cushion of the premium, but even it may not be enough
to keep the transaction from destroying value for them, if
the merger either fails to achieve its synergies and/or
causes each constituent firm not to realize its pre-merger
future value. The high performance bar for the merged
firm, moreover, must be achieved amid the difficult
circumstances, mentioned above, of integrating two
enormous firms, which distract the firm from achieving the
synergies or even the expectations of each constituent firm,
and of responding to competitors who attack the distracted
firm.lo0
102. That is, if one takes a simple example, assume two firms, one (Firm A)
with a market value of $200 and ten shareholders and another (Firm B) with a
market value of $100 with ten shareholders. If the managers of both firms agree
that synergies of $100 can be realized by a combination of the two firms, it could
be argued that, in a stock-for-stock exchange, Firm B shareholders should
receive .5 shares of Firm A for each Firm B share, which would represent their
justifiable proportionate ownership of the combined firm and entitlement to the
realization of synergies. If Firm B's shareholders are paid any premium in the
transaction (in the form of a greater exchange ratio), then they capture more of
the synergies, to the detriment of Firm A's shareholders. See id. at 149. Of
course, if one could identify what part of the synergies will be contributed by
the target firm, the shareholders should also receive payment for that value as
well.
103. See id. at 149-51. Indeed, because a merger in which stock is offered as
consideration conveys negative signals about the acquirer's confidence relating
to the transaction (if the synergies are likely to materialize, why give so much of
their value to the target shareholders?) and about the value of the shares
offered (the acquirer believes them to be overvalued, for why else use them as
acquisition currency?), the target company's management has a rational
incentive to demand as much of the alleged synergies as possible. See id. at 154.
104. See SIROWER, supra note 55, at 21 ("So achieving synergyimprovements above what is already expected or required-is like starting a
new business venture.")
105. See id. at 24-26, 39-42.

2001]

BRAKING MEGA-MERGERS

285

III. THE MOMENTUM OF THE MEGA-MERGERS
A. Executive Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
A major cause of the value destruction of the megamergers is that CEOs are making flawed decisions in
proposing them and pushing boards to approve them. Yet
this poor decision-making is more than another example of
the common agency problem in large U.S. corporations,
where executives exert so much power and control, in
comparison to the weak position of shareholders, and can
thus disastrously mismanage a firm.' There are powerful
business and economic reasons for executives at least to
consider a mega-merger: in the 1990s firms in a bewildering
number of industries are in the middle of a rapid
restructuring caused by many changes, most particularly by
massive technological advances in communication. Making
decisions
in
these
circumstances,
however,
is
extraordinarily difficult. This difficulty, coupled with the
decision-making flaws exhibited by most people and
exacerbated by the hubris and overconfidence to which
CEOs are particularly prone, has contributed to the megamerger phenomenon."
It is clearly difficult for CEOs to make major decisions
in current business circumstances. This is a time of great
economic transformation and uncertainty as technological
advances, particularly in communications, make possible
106. This issue refers to the fact that, in large U.S. public corporations,
shareholders have been dispersed and unorganized and thus in a position where
it is difficult for them to control managers of the corporation, who can operate
the firm with little check by these owners, often for their own benefit to the
shareholders' detriment. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 78-82 (Transaction
Publishers, reprinted 1991); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS:
THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMiERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 3-8 (1994). See also
MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 53-55 (1998).
The effort to address this agency problem inspires much legal and financial
scholarship (and shareholder activism) regarding the public corporation. See
Blair & Stout, supranote 83, at 248 n.1 (citing the literature).
107. See ANJu SETH ET AL., SYNERGY, MANAGERIALISM OR HUmiS? AN
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF MOTIVES FOR FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS OF U.S. FIRMS 811 (Univ. of Illinois, College of Commerce and Business Administration, Office
of Research Working Paper No. 98-0122, Nov. 1998) (describing literature on
managerial motivations for mergers). See also Loughran & Vijh, supra note 20,
at 1775; David J. Denis et al., Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and
CorporateDiversification,52 J. FIN. 135, 136 (1997).
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startling changes in business structure.' These advances
are reshaping the production and distribution processes (to
name only a few business attributes) in many industries
and firms, are making some industries and firms obsolete
and are establishing connections between others that were
previously unseen (and thus are creating new firms). The
period has witnessed great "shocks" to firms and business,
which typically
lead to much restructuring and thus merger
1 9
activity.

0

In the middle of this transformation, CEOs must make
sense of the possible changing nature of their firm and
industry and decide how to allocate resources to particular
businesses and technology, while abandoning or selling
others."0 They also have to take into account other firmand industry-specific factors, which may or may not be due
to technological change and which add more decisionmaking complexity. This is the classic kind of decisionmaking that all executives face: e.g., to consider whether
they can enhance the competitive position of their firm by
expanding its scale or scope. Recent mega-mergers, for
example, have been in diverse industries-financial
services,
pharmaceuticals,
telecommunications
and
commodities (such as oil and copper)"'- each with its own
industry-specific justifications."'
108. See Jensen, supranote 25, at 841-42.
109. See Gregor Andrade & Erik Stafford, Investigating the Economic Role
of Mergers 16, Social Science Research Network, at http'//papers.ssrn.coml
sol3/results.cfn (Jan. 12, 1998) (concluding that merger activity reflects
"shocks" to an industry and often an effort to eliminate excess capacity,
although observing that the evidence about mergers in the 1990s points to an
expansionary, rather than, contracting role for mergers); Jensen, supra note 25,
at 851-52; Moon H. Song & Ralph A. Walking, Abnormal returns to rivals of
acquisition targets: A test of the "acquisitionprobability hypothesis", 55 J. FIN.
ECON. 143, 145 (2000) (discussing "shock" hypothesis for mergers).
110. See generally Timothy A. Luehrman, What's It Worth? A General
Manager's Guide to Valuation, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1997, at 132
(discussing basic strategy for resource allocation decisions).
111. See Thompson Financial Securities Data, supra note 2, at 2 (observing
that
top industries for
1998
mergers were
financial
services,
telecommunications and oil and gas); id. (observing that telecommunications,
financial services and radio and television and broadcasting were the main
industries of 1999 merger activity).
112. Financial institution mergers, for example, owe much to a consolidation
(which has technological causes) among financial services companies as banks,
securities houses, and insurance firms increasingly offer similar products and to
legal changes permitting bank geographic expansion and bank development of
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Executives, moreover, are not acting in a vacuum, for
they make their decisions in reaction to, and within the
constraints imposed by, their competitors' strategies."'
Competition has become even more acute for the kinds of
mega-firms that are involved in the mega-mergers. Given
the decline of trade barriers, a typical U.S. mega-firm now
faces both domestic and foreign competitors because the
product and services markets for the firms are global.' If,
for example, one firm, through an acquisition or otherwise,
captures more market share by entering a new geographic
or product market or by producing goods or services at
lower costs, the competitive landscape can be entirely
changed. The existence of a massive merger in the same or
related industries puts considerable pressure upon a CEO
to react, often by a similar mega-merger strategy.""
Executives have numerous strategic options to respond
to the macro-economic and business- and industry-specific
changes, including internal growth, alliance with other
firms, a mega-merger and even an exit from one or more
businesses (with the most radical approach being a sale of
the firm). A mega-merger (like any merger) can permit a
firm to attain an immediate position in a market, product
or form of technology or to rationalize its present production
or distribution of services." 6 This tactical selection,
nonbanking products. See generally Allen N. Berger et al., The consolidation of
the financial services industry: Causes, consequences, and implicationsfor the
future, 23 J. BANK. & FIN. 135, 144-51 (1999). See also Marcia Vickers & Peter
Coy, A New Net Equation, Bus. WK., Jan. 31, 2000, at 138-40 (describing
competitive necessity of combining internet and offline companies);
Commodities get big, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 1999, at 47-48 (discussing
explanations for current mega-mergers among commodities firms).
113. See generally Oz SHY, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 59 (1995) (describing items affecting firm behavior to include
"[flirms' expectation about the actions available to competing firms, and how
the competing firms will respond to each firm's action").
114. See Jensen, supra note 25, at 843-47.
115. Indeed, following the announcement of a significant mega-merger
appear articles speculating about the likely merger strategy of the remaining
mega-firms. See, e.g., How the Merger Will Affect Other Big Web and Media
Players, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2000, at B12 (speculating about strategies of
firms following announcement of the AOL-Time Warner merger).
116. See generally Alfred Rappaport, Calculating The Value-Creation
Potential of a Deal, 33 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 33 (July/August 1998) (stating
that "[tihe basic objective of making acquisitions is identical to any other
investment associated with a company's overall strategy, namely, to add
value").
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however, comes with its own internal set of problems and
concerns, chief of which (as mentioned above) is
consolidating the operations of two large firms. The
concerns, moreover, take on a different shape and
importance depending upon the business and industry in
question. In the high technology area, for example, which is
so dependent upon human capital and in which so many
recent mega-mergers have occurred, it is important to plan
and conduct a merger in such a way so as not to alienate
and thus lose the key creative employees of both firms." 7
Even in the best of times, it is difficult for a CEO to
propose a large "bet the company" kind of merger, with all
of the uncertainty and risks surrounding it. In current
circumstances, with the rapid technological changes and
actions and reactions from competitors, the difficulties,
uncertainties and pressures are enormously magnified.
This situation has led executives to enter into megamergers on the basis of the kind of decision-making biases"'
that, according to behavioral and psychological research,
are typical of human beings reacting in the face of
complexity and uncertainty."' People often make decisions
from little data, or from data that is exemplary, in the
foreground or available, but that is not statistically
117. See Saikat Chaudhuri & Behnam Tabrizi, Capturingthe Real Value in
High-Tech Acquisitions, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 128-30 (pointing
out how the key to success in acquisitions involving high technology companies
involves successfully integrating the employees of both firms). See generally
Towers Perrin, Mergers and Acquisitions Foster "Cool Hand Luke" Syndrome;
"What We Have Here Is Failure To Communicate", at www.towers.com/towers/
news/pr991020.html (Jan. 5, 2000) (management consulting firm reports that
lack of communication with employees is a central failure for companies
involved in mergers).
118. See, e.g., SIROWER, supra note 55, at 164.
119. Work discussing the influences of psychological and behavioral biases
on economic decision-making is voluminous and has spawned a branch of
behavioral law and economics. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS
Cass R. Sunnstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (reviewing data
calling into question rationality of economic actors); Cass R. Sunstein,
BehavioralLaw and Economics: A ProgressReport, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115
(1999) (discussing current state of research); Cass R. Sunstein, The Future of
Law and Economics: Looking Forward:BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U. CRH.
L. REV. 1175, 1182-84 (1997) (outlining psychological behavior that undermines
rationality); Symposium: The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human
Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1495-1788
(1998) (featuring representative legal scholarly work inspired by behavioral law
and economics).
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representative. 2 ' With respect to mega-mergers, for
example, this means that a chief executive proposes a
transaction on the basis of the apparent success of a past
merger (which might not be of the same order of
magnitude) or of a recent mega-merger of significant
competitors, without considering the difference between the
past and the proposed transactions or between the
competitors and one's own firm, and importantly without
focusing on the likely negative results from a large sample
of mega-mergers.
Related to this point is the evidence from behavioral
studies that people (particularly men) are prone to
excessive optimism and attached to points of view that they
have adopted and thus fail to consider realistically the
probability of the negative outcomes of their decisions and
the reasonableness of viewpoints or perspectives different
from their own.' 2 ' If anything, a CEO of an enormous firm,
at the pinnacle of an elaborate hierarchy and in possession
of so much power, is particularly prone to these common
decisional problems, which would be exacerbated when he
proposes a mega-merger.'22 For it takes a very optimistic
and/or behaviorally "blind" CEO to believe that his or her
120. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1499, 1504 (1998) ("People often find causal patterns and relationships in
matters that are the product of random chance. Statistical base rates are
ignored in favor of highly salient or available, but less predictive, information.");
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, COGNITION AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 9-10 (Univ. of
Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 85 (2d Series), Oct.
1999) (describing the "availability heuristic" pursuant to which "people tend to
think that events are more probable if they can recall an incident of its [sic]
occurrence") (footnote omitted).
121. See, e.g., HERSH M. SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 18-20 (2000); Jennifer
Arlen, Comment, The Future of BehavioralEconomic Analysis ofLaw, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1765, 1773 (1998); see also Terrance Odean, Volume, Volatility, Price,
and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average, 53 J. FIN. 1887 (1998)
(discussing empirical data on investor reactions based on overconfidence). It
may be somewhat unfair to focus on the unreasonable behavior of male CEOs.
Psychological evidence also shows that firstborns tend jealously to guard their
position and views and to brook no opposition. See FRANK J. SULLOWAY, BORN
To REBEL: BIrTH ORDER, FAMILY DYNAMICS, AND CREATIVE LIVES 79 (1996).
122. See, e.g., Eccles, supra note 88, at 144. "A lot of deals happen because
managers fall in love with the idea of the deal. Successful executives, after all,
are competitive people who hate to lose, and nothing brings out the competitive

juices like going after another company, particularly when one's rivals are in
hot pursuit." Id.
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merger could overcome the high probability that the
transaction will fail, and this kind of person, having
committed to a course of action, will become attached to the
strategy and ignore its real negative consequences (and
hostile to those mentioning them). Again, this perspective
on problems in executive decision-making is completely
compatible with, and indeed supported by, the classic view
of the dominant role of the CEO in large firms and studies
of his or her hubris and overconfidence."
The effects of competitor strategies on executive
decision-making must be understood in this behavioral
focus. It is well-established that, in the midst of
uncertainty, human beings are inclined to imitate
strategies that they perceive to be successful.124 The rapid
imitation of transactions in industries, which so
characterizes mega-mergers, is not so much the outcome of
an elaborate chess game of visionary business thinkers as it
is a sometimes desperate imitation of another's strategy by
a CEO, egged on by investment bankers eager to promote
transactions.'25 And this desire to imitate draws support
from yet other decision-making biases: the "alarmist" focus
upon the new risk posed by competitors' mega-merger" 6 and
the concern over the loss that it threatens to the present
123. See generally Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41
STAN. L. REV. 597, 623-28 (1989) (reviewing the literature).
124. See Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 94 (Fall
1989).
125. Cf P. Raghavendra Rau, Investment Bank Market Share, Contingent
Fee Payments, and the Performance of Acquiring Firms, 56 J. FIN. ECON. 293,
314-16 (May 2000) (finding, on the basis of data relating to mergers occurring
between 1980 and 1994, that more reputable investment banks (determined on
the basis of their market share), as opposed to lesser tier banks, do not produce
"superior" transactions that they advise on and that there is no relation
between long-term performance of a firm engaged in a merger and the continent
fee charged by an investment bank; rather, evidence suggests that the market
share of investment banks in this area is "positively related to their ability to
complete the deal"). Moreover, bankers add to the value-destruction of deals by
foregrounding data about comparable prices paid in similar transactions, which
may have little to do with the reasonableness of a particular acquisition
decision; see also Jayant R. Kale et al., On the Participationand Reputation of
FinancialAdvisors in CorporateAcquisitions, Social Science Resource Network,
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfin (Aug. 11, 1998) (finding that there is
no relation between bidder wealth effects and bidder advisor's reputation in
mergers, but that such relation exists in tender offers). Cf Rappaport &
Sirower, supranote 8, at 149.
126. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 120, at 15-17 (discussing "alarmist bias" and
the role of emotions in decision-making).
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market position of the executive's firm." ' Motivated by
competitors' actions, CEOs thus rush into transactions,

which in turn produce a cascade of additional deals until
the movement exhausts itself.
My point here is not to suggest that all decisions by
executives proposing a mega-merger are flawed because of
behavioral biases or that there is an available
comprehensive rationality that CEOs should employ when
considering a mega-merger. We are, after all, all creatures
of "bounded rationality," unable to detect, foresee and
comprehend all necessary factors in any given decision,'28
and our behavioral shortcuts are often adaptive
mechanisms that help us survive in the world. 9 The
message here is simply that CEOs of the large U.S. firms
are not free of the biases that we all share and may even be
more prone to them because of the complexity of megamerger decision-making in this period coupled with the
hubris that their position often leads to; the history of bad
executive decisions in mega-mergers suggests that this is
indeed the case. As do ordinary people, CEOs can resist,
overcome or at least minimize these biases in their megamerger decision-making if they become aware of the
existence of biases, and especially receive help from people
who critically evaluate the decision. But this leads us to
other reasons for the mega-mergers.
B. Failureof Boards and the FinancialCommunity to
Restrain CEOs in Mega-Mergers
1. Board Failure.Another reason for the mega-mergers
is that the CEOs' behavior is unchecked by the two groups
associated with a firm that should be most interested in
eliminating value-decreasing behavior: boards of directors
of companies involved in the mergers and investors
127. See id. at 13 (discussing "loss aversion").
128. See generally OLIVER E. WILL=AMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE
6 (1996) ("The cognitive and self-interestedness assumptions from which
transaction cost economics works are bounded rationality, defined as behavior
that is "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so" ([Herbert] Simon,
[Administrative Behavior] [2d ed.] 1961, p. xxiv, emphasis in original) ....").
129. See Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle
Hypothesis, in QuAsI-RATioNAL ECONOmiCS 91, 97 (1991) (describing habitual
rules that enable individuals to resist impulses, such as the impulse to consume
rather than to save).
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themselves. And the failure of these two groups to restrain
executives owes much to the same behavioral problems that
influence the managers, although with differences
associated with their respective positions in firms. The
board's usual inability to veto a mega-merger is particularly
troubling because the board is the foundation of the
intricate legal and normative support and regulation of
companies that characterize U.S. corporate governance."'
Board members of the enormous companies engaging in
the mega-mergers, who are themselves often executives of
similarly large companies or service providers (investment
bankers, lawyers) to these companies, suffer from many of
the same behavioral limitations as characterize CEOs: they,
too, can be very optimistic and are pressured to react
quickly in a highly competitive, rapidly changing
situation.' Yet another problem, not of their own creation,
enhances these limitations and thus hinders them from
fulfilling their role of dispassionate, critical evaluators of
130. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997) (characterizing the U.S. system of corporate
governance as one characterized by the rule of law); Raphael La Porta et al.,
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (contrasting the rule of law in
the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries with that in countries of the
German and French tradition); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (pointing out that strong legal
protection in countries, such as the United States, produces large capital
markets). Consensual or normative structure would add weight to the law. See
generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 338, 343-50 (1997). In the United States, examples of
non-legal efforts to address problems in corporate governance and financing
abound. See generally THE BusINEss ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (1997).
131. Indeed, a telling sign of this overoptimism is that decision-makers in
mergers believe that their mergers are successful, despite the existence of
objective evidence of value destruction resulting from these transactions. See,
e.g., KPMG, UNLOCKING SHAREHOLDER VALUE, supra note 95, at 7.
Organizations often suffer from problems in highlighting negative information
about themselves or their projects for the behavioral reasons noted above. See
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 133-48 (1997) (discussing the tendency to
construe facts in terms of one's initial views, overoptimism (despite indications
to the contrary), commitment to a decided-upon strategy despite its evident
failure, holding beliefs that magnify one's own position and importance). The
discussion below assumes that the board members are independent of
management and are thus "outside" directors. If they are management, i.e.,
"inside" directors, their views on and behavior regarding the mega-merger are
likely to reflect those of the CEO.
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CEOs' mega-merger proposals. Behavioral studies have
shown that the outcome of a decision is highly susceptible
to how choices are portrayed or "framed."32 It is a well
known that, in public corporations, CEOs and their
assistants, including outside counsel and investment
bankers, control the presentation and flow of information to
the board. 33 They can thus present a proposed mega-merger
in a way so as to avoid or undermine any board critical
evaluation of it. For example, an unremittingly positive
presentation of a mega-merger (with no mention of the
large body of negative evidence of the results of this kind of
transaction) influences board members to overlook the
potentially negative aspects of the transaction and adds to
the "cascade" of information supporting it." Similarly,
when executives present a mega-merger as necessary to
avert a loss of a competitive position or to respond to
another mega-merger threatening such loss, they tap into
the "loss35 aversion" that so motivates human decisionmaking.
It is also difficult for boards to take a critical position
regarding CEO mega-merger proposals because these
projects do not trigger established concerns on management
oversight that, on account of legal developments and
custom, board members are trained to look for. The purpose
of the board is to address the U.S. form of the "classical"
agency problem:'36 to ensure that executives do not operate
companies for their own interests at shareholders' expense,
as well as to deal with perennial problems of executive
132. See Langevoort, supranote 120, at 1504.
133. Indeed, it is well-accepted in corporate law that directors are legally
entitled to rely upon information provided to them by corporate officers. See

generally 1

AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOAMIENDATIONS 188-96 (1994).

134. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 120, at 12-13 (discussing the importance of
foregrounding information in the results of decisions). Moreover, once the board
decides upon a merger, the firms' publicity departments swing into action with
unremitting positive presentations of the transaction; Cf 'Cool Hand Luke'
Syndrome, supra note 117, at 3 (referring to the 'rah-rah' role" of firms' formal
communication media, which is not even credible to firms' employees). On the
"cascade" effect (i.e., positive views producing more positive views, or negative
views more negative views), see CASS R. SUNSTEm, THE LAW OF GROUP
POLARIZATION 7-9 (Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working
Paper No. 91 (2d series), Dec. 7, 1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, GROUP
POLARIZATION].
135. See SUNSTEIN, supranote 120, at 13.

136. See supranote 106.
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financial fraud.' In proposing the mega-mergers, CEOs are
not displaying obvious signs of management self-interested
behavior and advocating a course of action that would
suggest an entrenchment motive. That is, the mega-merger
strategies do not resemble the empire building of the 1970s
or indicate the opportunism found when management alters
financial results or pushes for excessive compensation
packages. Rather, the mega-merger is presented and
justified as necessary to maintain shareholder value in a
highly competitive environment, where like companies are
engaging in similar transactions. More importantly, the
executive who proposes the mega-merger is usually a CEO
who has delivered shareholder value, has a good track
record on previous mergers and acquisitions and has
increased firm size through mergers and who thus has
considerable credibility with the board. 3 '
In sum, when other boards are approving mega-mergers
amid a rapidly changing industry or industries and amid
often hysterical celebration from the business media
concerning the transactions, it is difficult for board
members to resist these trends and the weight of opinion.
In this situation of uncertainty and celebration, a board
member's understandable inclination is to defer to a
successful CEO rather than to resist a merger that is
presented as potentially "making or breaking" the company,
particularly since he or she generally has less familiarity
with the firm's business than do the executives. Board
members invariably accede to the CEO's request that a
mega-merger proceed and often approve them in a short
time (although after the requisite meetings and following
the appropriate procedures to satisfy the requirements of
the legal duty of care).
137. See supra note 71 (discussing improvements to board audit committees
to prevent significant, often fraudulent, accounting practices in companies
generally arising from management's inclination to meet earnings expectations
at all costs).
138. See, e.g., supra note 98. Evidence suggests that, if board members
disagree with a CEO's strategy, they are likely either to go along with it or to
resign from the board-not to oppose it. See William 0. Brown & Michael T.
Maloney, Exit, Voice, and the Role of Corporate Directors: Evidence From
Acquisition Performance, 4-5, 20-21, Social Science Research Network, at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfin (Aug. 25, 1999) (referring to the
literature supporting this proposition and finding that their empirical evidence
dealing with board member behavior in firms making acquisitions supports this
point).
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2. Failures of Investors and the General Financial
Community. In a market system, like our own, the
conclusion that managers and board members are
proposing and approving value-decreasing mega-mergers,
while disturbing, should not be greeted with concern. In
highly competitive industries, where competition is
increasingly global, the "market" in all its complexity
should eventually identify and punish CEOs, boards and
firms that engage in value-decreasing mega-mergers. From
a product market perspective, any combination that does
not make business sense will place the new mega-firm at a
competitive disadvantage as more nimble competitors
outflank it to gain market share at its expense; from a
capital market viewpoint, the firm must pay a higher
return to obtain capital as investors penalize its managers
and board for having made a bad decision.'39 In a world of
"second-best" and multiple solutions to economic and
business problems, which is the one we inhabit, 4 ' market
competition, together with the existing normative and legal
structures that have been developed to support it and
correct its obvious failings, will ultimately address the
abuses of the mega-mergers most efficiently (i.e., with the
least cost) in our circumstances, although it may not do so
immediately. Just as institutional investors, financial
professionals and others who make up the financial
community eventually corrected the excesses of the
conglomerate mergers in the 1970s and 1980s, they will
eventually turn their attention to, and remedy the abuses
of, the mega-mergers.
It is not, however, a satisfactory answer to the problems
of the mega-mergers to observe that, as in the case of
conglomerate mergers, it is best to wait another "break-up"
or "spin-off' movement that will take care of these
139. See Jensen, supra note 25, at 850-52.
140. See Roe, Backlash, supra note 86, at 239-41 (arguing that what appear
to be economic inefficiencies may be an effort to prevent political turmoil and
suggesting that different country situations call for different, second-best
economic and business compromises); see also Mark Roe, PoliticalPreconditions
to Separating Ownership from Control: The Incompatibility of the American
Public Firm with Social Democracy, Social Science Research Network, at
(Aug. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Roe,
http:lpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cftn
Political Preconditions] (arguing that, for political reasons, most Continental
countries could not have a U.S.-style capitalism and corporate ownership
structure).
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transactions. This argument has the important force of the
status quo,'4 ' but also its negative consequences, for it is a
thinly veiled apologetics for the numerous parties-the
CEOs, the board members, the investment bankers and
financial professionals, the M&A lawyers and their
advocates in the legal academy-who benefit from present
circumstances." Even market proponents, moreover, point
out that its strongest component, the discipline of the
product market, often arrives late and is ill-adjusted to
dealing with problem firms without engendering a
considerable amount of waste and destruction.' And if, as
the evidence clearly shows, so many mergers decrease value
either immediately or over time, sometimes disastrously,
the market can hardly be said to have produced an optimal
mechanism to police mergers.
The lack of adequate disciplining of those proposing and
approving the mega-mergers by the most immediate of
market solutions, the capital market, owes much to the
cognitive biases previously discussed. Because investors
and the numerous financial professionals who guide them
and/or manage their funds-all of whom make up the
capital market-appreciate the difficulty of strategic
decision-making in economic circumstances characterized
by rapid technological change and uncertainty, they, too,
are inclined not to judge too harshly the CEOs and boards
who must make the strategic decisions. Yet the heightened
uncertainty has caused these investors and professionals to
exhibit the psychological and behavioral problems that
undermine their own rational evaluation of the megamergers. In recent years, a growing body of evidence, which
financial economists use to explain the persistence of
irrational market behavior, shows that even sophisticated
investors exhibit cognitive biases, such as overoptimism,
141. The status quo argument would be as follows: if a situation, such as the
present U.S. approach to mergers, has endured, there is a presumption that it
may be the best available solution in our circumstances. In a political and
cultural situation where strong financial institutional monitors of management
never developed, it is no surprise that managers may periodically build
inefficient empires through mergers (only to be just as periodically disciplined).
See generally ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supranote 106, at 28-42.
142. See infra note 170. The very dynamic of capitalism, which involves a
creative entrepreneurialism, and thus change, should make one careful about
status quo arguments. Cf FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIuALIsM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER 92-106 (1948).
143. See Jensen, supranote 25, at 854.
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failure to accept statistical probabilities, inability easily to
move away from a given investment strategy and imitation
of competitor strategies (to name just a few).' It is not
surprising, therefore, that investors and financial
professionals do not provide any brake on mega-mergers,
because these transactions appeal (and are even designed to
appeal) to many of the cognitive biases that afflict them.'45
In a situation of industrial uncertainty, firms engaged in
the mega-mergers announce the transactions with great
fanfare and optimism, which create a momentum and
approval cascade among investors, particularly among the
retail investors who are increasingly entering the securities
markets through online trading and have little
understanding of business combinations,'46 who may believe
the often told tale of merger synergies and who add to the
momentum by bidding up the stock prices of the acquirer.'
It is important to emphasize that this process does not
necessarily involve duplicity: CEOs and board members are
not "manipulating" the financial community but only trying
144. The literature on market irrationality is truly voluminous. See
generally SHEFRIN, supra note 121, at 1-12 (discussing origins of behavioral
finance); ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY 7-48 (1989); see also Kent

Daniel et al., Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and
Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839, 1839-44 (1998); Terrance Odean, Are Investors
Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, 53 J. FIN. 1775, 1776-78 (1998); Richard H.
Thaler & Hersh M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, in QuASIRATIONAL ECONOIcs 77, 79 (1991).
145. Of course, financial professionals, like investment bankers who are
often their colleagues, may have an interest in promoting transactions for no
other reason than because it increases their own business.
146. See Fanto, supra note 27, at 121.
147. On investor hysteria, see CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS
AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (3d ed. 1996). Although securities

markets appear to be informationally efficient, particularly regarding historical
and current public information about companies, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 1, at 323-36, the market of course consists of its participants. If these
participants have no memory of past problems with mergers, or decline to
unearth information that would point to these problems, it is questionable
whether, either in the short or long term, the market is operating efficiently in
its evaluation of present mergers. Under the most extreme version of this
argument, experienced investors leave the market or transfer their money to an
index fund. See BURTON G. MALEIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 421-

32 (1996). New investors, unfamiliar with the problems, provide capital for a
new wave of problematic mergers because of their having been harmed by these
transactions in the past. Cf Lynn Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?
Disagreement,Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611,
666 (1995) (discussing how new investors have no "market memory").

298

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

to bring investors and financial professionals within their
optimistic vision of the transaction, and, for the most part,
they have succeeded.
In effect, the situation is even more complicated.
Caught up in the exuberance of an ever-rising stock
market, impatient investors and their financial advisors are
putting pressure on CEOs and boards to produce constantly
improving financial results, which justify a higher stock
price. A momentary stumble of a firm or even an
announcement of less than stellar financial results or a
perception of a lack of a bold strategy (a situation made
worse by the announcement of a mega-merger by a
competitor) means that investors, including the "activist"
investors beloved by corporate law scholars, support the
immediate replacement of the management team and board
members. 48 Investors thus expect CEOs to come up with
ambitious growth strategies, with the mega-merger being a
necessarily move; it is not too strong an expression to say
that investors have become addicted to these transactions.
It is no wonder that the CEOs who rise and succeed in
these circumstances are those who exhibit similar
unbounded optimism and who can satisfy this investor
appetite for bold schemes.149
C. Media and PoliticalReasons for the Celebrationof MegaMergers
CEOs and board members can be made more cautious
in their mega-merger decisions when they feel that the
business media is critically scrutinizing their decisions,
which scrutiny, in turn, may inspire government officials
and politicians to turn their attention to, and even to hinder
or prohibit, the transactions. Yet, with rare exceptions, this
critical scrutiny has not occurred regarding mega-mergers.
Rather, the media has celebrated the transactions and
lionized the CEOs proposing them and, if anything, has
contributed to investor exuberance for this merger wave.
The lack of critical press scrutiny first owes much to
148. Again, the examples here are legion. Indeed, the rapid demise of John
McCoy, CEO of Bank One, could be seen either to exemplify market discipline of
a "serial acquirer" and market impatience once such a person fails to deliver on
expectations. See supranote 73.
149. See, e.g., A Theory of the Case, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2000, at 24
(discussing "unshakeable conviction and iron nerve" of AOL CEO Steve Case).
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politics in the media itself, both in a broad and narrow
sense. That this is the case is clear when the present press
treatment of the mega-mergers is contrasted with the
widespread media condemnation of the "bust-up" mergers of
the 1980s. In a well-known, but largely inaccurate, tale, the
1980s were characterized as the "decade of greed," with
unscrupulous and immoral financiers destroying corporate
America as they engaged in highly-leveraged acquisitions of
conglomerates effected through tender offers followed by
mergers and as they then broke up the companies.' The
press largely condemned those mergers as symptomatic of
and favored by a "laissez-faire"Republican administration
given to the ostentatious displays of wealth of its highincome and high-net worth supporters. 1' The media
political message was that the Republican Party
championed a capitalism destructive of U.S. industry and
society. Galvanized by, and making political use of, a
popular opinion stirred up by the media, politicians and
government officials did their best to put an end to this
corporate restructuring, whether by passing corporate laws
facilitating management resistance to tender offers,5 2
aggressively pursuing financial promoters of these
transactions for securities law violations,'53 or generally
making the transactions more costly.'54
The current media treatment of the mega-mergers,
which has been generally adulatory rather than critical, is
partly due to the media's reluctance to undermine a
Democratic administration (the administration of William
Jefferson Clinton), indeed the first such administration
150. See, e.g., CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL: THE JUNK BOND
RAIDERS AND THE MAN WHO STAKED THEM (1988); see also TOM WOLFE, THE

BONFIRE OF THE VANmEs (1988) (for a fictional account of the years). The
leveraged buyout of the 1980s was simply a variation on an earlier practice
whereby most of the equity in a firm was bought out (for a premium) and put in
the hands of a few financial buyers and management with the goal of improving
the return on the firm's assets. See BAKER & SMITH, supranote 51, at 50-58. The
1980s' variation was simply to apply the technique to large firms.
151. See FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 4.
152. See generally Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE:
WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
321, 330-53 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993) (discussing the influence of politics in
corporate governance).
153. See FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 128-89.
154. See BRUDNEY & BRATrON, supra note 37, at 676 (describing changes in
tax laws that made leveraged acquisitions more costly).
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after twelve years of Republican executive rule.'55 With few
exceptions, the media has thus not condemned the excesses
in the mega-mergers that have so dominated business and
finance, because, from a simple political perspective, these
excesses are not supposed to occur during this kind of
administration.'56 In today's circumstances, the media
presents much of business and finance, including the megamergers, as background phenomena that contribute to the
good economic times benefitting most people (which further
redounds to the stewardship of the most recent
Administration), rather than as leading to social dislocation
and wealth disparities and thus becoming targets of harsh
press and then political criticism.
Naturally, the explanation is more complex than a
general
media
preference
for
a
Democratic
administration. 7 The hostility to the 1980s' LBOs owed
much to a longstanding U.S. populism that manifests itself
in a fear of and opposition to financiers and concentrated
financial power and that surfaces in and out of both
established political parties.' Managers of "Main Street"
businesses, the target of the leveraged buyout financiers
and in alliance with politicians of all stripes and parties,
tapped this populism, which the media fanned, to resist the
aggression of financial buyers.5 9 The mega-mergers have
raised-so far' 60 -no obvious populist issue, because, as
155. On the general permissive, progressive orientation of the media, see
references in GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, TWO CULTURES 119 (1999).
156. The Democratic Party, at least that of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, is understood not to be under the control of business people and
financiers. See, e.g., ROBERTA S. KARIEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMSSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 23 (1982). "I
considered myself a liberal Democrat. Accordingly, I was anti-business, prolabor and in favor of government intervention in the economy, if not outright
nationalization of essential industries for the public good." Id.
157. One nuance is the following: as this Article has shown, there are media
stories critical of mergers. They are simply not as numerous, nor do they receive
the kind of display, as do the reports extolling the mergers.
158. See ROE, supranote 106, at 28-29.
159. See id. at 151-68.
160. An interesting question is whether mega-mergers can continue to
remain free of populist animus in light of their growing size. Indeed, recent
actions by AOL and Time Warner suggest that they are not only attempting to
defuse antitrust scrutiny regarding their merger, but also any populist attack
on their control of media. See Kathy Chen & Nick Wingfield, Time Warner,AOL
Vow to Give Rivals Access, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2000, at B8 (describing
appearance of company executives before the Senate Judiciary Committee
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commentators point out, they often involve strategic
transactions designed and executed by the "Main Street"
businesses themselves, not Wall Street financiers and their
legal assistants.'61 Big business, moreover, has not received
a "free ride" during this Administration. Populist suspicion
has traditionally focused on a U.S. business perceived as
growing too large and on foreign businesses acquiring
excessive control of U.S. firms." The government's initially
successful antitrust suit against Microsoft, as well as the
media "demonization" of that company, "6
and the
intermittently expressed concern about foreign acquisitions
of U.S. firms and globalization in general, which violently
surfaced in Seattle, reveal a populist based-hostility to
business that the media echoes and that animates
politicians and government officials of both mainstream
political parties.
The explanation for the media portrayal of the megamergers is even more complicated than this rough macropolitical and populist account. Wall Street professionals
actively participate, and may even stimulate, many
transactions, as investment bankers push CEOs to respond
to mega-mergers with similar mergers." Yet, for several
reasons, Wall Street is no longer a simple Democratic and
populist target. First, Wall Street and the financial world it
symbolizes are simply not the bastion of Republicans hostile
to Democratic administrations that typified the New Deal
period.'65 Rather, close links have been forged between Wall
vowing to open their media delivery services to rival content providers).
161. See How to Make Mergers Work, supra note 10, at 15 (observing that
current mergers may have better chances of success than former ones because
of their industrial logic).
162. See ROE, supra note 106, at 28.
163. See John R. Wilke & Keith Perine, U.S. Says Microsoft Had 'Enemies
List' of Rivals, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1999, at A3 (discussing Microsoft's
"enemies list" of small software makers and Bill Gates's role in it); see also
United States v. Microsoft, No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2000) (finding Microsoft
to have violated the federal antitrust laws).
164. See, e.g., Steve Lipin & Nikhil Deogun, Anything Goes! After AOL Time
Warner, Who's Next?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2000, at C1 (reacting to the
announcement of the AOL Time Warner merger, Gary Kominsky, a managing
director at money manager Neuberger Berman, states "It's like Christmas
again for the investment bankers").
165. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE
FINANCE 19-38 (1982) (discussing politics around the time of advent of federal

securities laws).
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Street and Democratic elites, particularly in the recent
Administration, and even the most partisan of Democratic
politicians and government officials move easily between
these worlds, as do Republican and politically independent
elites.'66 Second, investing has become so much a part of
ordinary life for a majority of Americans that it is not seen
or felt as being the province of some well-to-do, generally
Republican, up~per middle class (which, in any event, no
longer exists). For pure business survival reasons, the
media must respond to the popular investor interest in the
mega-mergers and it no doubt fears the bottom-line result
of simply condemning the transactions (i.e., people will turn
to competitors for financial news). Third and significantly,
it should be remembered that much of the media originates
from the very media and entertainment companies that are
involved in some of the largest mega-mergers and that
receive much advertising from securities professionals.'68
These facts not only raise questions about media
independence and objectivity regarding the transactions,
but also explain why the media coverage of them, with the
tales of mega-merger personalities and intrigues, have
become increasingly indistinguishable from entertainment
itself.
What is particularly ironic about this media treatment
of mega-mergers is that the media ignores the same
excesses that it and politicians condemned so vigorously in
the 1980s. Recent years have seen growing wealth
disparities in the United States, starker than those in the
1980s, that the mergers have helped foster, as mega-firms
justify larger executive compensation packages.'69 The huge
166. See Steven Lipin, Deals & Deal Makers: LazardNames Vernon Jordan
As Rainmaker, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1999, at C24 (discussing appointment of
President Clinton's notorious confidant, Vernon Jordan, as a managing director
of investment bank, Lazard Freres). This movement between the recent
administration and investment banks has taken a humorous turn. See, e.g.,
Michael Lewis, The Artist in Gray FlannelPajamas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000,
Sec. 6, at 45 (referring to rumor that President Clinton will become an
investment banker upon leaving office).
167. See Fanto, supranote 27, at 112-26 (describing growth of attraction for
Wall Street by ordinary Americans).
168. See Marcia Vickers & Gary Weiss, Wall Street's Hype Machine, BUS.
WK., Apr. 3, 2000, at 113 (describing media and brokerage industry connections
encouraging ordinary people to trade securities).
169. See, e.g., John Hechinger, BankBoston's CEO Got Safeguards In Fleet
Buyout, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1999, at A13 (describing lucrative severance
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wealth gains have not been restricted to CEOs, for the
mega-mergers have created a bonanza for financial services
professionals (again, a group so condemned during the
1980s)-Wall Street bankers and lawyers, consultants and
accountants-whose profits dwarf those made during the
earlier period.' Accompanying many of the combinations
are massive layoffs and the social dislocations that occur
when an enormous company must cut costs on a titanic
scale and move its headquarters and operations out of a
community.'' Indeed, the very size of the companies
involved in these transactions magnifies the social effects.
My point here is not that the media must criticize the
mega-mergers and stir up a populist animus against them
(which would spur political action), for, as in the past,
populism and populist politicians could well condemn
economically sensible transactions with the bad. Nor is the
point to highlight the hypocrisy of the media, which stirs up
package offered to a target firm's CEO); Debra Sparks, The Mother ofAll Stock
Option Plans, BUS. WFK, Nov. 23, 1998, at 158 (describing stock option plans for
executives of Conseco, a company formed by serial acquisitions); Reingold,
supranote 15, at 41; see also supra note 14 (discussing executive compensation).
See generally Ajay Khorana & Marc Zenner, Executive compensation of large
acquirors in the 1980s, 4 J. CORP. FIN. 209, 233 (1998) ("This result has two
important implications: (i) for acquirors, there is an ex ante managerial
expectation that a larger firm size will result in correspondingly larger
managerial remuneration, and (ii) the relative size/compensation sensitivity of
an executive compensation contract can be an important determinant in a firm's
decision to undertake a large acquisition."). On general income and net worth
disparities, see Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family
Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, 86 FED. RES.
BULL. 1, 6 (2000), stating that from 1995-98, the "median net worth rose most
markedly for families headed by someone with at least some college education,
while it fell for families headed by those with less than a high school diploma;
indeed, for the latter group, the median has fallen over the period of the four
surveys."
170. See Thompson Financial Securities Data, supra note 2, at 4-5
(discussing involvement of financial advisors and securities law firms in 1998
mergers); Thomson Financial Securities Data, supra note 2, at 5 (same for 1999
deals); Cf Rau, supra note 125, at 6-7 (describing investment banking fee
structure in mergers and tender offers).
171. See generally Joan Harrison, M&A Is a Key Source Of Corporate
Layoffs, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 7 (observing that mergers
and acquisitions account for at least 10% of the job losses, and probably more
since layoffs often occur gradually after mergers); KPMG, UNLOCKING
SHAREHOLDER VALUE, supra note 95, at 12 (observing that, of the survey's
sample, "headcount reduction is the area where most companies have achieved
benefits [in terms of merger synergies]"); see also supra note 15 (exploring
negative situations resulting from mergers).
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anti-business sentiment at politically convenient times.
Rather, it is simply that, for politically and socially complex
reasons, the press and the politicians who are motivated by
it have not placed upon CEOs and particularly board
members what can at times be a salutary pressure to justify
to themselves and to the public the increasingly enormous
mega-mergers, but have encouraged and celebrated the
transactions, making the "cascade" of favorable information
about them complete.'72 When this media treatment is
coupled with the complexity of the industrial situation
facing most firms, the behavioral biases that executives,
directors, finance professionals and investors are prone to,
it is no surprise that there has been little to check the value
destruction produced by the mega-mergers.
IV. THE FAILURE OF LAW TO CONSTRAIN MEGA-MERGERS

A. The Law Governing ConsensualMergers
Law has done little to brake the momentum of the
mega-mergers promoted by CEOs, accepted by boards, and
embraced and encouraged by investors and the press. This
outcome is not surprising, because corporate and securities
laws provide a very limited process for outsider (that is,
court or agency) review and criticism of a friendly merger,
no matter how great its size. Two assumptions generally
support this result. The first assumption is related to the
standard deference courts give to business decisions: as
articulated in the well-known case Dodge v. Ford Motors,
'judges are not business experts. " " Judges are in a much
worse position than executives and board members to
decide upon and review any merger. Related to the first is
the assumption that the "invisible hand" of the market is
the most economical means of evaluating mergers and
punishing those who make poor merger decisions." In more
172. There are occasional voices in the wilderness. See, e.g., Jeffrey E.
Garten, MegamergersAre A Clear and PresentDanger,BUS. WK., Jan. 25, 1999,
at 28 (expressing concern that, as a result of mergers, private power is growing
too big in this country while government is shrinking); see also Jaret Selberg,
Anti-M&A Initiatives Grow in D.C., THE DAILY DEAL, at www.thedailydeal.com/
topstories/A20411-2000Apr3.html (Apr. 3, 2000) (discussing the hostility of
various politicians to large mergers).
173. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 508 (1919).
174. See, e.g., COx, supra note 34, at 607 ("When the parties are dealing at
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prosaic terms, but significant for doctrinal purposes, the
law limits court intervention in mergers because the
market judgment operates through the vote of each
combining firm's owners (the shareholders) to approve or
disapprove the merger.
Although the law declines to intervene in the substance
of the merger decision, as every student of corporate law
knows it surrounds the merger decision process with
considerable formality and procedural safeguards, which
emphasizes the importance of this transaction for the
firm. 5 The rationale is that, if the process is adequate, then
the best board and shareholder decision under the
circumstances has been made. Corporate law establishes
that each board of directors of a constituent firm must
agree upon the terms of the transaction with the other
board and recommend the merger to their shareholders for
approval.' In most cases (and in nearly all mega-mergers),
shareholders of each firm must approve the merger,
generally by a majority vote of outstanding shares. 7 Once
shareholders have made the merger decision, certain
formalities ensure that the corporate existence of one firm
ends and the other survives as the combined entity (or, in
some cases, both firms disappear into a new firm).'78

arm's length, there is little justification for judicial scrutiny, any more than for
the business decisions of the board of directors or officers generally. This is not
to suggest that mistakes, errors in judgment, or bad results do not flow from
acquisitions; they most certainly do. The law's caution here [is] that capitalism
works best when it is Adam Smith's invisible hand, not causes of action, that is
the preeminent force in placing resources to their highest use.").
175. The law governing the affairs of a corporation is the law of the State in
which it is incorporated. See Cox, supra note 34, at 45. Accordingly, corporate
law on mergers involves the law of the fifty States. As mentioned above, for
purposes of this Article, I concentrate on the General Corporation Law of
Delaware (the State with the largest number of public corporations), the law
governing nearly all of the mega-mergers.
176. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1999); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 11.01(a) (1998) [hereinafter MODEL ACT].
177. The special shareholder voting requirement is that some absolute
number of votes (generally a majority) of all outstanding shares must be cast in
favor of the merger (not a majority of a quorum). See, e.g., DEL. CODE § 251(c);
MODEL ACT § 11.03(e). In some States, the statutory minimum number of
shareholder votes is higher than a majority, see Cox, supra note 34, at 586
(citing jurisdictions with a higher than majority vote required), and a
corporation may always require a supermajority vote (as stipulated in its
certificate of incorporation).
178. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c).
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Depending upon the jurisdiction, there may be a statutory
right of exit for shareholders of the disappearing firm who
oppose the transaction and wish to be "cashed out" of their
shares prior to the combination
(this is the appraisal or
179
"dissenters' "remedy).
Corporate law, moreover, strengthens the decisionmaking of the board by imposing fiduciary duties upon the
directors.' A director has duties to supervise the affairs of
the corporation, on behalf of the corporation and its
shareholders, as an ordinarily prudent person would in like
circumstances and not to allow his or her own interests to
interfere with those of the corporation and its owners. 8 ' The
duty of supervision, known as the duty of care, is more
relevant than a duty to avoid conflicts of interest (the duty
of loyalty) in a mega-merger where two unrelated firms are
combining. In essence, the duty of care dictates that
directors must inform themselves about the merger and
make a rational business decision that, if they recommend
it, the transaction benefits the corporation and its
shareholders.'82 If a court finds that they have adequately
conducted the process of merger decision-making, it will
defer to their business decision-that is, accord them the
deference of the "business judgment rule"-on the
transaction.'83 A further jurisprudential development based
on this duty of care is a "duty of disclosure," which
generally arises when a board requests a shareholder vote
on an issue, as in a merger.'84 This latter duty requires that
179. See, e.g., id., § 262(a); MODEL ACT § 13.02(a)(1). For recent writings on
this remedy, see Peter V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39
B.C.L. REV. 1121 (1998), for a proposal offering a theory to explain the use of
appraisal, and Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders'AppraisalRemedy and
How Courts Determine FairValue, 47 DUKE L.J. 613 (1998), for an argument
supporting a reformation and extension of the appraisal remedy.
180. Fiduciary duty does not literally apply to a company's disclosure under
the federal securities laws. Yet, as explained below, since it governs the
behavior of board members in all actions affecting the corporation and since
they must approve such disclosure, it indirectly affects their obligations under
the federal securities laws.
181. See 1 BLOCK, supra note 22, at 1.
182. See, e.g., GILSON & BLACK, supra note 52, at 1024-25; see also
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 133, at 389-98 (discussing
the board of directors' role in control transactions).
183. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 133, at 139,
172-85.
184. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d. 5, 14 (Del. 1998).
The duty of disclosure is, and always has been, a special application of
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directors provide shareholders with the requisite "material"
information so that185the latter can competently make their
important decision.
As is typical of their overall relationship with corporate
law, federal securities laws support the corporate law
emphasis upon adequate decision-making in mergers, at
least for those transactions involving "public" companies
that fall within the jurisdiction of these laws (which include
firms involved in mega-mergers).'86 Federal proxy rules
dictate the procedures that public companies must follow in
soliciting shareholder votes in a merger and the
information that they must provide to shareholders. Under
these rules, shareholders receive considerable disclosure
about the transaction, the parties involved, the reasons for,
it, its risks and the merger consideration, as well as have
time to evaluate the information and to decide whether to
cast their vote in support of the merger.'87 If, as in the
mega-mergers, the merger consideration consists of
securities, the firm offering the securities must register
them under the Securities Act of 1933, a process that
provides shareholders with information on that firm's
business, management and financial results, as stipulated
on the Form S-4 used to register securities offerings in
business combinations. 8
the general fiduciary duty owed by directors. The duty of disclosure
obligates directors to provide the stockholders with accurate and
complete information material to a transaction or other corporate event
that is being presented to them for action.
Id. See generally 1 BLOCK, supranote 22, at 499-508.
185. See Malone, 722 A.2d. at 9-11.
186. Companies that have securities registered on a national securities
exchange (or traded on a national securities association), that have done a
public offering or that have a class of equity securities held by 500 or more
holders and have more than ten million dollars in total assets must register
their securities under the Securities Act of 1934 and are subject to the
jurisdiction of this Act. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(a)-(g), 78o(d) (West Supp. 2000).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to 14b-2 (1999).
188. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (requiring that securities offered in a merger be
registered under the Securities Act of 1933). There is a special form that an
issuer must follow in registering its securities in a business combination. See id.
§ 239.25 (requiring, among other things, detailed information on risk factors,
terms of the transaction, pro forma financial information of the "combined"
company). Companies involved in a strategic merger often file a 'joint proxy
statement/prospectus" that both registers the securities offered to the "target"
company and follows the mandated procedure for seeking a vote from
shareholders. See id.
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Again, it must be emphasized that shareholders of
companies involved in mega-mergers receive almost no
direct substantive protection and rights, apart from the
right to vote. 8 9 If the mega-merger is undertaken under
Delaware law, shareholders of both merger partners have
no statutory appraisal right, given that publicly-traded
stock is the merger consideration. 9 ' As for their process
rights, there is no debate in the proxy statements or other
disclosure documents on the merits of the proposed merger,
for executives of the companies involved and their counsel
prepare them. While the disclosure documents must
present the shareholders with considerable information
about the combination, including the risks associated with
it, in accordance with SEC guidelines and often as a result
of specific comments on disclosure documents by the SEC
staff, the disclosure is geared to protect the companies
against future (or ongoing) shareholder lawsuits, not to
stimulate among shareholders a debate on the merits of the
merger.' 9' Recent changes in SEC rules governing business
combinations, moreover, allow combining firms in stock-forstock transactions greater freedom to promote, and thus to
increase the momentum for, the transaction outside the
mandated disclosure documents and to complete it more
quickly than in the past. 92 The only legally mandated
"debate" about a merger occurs if a third party seeks to
189. A corporation conducting an acquisition can avoid the requirement of
shareholder approval of a merger by conducting the transaction through a
special acquisition subsidiary established for this purpose (the well-known
"triangular" merger structure). See supra note 52; see also Cox, supra note 34,
at 590. In the triangular merger, an acquiring corporation may have to seek
shareholder approval if the number of shares needed for the acquisition exceeds
the number authorized in the certificate of incorporation (thus requiring an
amendment to this certificate and a shareholder vote) and/or if the corporation
is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and issues a number of shares
amounting to 20% of the corporation's equity capital. See NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANuAL § 312.03(c) (1999). Most mega-mergers need the approval of
the shareholders of the acquiring company.
190. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1999); Wertheimer, supra note 179,
at 620, 632-35.
191. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (providing that a company must provide a
discussion of the most significant factors that make the offering speculative or

risky).
192. See generally Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder
Communications, Securities Act Release No. 7760, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,408 (Nov. 10,
1999) (final release); Securities Act Release No. 7607, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,331 (Nov.
3, 1998) (proposing release). See also infra notes 335-37.
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break up the transaction and files its own disclosure
documents, which generate a required response from the
combining companies.193
Even the process protection to shareholders in the
mega-mergers derived from fiduciary duties imposed upon
board members should not be exaggerated. The plain fact is
that a court rarely finds fault with a board's decision to
enter into a friendly mega-merger conducted in stock-forstock form. 9 ' Admittedly, the boards' duties are situational:
the behavior that the duties demand of a director varies in
accordance with the context.'95 From the fiduciary duty
perspective, directors of enormous public companies should
have considerably more responsibility when deciding upon a
mega-merger, particularly if the directors themselves have
business experience.'96 Yet the fiduciary standards of
conduct, combined with the "business judgment" court
deference, are not onerous. Provided that there is no
controlling shareholder nor any director interested in the
transaction (which is generally the case in the recent megamergers), court evaluation of the decision is focused upon
process, although courts tend to give additional deference to
boards composed primarily of "outside" directors."' In
193. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-9, 240.14e-2.
194. The well-known case, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985),
where board members were held liable for a violation of their duty of care in
approving a merger decision, is not to the contrary, insofar as it involved a
situation in which a company agreed to be the target of a cash-out merger, there
were suggestions of self-interest and the board had not adequately sought
"outside" advice concerning the merger. See generally GILSON & BLACK, supra
note 52, at 1054-57. It should be added that the consequences of the violation of
the duty of care are not significant, because the law generally allows
corporations to exempt directors from liability for good faith violations of the
duty of care. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); see also GILSON &
BLACK, supra note 52, at 1057 (observing that forty-one states have such
protection in their corporate statutes). Board members also receive protection
through indemnification and directors' and officers' insurance for such
violations. See generally Cox, supra note 34, at 449-55. The failure of directors
to comply with their fiduciary duty of care does not make the merger invalid, for
such a duty arises not from the statutory law, but from equity. See Arnold v.
Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 537 (Del. 1996).
195. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821 (N.J. 1981)
("[D]irectors must discharge their duties in good faith and act as ordinarily
prudent persons would under similar circumstances in like positions.").
196. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 133, at 178-79.
197. Courts ask whether directors adequately informed themselves before
agreeing upon a transaction and whether the decision can be seen as rational.
See id. at 177-81.
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arriving at their decision, moreover, the board is expected,
and legally encouraged, to rely upon "experts," such as
investment bankers and outside counsel, and even
executives-that is, the very parties who are advocating the
transaction, for courts do not impose upon the board the
duty of independently seeking information.198 At most,
courts impose a slightly higher process burden on the target
firm in an acquisition, but this remark properly leads to the
discussion in the next section.
B. Impact of Hostile Takeover Law on the Law of MegaMergers
The deferential business judgment approach to
mergers, which applies to the mega-mergers, places no
brake on the momentum of these transactions. Corporate
law also gives substantial legal encouragement to this kind
of transaction and thus adds to the momentum of the
current merger wave. This jurisprudential outcome
occurred, somewhat unintentionally, as a result of the
judicial reaction to the hostile takeover. In the 1980s, the
courts (primarily the Delaware state courts) had to address
standards governing board behavior in a hostile takeover.
As a by-product of their decisions regarding hostile
takeovers, courts implicitly, and in some cases explicitly,
approved the strategic merger of equals, conducted as
stock-for-stock transactions, which had none of the
transaction attributes or Wall Street personalities that the
courts often found distasteful and which became the model
for the mega-merger of the 1990s.'99 The clear message from
the courts was that these mergers, rather than the "bustup" LBOs, would receive favorable judicial review.0 0 This
198. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2000); see also Ash v. McCall, No.
17132, slip op., at 27 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000) ("What would plaintiffs have the
McKesson board do in the course of making an acquisition other than hire a
national accounting firm and investment bank to examine the books and
records of the target company?").
199. For a number of reasons, judges did not look favorably upon hostile
transactions: selected from the bar of local communities, they had more affinity
with managers of firms that were the targets of takeover activity than with the
aggressive financial entrepreneurs undertaking these transactions, and they
would also likely be influenced by the anti-Wall Street populism of their fellow
citizens. See generally Roe, supra note 152, at 341 (noting that the Delaware
judiciary became only gradually anti-takeover).
200. The result of this jurisprudence was to allow boards to resist the value-
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judicial signal was not lost on corporate and securities
lawyers, who further developed the contracts locking
parties into the mega-mergers, once hostile offers became
less frequent at the end of the 1980s.
1. JudicialSupport for the Mega-Merger. My goal here
is not to re-examine
exhaustively the takeover
jurisprudence of the 1980s and the related academic
literature."' Rather, it is simply to highlight how, while
developing the law on board fiduciary duties in reaction to
this financial phenomenon, courts promoted the megamerger as the favorable transaction structure, which it
became in the 1990s. The following discussion refers almost
exclusively to the most important corporate case law on
hostile transactions, that of Delaware."
The well-known Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time, Inc.,2 3 which has appropriately been referred to as a
"watershed"
case
in
Delaware
corporate
law
jurisprudence," 4 best exemplifies how judicial promotion of
the mega-merger emerged from the development of
jurisprudence on hostile transactions. The case is about a
paradigm mega-merger. In a combination of media content

creating hostile acquirer, even though the overwhelming economic evidence
suggests that these parties add value. See, e.g., Loughran & Vijh, supranote 20,
at 1767 ("We find that postacquisition returns of acquirer's stock are related to
both the mode of acquisition and form of payment. In the overall sample of 947
cases, acquirers that make merger bids earn, on average, 15.9% less than
matching firms whereas acquirers that make tender offers earn 43.0% more
than matching firms during a five-year period after acquisition. Similarly, stock
acquirers earn 24.2% less than matching firms whereas cash acquirers earn
18.5% more than matching firms.").
201. The literature, whether legal or financial, on the takeover and its
jurisprudence is voluminous and continues to grow. See generally THE DEAL
DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE, supra note 152 (collection of essays from financial economists and
legal scholars). See also BRUDNEY & BRATTON, supra note 37, at 936-1163
(reviewing cases, policy discussion and finance literature on takeovers); GILSON
& BLACK, supra note 52, at 730-1008 (same).
202. Because other jurisdictions were more unfavorable to the hostile offer
than Delaware courts (and had few opportunities to consider it), their
jurisprudence was even more supportive of the strategic merger. See Roe,
Takeover Politics,supra note 152, at 338-40.
203. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
204. See Cox, supra note 34, at 620 ( "Thus Paramountreaffirms the board
of directors as a presumptively infallible decision-maker regarding the longterm benefits of an incumbent board's strategic plan.").
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and distribution that is a precursor to present day Internetrelated mergers (even to one involving Time Warner itself
with AOL!), Time located a strategic partner in Warner
with the idea of creating a publishing and film media firm
with numerous delivery options (particularly cable). As is
typical in a merger of equals between two enormous firms,
Time and Warner's executives negotiated over management
of the combined firm, management succession and board
structure and initially structured the deal as a stock-forstock transaction, whereby Warner shareholders would
receive Time stock and shareholders of both firms would
share in the fortunes of the combined firm.205 In accordance
with a standard procedure for mergers during hostile times,
which became further developed in the 1990s, the two firms
guarded their transaction by "deal protection" mechanisms,
such as a mutual share exchange and no-shop clause."'
Significantly for the outcome of the case, Time and Warner
publicly contrasted their proposed strategic merger with the
typical hostile takeovers then prevalent.
Like a story in the classic literary form of the comedy,
where the hero and heroine come together only after
incurring and surmounting danger, the blissful marriage of
Time and Warner took a turn for the worse when
Paramount launched a surprise all-cash hostile offer for all
Time shares. Fearing that the delay necessary under
corporate law and the federal proxy rules to solicit the
approval of Time and Warner shareholders for the merger
would play into Paramount's hands (i.e., Time shareholders
would sell their shares at a discount to the Paramount
tender price to arbitrageurs, who would then have an
economic interest in Time's accepting Paramount's cash
205. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1146
("The resulting company would have a 24-member board, with 12 members
representing each corporation. The company would have co-CEO's, at first Ross
and Munro, then Ross and Nicholas, and finally, after Ross' retirement...
Nicholas alone. The board would create an editorial committee with a majority
of members representing Time. A similar entertainment committee would be
controlled by Warner board members. A two-thirds supermajority vote was
required to alter CEO successions but an earlier proposal to have supermajority
protection for the editorial committee was abandoned.").
206. See id. at 1146-47. For more discussion of these mechanisms, see infra
Part IV(B)2.
207. See Paramount Communications v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1147 ('Time
representatives lauded the lack of debt to the United States Senate and to the
President of the United States.").
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offer), 28 Time changed its transaction form to a two-step
tender offer for Warner, with cash for 51% of the shares in
the "front end" and a mixture of cash and securities in the
back end.0 9 This change resulted in the transaction's
looking a lot like the leveraged acquisitions that Time and
Warner had implicitly criticized and in the debt-laden
Time-Warner becoming unattractive to Paramount.
In its decision approving the action of Time's board, the
Delaware Supreme Court gave a significant impetus to the
mega-merger as the favored (i.e., insulated from most
corporate legal problems) transaction for a major
restructuring. As is well known, the critical question in
takeover jurisprudence that the Court had to answer in
response to challenges to the transaction that were brought
by the suitor Paramount and disgruntled Time
shareholders was the following: Under which standard
should the Court evaluate the behavior of Time's board-its
primary standard regarding board behavior, as articulated
in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,21 that was favorable
to target company management or the variation set forth in
Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.211 that
was more protective of shareholder interests. In an outcome
critical for planning of mega-mergers, the Court decided
that Time's decision to enter into its strategic "merger of
equals" with Warner did not trigger the board's Revlon
duties to maximize shareholder value, so long as the
combined company would remain in the hands of a "fluid
group of undifferentiated stockholders."' Once the Court
208. That is, Time would have to file a joint proxy/prospectus for the
shareholder meetings of Time and Warner and for the registration of the Time
shares offered to Warner shareholders. This involved a process made lengthy by
the necessary SEC review of the proxy/prospectus and the notice provisions for
calling shareholder meetings. A shareholder who wanted to take advantage of
the Paramount cash offer could sell his or her shares to an arbitrageur, who
would buy them at a discount to Paramount's offer price (a discount calibrated
to the risk that the offer would be successful). The arbitrageur's profits would
depend upon the success of this offer. See generally Francesca Cornelli & David
Li, Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 2026 (Centre for
Economic Policy Research 1998) ("[Tihe arbitrage community has often come to
control, in total, 30 to 40% of the stock and therefore they have become the
single most important element in making many deals happening [sic].").
209. See ParamountCommunications v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1148.
210. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
211. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
212. See ParamountCommunications v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150. The Court
observed that "without excluding other possibilities" the two circumstances for
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adopted a Unocal analysis as an appropriate standard of
review, the result was foregone that Time would prevail
against legal challenges to the merger given the relatively
deferential character of the Unocal test.213 From a legal
perspective, it mattered little that Time had to change the
transaction from a stock-for-stock merger to its leveraged
acquisition of Warner, for this response was an acceptable
defensive response by Time to Paramount's bid. What
mattered, rather, was that, so long as structured as a megamerger, a corporation could enter into a transaction that
would massively change its character and business, but
that would not trigger the significant enhanced judicial
scrutiny that would apply to a potential major restructuring
from a hostile offer.
The next major case in the takeover area, Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network214 confirms, albeit
the application of Revlon were (i) an auction and (ii) abandonment of a longterm strategy in favor of a breakup of the company. When Revlon is triggered,
directors must maximize the price for the stockholders. See id. at 1150.
213. In considering whether Time satisfied the first Unocal prong
("reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed," id. at 1152), the Court adopted a business judgment-like
approach by according much deference to the board's definition of a "threat." It
suggested that it was not a court's place to assess what was the threat posed by
a hostile offer but simply to ask whether the threat seen by the board was a
reasonable one. See id. at 1153 ("Indeed, in our view, precepts underlying the
business judgment rule mitigate against a court's engaging in the process of
attempting to appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a long-term versus a
short-term investment goal for shareholders."). Similarly, under the second
Unocal prong ("that the defensive measure adopted was reasonable in relation
to the threat posed," id. at 1152), the Court gave the board considerable scope in
resisting a threat that it had identified, provided that the resistance did not
constitute an absolute "show stopper." In other words, defensive measures,
including the restructuring of the transaction, were reasonably justifiable as
the board's resistance to Paramount's threat to its long-term policy of a
strategic combination with Warner. See id. at 1154 ("Directors are not obliged to
abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder
profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.")
(citation omitted). Given the heavy "business judgment" implications of this
decision, it is not surprising that commentators have concluded that Unocal
analysis is reducible to the business judgment rule of court deference to board
consensual merger decisions. See GILSON & BLACI, supra note 52, at 894 ("The
Supreme Court's opinion reduces to a business judgment inquiry judicial review
of the target board's determination that an offer presents a threat to the
company's business plans. If a poison pill is always a reasonable response to
such a threat, then the Unocal intermediate standard has become just another
incantation of the business judgment rule.") (footnote omitted).
214. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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indirectly, that structuring a transaction as a strategic
merger of equals will enhance judicial deference regarding
the transaction, regardless of whether the company that is
the object of the legal challenge is the acquirer or the target
of the transaction. "5In Time, Time was the initiator of the
combination with Warner. In Paramount, Paramount, the
unwanted suitor in Time, agreed to a "strategic merger"
with Viacom Inc. in another media mega-merger, but here
Paramount was the target with its shareholders receiving
voting and nonvoting stock of Viacom, as well as cash. As in
appeared
following
Time,
an
interloper,
QVC,
announcement of the transaction, proposing that
Paramount combine with it. In response to the threat to
their merger, Viacom and Paramount restructured the
transaction so that Viacom would take control of
Paramount by a cash tender offer for 51% of Paramount's
shares followed by a back-end merger for a combination of
voting and nonvoting shares and convertible securities. A
bidding war then ensued with Paramount favoring Viacom
despite consecutively higher QVC offers.
When QVC sought an injunction against Viacom and
Paramount's proceeding with their merger, the Court
declined to accept their argument that the Paramount
board's decision to engage in a strategic merger with
Viacom was entitled to the relatively deferential Unocal
scrutiny. It based this decision not on Paramount's status
as a "target" rather than as the acquirer of the
Viacom/Paramount merger. In a merger of equals, the
respective role had little jurisprudential significance.
Rather, the Court observed that the transaction was simply
215. There is no question that, even in a strategic transaction, a board of the
company that is the "less equal" in the merger of equals is always under a legal
obligation to obtain some premium for its stockholders. In Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), decided in the same year as Unocal, the
Delaware Supreme Court found that a board of a target company in a leveraged
buyout violated its duty of care by agreeing to a consensual merger without
adequate investigation about the value of the company, even though the board
had obtained a substantial premium for the shareholders. However, the issue of
obtaining an adequate premium to satisfy business judgment analysis is
different from that of obtaining the highest premium that might emerge out of
an auction. And, in any event, Van Gorkom did not involve a consensual stockfor-stock merger, but a cash-out merger that was essentially a takeover of the
target and that might well have triggered Revlon duties on the target's board,
had Revlon been decided at that time. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 52, at
1054-57.
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not a merger of equals: Viacom had a controlling
shareholder, Sumner Redstone, who would dominate the
combined company following the merger. In these
circumstances, as in a breakup or auction, it made no sense
to talk about a strategic combination of firms in which
management and shareholders would be united. Instead,
the public shareholders of Paramount would be losing their
voice in their firm (the Viacom shareholders other than
Redstone had no such control to begin with), and in this
case the Paramount board had a legal obligation to obtain
the "best value" for its shareholders-Revlon duties
applied. 16 The clear implication is that, in the absence of a
shift of control (or the other circumstances triggering
Revlon), courts should defer to a target board's decision to
engage in a mega-merger, just as to a similar decision by an
acquirer's board.217
Delaware cases after QVC make it clear that the board
of each company involved in a mega-merger, whether it be
the "acquiring" or "acquired," is under no greater burden to
maximize shareholder value in the transaction than what
the standard duty of care analysis provides, unless the
special circumstances of Revlon exist. 1 Indeed, so protected
216. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 4445 ("While the assessment of these factors may be complex, the board's goal is
straightforward: Having informed themselves of all material information
reasonably available, the directors must decide which alternative is most likely
to offer the best value reasonably available to the stockholders.").
217. Moreover, the Court even implied considerable deference in the Revlon
analysis. It observed that it had no expertise in determining the best value of a
corporation and simply expected to find that a board had made a reasonable
decision after adequately informing itself about alternatives:
There are many business and financial considerations implicated in
investigating and selecting the best value reasonably available. The
board of directors is the corporate decision-making body best equipped
to make these judgments. Accordingly, a court applying enhanced
judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made a
reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a board selected one of
several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess that
choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent
events may have cast doubt on the board's determination. Thus, courts
will not substitute their business judgment for that of the directors, but
will determine if the directors' decision was, on balance, within a range
of reasonableness.
Id. at 36 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
218. In In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. ShareholderLitigation, Santa Fe Pacific
Corporation was the target of a consensual, stock-for-stock merger with
Burlington Northern, Inc. when Union Pacific Corporation, rebuffed by Santa
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from strict scrutiny are board decisions in consensual
mergers (in the absence of a shift in control) that the recent
focus of Delaware case law regarding these transactions has
been almost exclusively on whether various board defensive
measures satisfy the two-pronged Unocal test, not on
whether Revlon analysis invalidates these actions.219 Courts
evaluate the merger decision and the merger protective
devices (see below), if challenged, in the same way that they
analyze a board's resistance to an unwanted suitor when no
friendly partner is on the horizon. Just as a board has the
right "just to say no" to an unsolicited bid and to proceed in
life without a combination, it can select its desired partner,
again assuming no change in control. In either case, by
2 °
means of Unocal or related doctrines in the case law, 2
Fe's board, launched a hostile offer for Santa Fe. Although the Santa Fe board
felt pressure to-and did in fact-maximize the value to its shareholders from
the friendly transaction because of a hostile offer, the Court evaluated the
board's decision to proceed with the Burlington merger and erect defenses to
Union Pacific's offer under Unocal, not the scrutiny of Revlon. Without any shift
in control, auction or break-up, the Santa Fe board was entitled to proceed with
its strategic transaction, provided that its defensive measures passed Unocal
analysis. In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 669 A.2d 59 (Del.
1995). See id. at 71 ("While the [Santa Fe] Board properly encouraged Union
Pacific to improve its offer and may have used the results as leverage against
Burlington, the Plaintiffs do not allege that the Board at any point decided to
pursue a transaction which would result in a sale of control of Santa Fe to
Burlington. Rather, the complaint portrays the Board as firmly committed to a
stock-for-stock merger with Burlington."). Recent cases follow this deferential
approach to strategic mergers. See also Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate
Bancorp, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5502, *1 (Del. Ch. 1996) (rejecting contention
that Revlon scrutiny should apply to board decision to proceed with a stock-forstock merger with one company to the exclusion of another interested suitor).
219. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995)
(upholding Unitrin board's defensive repurchase of shares under Unocal
analysis); Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(challenging "dead hand" poison pill-i.e., in which newly appointed directors
cannot remove rights plan-as disproportionate defensive measure under
Unocal); see also Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998)
(invalidating "no hands" rights plan-which can be removed by the board only
six months after the board's membership changes-as unduly restricting the
board's exercise of its fiduciary duties). In other cases, parties understand that
Revlon analysis applies, but they dispute whether the board adequately fulfilled
its Revlon duties. See, e.g., Matador Capital Mgmt. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729
A.2d 280 (Del. Ch. 1998); Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d
1040 (Del. Ch. 1997).
220. The primary related doctrine, which arguably has independent
validity, is that articulated in Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992) and
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), which invalidates
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courts basically concentrate on whether, in proceeding upon
its chosen strategic path, the board of either company
prevents shareholders from ultimately disagreeing with
and rejecting its merger proposal."
In one sense, the jurisprudential outcome of the case
law on hostile offers was a judicial reaffirmation of the
deference that courts traditionally accorded to boards of
companies engaging in friendly mergers. Indeed, if no third
party bidder for either company emerged, even the
relatively benign Unocal standard would not be triggered if
a shareholder challenged the transaction, for the
appropriate standard of review was the "business
judgment" rule. If management of merging firms
anticipated a third-party challenge to their transaction,
they had only to emphasize the transaction's "strategic"
nature to put themselves in a particularly favorable legal
position." The judicial "message" of deference to boards in
mergers was thus reinforced in the crucible of the 1980s'
case law. Although the jurisprudence did not itself
determine the mega-mergers of the 1990s, there is no
question that it gave an impetus to these transactions,
rather than impeding them.
2. Practical Consequences of the Legal Impetus to the
Mega-Merger. The case law favoring the strategic megamerger gives further impetus to these transactions through
its effects on merger law practice. In corporate law, as in
other legal areas, the force of the law also arises from legal
practice, when, seeking to give legal certainty to clients'
transactions, practicing lawyers translate the dictates of
the law into contracts and other means of private
ordering.22 Guided by case law favoring strategic megadefensive measures that "purposefully disenfranchise" shareholders. Stroud,
606 A.2d at 92 n.3; see, e.g., Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1193-94 (invalidating "dead
hand" rights plan on Blasius grounds). For a recent case in which the Delaware
Chancery Court explained the limited scope of Blasius, see Chesapeake Corp. v.
Shore, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20 (Del. Ch. 2000).
221. See Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme
Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. IOWA CORP. L. 583, 606 (1994) (arguing
that the Court's jurisprudence can be seen as consistent on this point).
222. Naturally, if merger consideration is all cash, the board of the acquired
firm will have to admit that it is selling the company and that Revlon duties
arise. The acquiring company in such a transaction can maintain the strategic
transaction position.
223. See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardizationand

2001]

BRAING MEGA-MERGERS

319

mergers, merger lawyers devised or reinforced numerous
contractual provisions that, on their own, contributed to the
occurrence of the transactions. This legal practice shaped
the structure and many features of the mergers and made
(and makes) it difficult and expensive for boards to rethink
and pull back from a merger decision once they have made
it. When considering challenges to these devices from a
Unocal or other case law perspective, courts have generally
upheld their legality, adding yet another layer of case law
support for the mega-merger. It should be noted, however,
that, in some recent cases, courts are expressing uneasiness
with the extent to which the contractual provisions "lock in"
boards once they have made the merger decision.
These "lock up" provisions that, once a merger is agreed
to, keep the merger partners focused on, and committed to
do everything possible to effect, the transaction and that
discourage and penalize them for looking for and deciding
upon another deal, have been the subject of considerable
scholarly and practice analysis.2 " They have generally been
justified as the rational response of parties to consensual
mergers in a financial climate that permits hostile
interruptions to announced transactions by third parties
and in highly competitive, rapidly changing industries
where firms fear being left behind during a merger wave.225
A firm simply does not want to waste its time, energy, and
money on a transaction, only to see a third party snatch it
away and to find itself without a valued and potentially
important merger partner in a consolidating industry. My
immediate point here is not to add to this literature or to
challenge the economic rationality of the contractual
provisions, as it is to emphasize the impetus that they give
Innovation in Corporate Contracting(or "The Economics of Boilerplate'),83 VA.
L. REv. 713, 720-21 (1997).
224. See generally GILSON & BLAcK, supra note 52, at 1009-10, 1020-23 and
accompanying notes; Coates & Subramanian, supra note 6, at 4-5 and
accompanying notes; Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking
Lockups, 103 YALE L. J. 1739 (1994). For a practitioner's detailed review of all of
these devices, see 1 BLOCK, supranote 22, at 908-1003.
225. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 52, at 1020 ("Competitive bidding adds
a new risk: that the investment in making a bid will be lost because a
competitive bid will be successful. The planning problem is then how to
encourage a favored acquirer to go forward by reducing that risk. Note that the
problem is not simply assuring the favored acquirer that it will win. Rather, the
favored acquirer must be assured that its investment in bidding will have a
positive net present value even if it loses the competition.").
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to mega-mergers, so many of which turn out badly.226
The contractual provisions in a typical merger
agreement designed to ensure that a merger in fact occurs
are familiar to anyone engaged in merger practice and are
the object of often complex drafting.227 The entire detailed
agreement, of course, accomplishes the goal of a successful
transaction by committing both parties to do the necessary
tasks:
the
representations
reflect
the
parties'
understanding of each other; the covenants set forth the
specific actions they must undertake to bring the merger to
fulfillment; and at least some of the conditions to the
merger ensure that there is no closing unless the
transaction satisfies each party's goals.228 More specifically,
the "target" company's board covenants to recommend the
transaction to its shareholders (under corporate law, it
must make a recommendation to them in a merger)229 and to
226. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 223, at 729-36 (discussing the
potential for suboptimal contracting as a result of standardization).
227. Gilson and Black summarize them. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 52,
at 1020-23; see also Coates & Subramanian, supra note 6, at 6 and
accompanying notes. To get a sense of these provisions, one has only to look at
the proxy/registration statement addressed to the "target" company
shareholders in any typical strategic merger, which both summarizes the major
provisions of the merger agreement and includes as a central exhibit to the
registration statement this agreement. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(2) (requiring
inclusion of the "plan of acquisition" as an exhibit in the Form S-4, the
Securities Act form for the registration of securities used in a business
combination); Form S-4, Item 4 (a)(1), available at http'Jvww.sec.gov/smbus/
forms/s-4htm (requiring in the Form S-4 prospectus "[a] brief summary of the
terms of the acquisition agreement"). For a typical Form S-4 with an attached
merger agreement, see Exxon/Mobil Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus, SEC
File No. 333-75659 (Apr. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Exxon/Mobil Prospectus].
228. Such commitments, as one might expect, generally occur in the
covenants of an agreement, which has separate covenant sections for the
acquirer and target as well as joint covenants. These covenants can be tailored
to the nature of the acquisition and businesses involved, although there are
certain standard ones: for the target, that it will not change its business; for the
acquirer, that it will provide indemnification and insurance to the target's
officers and directors for suits arising post-merger, as well as maintain certain
employee benefits; and for both parties, that they will cooperate with each other
to see the transaction through, make the requisite legal filings, will give each
other access to information and notices about certain events, and will make
joint public announcements. See, e.g., Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supra note 227,
at A-21 to A-30 (Articles V-VI). For an excellent discussion of the rationale
behind provisions of a merger agreement, see JANIES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A
MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS (1975).
229. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2000).
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do what is legally necessary to ensure that a shareholder
vote occurs (i.e., call a meeting and prepare and file the
proxy statement that satisfies federal proxy rules)." °
Similarly, the acquirer covenants to do the same and even
more: to offer the target's shareholders its shares as merger
consideration, which means preparing and filing an SEC
registration statement on Form S-4, and to prepare its own
proxy to obtain approval from its shareholders for
amending its certificate of incorporation in order to
authorize the shares needed for the transaction. 3
More importantly for binding parties to the merger is
the classic "no shop" provision. To address specifically third
party intercession in the transaction, each party in a
merger of equals insists that the other agree to cease any
ongoing negotiations with any third parties, not to engage
in any discussions with, to solicit interest in an alternate
transaction with or to provide information to a potential
alternative merger party, and to report any third party
advances to each other.1 2 There is a well-established
230. See, e.g., Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supra note 227, at A-23 (§ 5.02),
providing that:
[Tihe Company shall cause a meeting of its stockholders ... to be duly
called and held as soon as reasonably practicable, on a date reasonably
acceptable to Acquiror, for the purpose of voting on the approval and
adoption of this Agreement and the Merger .... [T]he Board of
Directors of the Company shall recommend approval and adoption of
this Agreement by the Company's stockholders.... In connection with
the Company Stockholder Meeting, the Company (x) will promptly
prepare and file with the SEC, will use its reasonable best efforts to
have cleared by the SEC and will thereafter mail to its shareholders as
promptly as practicable the Company Proxy Statement and all other
proxy materials for the Company Stockholder Meeting, (y) will use its
reasonable best efforts, subject to the immediately preceding sentence,
to obtain the Company Stockholder Approval and (z) will otherwise
comply with all legal requirements applicable to the Company
Stockholder Meeting.
231. See, e.g., id. at A-26 (§ 6.04) (providing that Exxon covenants to call a
shareholders' meeting to submit proposals for amending its certificate of
incorporation and to prepare the registration statement on Form S-4 and
expedite its effectiveness with the SEC). Exxon and Mobil, as is often typical,
filed a joint proxy statement/registration statement addressed to both
shareholder groups.
232. See id. at A-23 (§ 5.03), which provides that:
The Company and its Subsidiaries will not, and the Company will use
its reasonable best efforts to cause the officers, directors, employees,
investment bankers, consultants and other agents of the Company and
its Subsidiaries not to, directly or indirectly, take any action to solicit,
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exception to this "no shop" clause, the "fiduciary out." In its

current form, the exception provides that the board of either
company may enter into discussions with, and provide
information to, a third party and change its
recommendation regarding the merger if this party makes
an unsolicited offer and if the board determines that it must
take these actions in order to comply with its fiduciary
duties."3 The jurisprudential support for this "out" comes
from the case law on hostile offers: if, as a result of the
announced merger, a bidder for either merger partner
enters the arena and if, because of a particular bid, one of
the merger partner's board begins to change its intentions
regarding its firm's future (i.e., it begins to enter the Revlon
"mode"), it needs to be able contractually to withdraw from
the merger. Indeed, in these circumstances, a court would
read this exception into the agreement, even if the
exception were not contractually provided for, because,
under Revlon, a court would invalidate as unlawful a "no
shop" clause that had no "fiduciary out." 4 The art of
initiate, encourage or facilitate the making of any Acquisition Proposal
(including without limitation by amending, or granting any waiver
under, the Company Rights Agreement) or any inquiry with respect
thereto or engage in discussions or negotiations with any Person with
respect thereto, or disclose any non-public information relating to the
Company or any Subsidiary of the Company or afford access to the
properties, books or records of the Company or any Subsidiary of the
Company to, any Person that has made, or to the Company's
knowledge, is considering making, any Acquisition Proposal .... The
Company and its Subsidiaries will, and the Company will use its
reasonable best efforts to cause the officers, directors, employees,
investment bankers, consultants and other agents of the Company and
its Subsidiaries to, immediately cease and cause to be terminated all
discussions and negotiations, if any, that have taken place prior to the
date hereof with any parties with respect to any Acquisition Proposal.
On "no-shop" provisions, see generally William T. Allen, Understanding
Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 Bus. LAw.
653, 653-54 (2000).
233. See generally 1 BLOCK, supra note 22, at 935-57 (characterizing this
exception, at 942-45, as a "window shop" exception); see also Allen, supra note
232, at 654.
234. In Revlon, the court specifically invalidated the "no-shop" provision in
Revlon's merger agreement with Forstmann stating that "[tihe no-shop
provision, like the lock-up option, while not per se illegal, is impermissible
under the Unocal standards when a board's primary duty becomes that of an
auctioneer responsible for selling the company to the highest bidder." Revlon,
Inc. v. Mac Andrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1985). The
implication is that, when Revlon duties are not triggered, which is the typical
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drafting this provision focuses on (because of some legal
uncertainty to be discussed further below) how strictly to
make the exception: for example, should the exception
language provide that the third party offer has to be
written and/or to be a superior offer to the existing
transaction on the basis of the opinion of a valuation
expert? Must outside counsel to the board opine that the
board has legally to invoke the exception when the third
party bid surfaces in order for the use of the exception to be
justified under the contract?235
Penalty provisions in the merger agreement are
designed to ensure that the "fiduciary out" is rarely used in
a mega-merger."' Because a merger partner does not want
to be a "stalking horse" (i.e., to invest significant amounts of
time and money, only to see another reap the benefits of the
transaction, and to lose the opportunity of competing
transactions), it will generally demand a termination fee
plus expense reimbursement if the other firm invokes the
"fiduciary out." 7 Indeed, the provisions governing these
fees (commonly known as "break-up" fees) are drafted
broadly enough to be triggered not only where one partner's
situation of a strategic merger, the no-shop provision is perfectly legal. See
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 n.15 (Del.
1989). The reason that the exception is now standard is that, without it, counsel
cannot opine that the merger agreement is legal. See generally Allen, supranote
232, at 656, 659.
235. See, e.g., Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supra note 227, at A-23 to A-24 (§
5.03). It may not matter how strictly the proviso is drafted so long as the
exception depends upon the board's exercise of its fiduciary duties. Under Time,
unless the board has decided upon a sale of the company, it need not obtain the
best price for its shareholders in a merger. However, if an unwanted third
party's bid is clearly superior to the merger premium, the board may feel both
pressure from its shareholders to entertain that bid and fear that a court will
find its insistence upon the initial merger somewhat irrational. Accordingly, in
any negotiation, lawyers for the target board may try to draft the exception as
broadly as possible (while bidder's counsel will insist that it be triggered only if
the third party offer is clearly superior to the bidder's proposal).
236. "Rarely" does not mean never. In a friendly merger, one merger partner
may concede defeat and leave the transaction to a third party, taking with it the
termination fee and any other negotiated benefit. See, e.g., Leslie Cauley &
Rebecca Blumenstein, Comcast, in AT&T Accord, Abandons MediaOne Bid,
WALL ST. J., May 5, 1999, at A3 (describing how AT&T broke up the Comcast
Corp. merger with MedlaOne, but that, in the settlement, Comcast left with,
among other things, the $1.5 billion termination fee).
237. See 1 BLOCK, supra note 22, at 957-58 (noting that the termination
fees, exclusive of expense reimbursement, often amount to 1 to 3% of the
transaction value).
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board decides to pursue an alternative transaction, but also
where the board changes its recommendation to the
shareholders regarding the merger without any third party
on the horizon, where the board fails to do the necessary to
effect the deal, where a firm's shareholders vote the
transaction down (with or without an existing third party
offer) and even where a third party simply appears and the
merger partner decides to abandon the field to it. 238 In

addition, generally in an ancillary agreement to the merger
agreement each merger partner may give the other the
right to purchase a significant portion of its shares at the
current market price (the stock "lockup") or the right to
assets at a favorable price (the
purchase certain valuable
"crown jewels" lockup). 9 The no-solicitation clause together
with the break-up fees and lockup makes a competing
transaction oftentimes prohibitively expensive, although
not impossible.4
Delaware case law has reinforced this contractual
238. See, e.g., Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supra note 227, at 1-60 (explaining
that the termination fee is triggered if Mobil's board enters into an alternative
transaction, if Mobil's board, among other things, withdraws its
recommendation or if Mobil's shareholders vote down the transaction during
the pendency of a third party offer and Mobil later does a transaction with such
third party). Again, the amount of the termination fee and the expansiveness of
the conditions triggering it depend upon the respective bargaining power of the
parties.
239. See 1 BLOCK, supra note 22, at 909-34 (describing "lockup" stock and
asset options and describing "lockup" stock options as those that simply give a
merger partner a certain percentage (between 10% and 20%) of the other's
share capital); see also Coates & Subramanian, supranote 6, at 6-10 (describing
empirical evidence on use of lockups); see, e.g., Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supra
note 227, at B-1 to B-9 (establishing a stock option "lockup" of approximately
15% of Mobil stock).
240. Of course, the most well-known of the stock lockups was that
invalidated in Paramount Communications v. QVC, where Paramount granted
Viacom the option to purchase 19.9% of its stock at the market price (or, at
Viacom's option, to pay Viacom the difference between such market price and
the stock price when the option was exercised). See Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del. 1994). The asset
lockup is exemplified in Revlon where Forstmann demanded and received an
option to purchase two Revlon divisions at a below market value price. See
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del.
1985). One way that a stock lockup discourages alternative transactions is that
it makes "pooling" accounting treatment difficult, if not impossible, for one
condition to pooling is that there be no significant share issuance or repurchase
at a time around the transaction. See ACCOUNTING PRiNCrPLES BOARD, OPINION
No. 16, supra note 56; see also Coates & Subramanian, supranote 6, at 11 n.28.
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structure to keep transactions "on track." Courts have
generally upheld the validity of the no-solicitation clause as
well as the termination fees and lockup penalties
discouraging use of the "fiduciary out." Although the
judicial treatment of termination fees and lockups is not
identical,24 courts have declared these provisions invalid
when they interfere with a board's fulfillment of its
fiduciary duties: that is, when a firm has entered into a
Revlon mode and the board properly elects to use the
fiduciary out, the penalty provisions cannot prevent the
board's action.242 Yet this jurisprudence is not necessarily
relevant where a board has no fiduciary duty to entertain
competing offers to the mega-merger: enhanced fiduciary
duties do not arise, because no shift in control is occurring.
If a third party surfaces, a court would review the
contractual deal-protection provisions only under Unocal.24
Guided by the Delaware Supreme Court's objection in
Paramountto a stock lockup that would have imposed no
"cap" on the benefit that a merger partner would receive
from it and by the general Unocal prohibition on defensive
measures that preclude shareholder choice among
competing bidders, practicing lawyers limit the total benefit
that any disgruntled merger partner can receive from both
termination fees and stock lockups to a set percentage of
the transaction."4
241. See 1 BLOCK, supra note 22, at 908-1002 (summarizing the case law
permutations on various defensive measures).
242. Again, the classic statement of this position is in Paramount,637 A.2d
at 48-51, where the Court found that the numerous defensive devices in the
contract (no-shop, stock lockup and termination fee) impeded the Paramount
board from exercising its fiduciary duties.
243. There may or may not be a theoretical problem with an absolute "no
shop" clause without a "fiduciary out." See generally A. Gilchrist Sparks HI,
Merger Agreements Under Delaware Law: When Can Directors Change Their
Minds, 51 U. MIAM L. REv. 815 (1997). Yet it is customary in current merger
practice for companies to insist on an out.
244. That is, a termination fee or benefits from a lockup could be so high as
to preclude an alternative transaction and violate Unocal's proportionality
prong as well as push against the outer bounds of the business judgment rule.
In addition, the language of the court condemning the size of the stock lockup in
Paramount Communications v. QVC was broad and could apply outside the
Revlon context. See Paramount Communications v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 55.
Accordingly, it is customary for the termination fee and stock lockup to be
interrelated; in essence, the merger partner gets a set amount approximately in
the amount of the termination fee or somewhat higher, and can take it either
through the stock lockup or termination fee arrangement. See, e.g., Exxon/Mobil
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Even more significantly, the Delaware Supreme Court
rejected a predictable shareholder (as opposed to a third
party bidder ) challenge to these penalty provisions. The
shareholder vote in a merger is a key justification for
subjecting board merger decisions (in the absence of
competing bidders) to the business judgment rule245 as well
as for that aspect of the Unocal analysis investigating
whether a defensive 6tactic unduly interferes with the
47
shareholder franchise. In Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,
a Bell Atlantic shareholder, Brazen, opposing the stock-forstock mega-merger between Bell Atlantic and Nynex
argued that the termination fee in the merger agreement
both impaired the Bell Atlantic board's exercise of its
fiduciary duty and "coerced" Bell Atlantic shareholders into
voting for the transaction, thus adversely affecting their
franchise.248 Brazen argued that, since the fees were so high,
he was compelled not to vote against the transaction (which
he opposed), because a shareholder rejection would damage
Bell Atlantic by forcing it to pay the enormous breakup
fees. 9
The Delaware Supreme Court first agreed with Bell
Atlantic that the fees should be characterized as liquidated
damages250 and that they satisfied the liquidated damages
standard because they were reasonable in a situation where
damages to the aggrieved party were uncertain.25' The
Court accepted the justifications for the breakup fees (i.e.,
Prospectus, supra note 227, at B-8 (essentially capping Exxon's benefits from a
break-up at $2 billion, where the contractual termination fee is $1.5 billion).
245. See COX, supra note 34, at 607.
246. See Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1195 (finding adequacy in claim that a "dead
hand" poison pill affects shareholder franchise (and could be disproportionate
under Unocal) by figuratively forcing shareholders to vote constantly for
directors who instituted the pill).
247. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
248. See id. at 46-47.
249. The fees potentially amounted to $550 million (approximately 2% of
Bell Atlantic's market value) and were payable in two ranches, depending upon
whether Bell Atlantic entered into a transaction with a third party that
triggered the merger's termination. See id. at 45-46 (describing the provisions of
the merger agreement that required payment of $200 million upon termination
and $350 million if a competing transaction were completed within eighteen
months of termination of the agreement).
250. See id. at 48.
251. In a situation where the amount of loss is difficult to calculate and
there is great uncertainty surrounding a transaction, courts give considerable
deference to the rationality of a fee amount.
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compensating the acquirer for its expenses and the
opportunity costs of foregoing other transactions in a
competitive acquisitions environment, the reasonableness
of these fees in relationship to those in similar
transactions).252 It observed in passing that, if the fees had
not been characterized as liquidated damages, it would
have applied the even more deferential business judgment
review. The Court then summarily dismissed the coercion
argument, observing that the fees were not "egregiously
large" and that coercion did not arise, simply because
shareholders knew that their rejection of the merger would
trigger payment of the fee or because not every termination
event gave rise to the fee (which, as Brazen argued, was
additional evidence that the fees were intended to coerce
shareholders).5 4 Relying upon Williams v. Geier,255 the
Court observed that an action coercive of shareholders must
be designed to obtain a shareholder approval of a
transaction that is not based on the transaction's merits.
The Court appeared to conclude that the fees were not
coercive from this perspective, because they were integral to
the transaction (i.e., the deal would not occur without deal
protection provisions), customary in merger agreements
and thus
256 not provisions specially designed to have coercive
effect.
The Delaware Chancery Courts are, however, beginning
to object to some of the deal protection provisions that lock
boards into stock-for-stock mega-mergers and that
contribute to the momentum of these transactions. Yet the
objections often arise from their concern that shareholders
of one firm involved in a merger should have the possibility
252. See id. at 48-49.
253. See id. at 49.
254. Id. at 50.

255. 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996). Williams involved a situation where a
company was recapitalized by its giving each shareholder a share with ten
votes. However, if a shareholder sold the share, the share had only one vote
until the new shareholder had held it for three years. Id.
256. See Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 50 ("To the contrary, it
appears that the reciprocal termination fee provisions, drafted to protect both
Bell Atlantic and NYNEX in the event the merger was not consummated, were
an integral part of the merits of the transaction. Thus, we agree with the
finding of the Court of Chancery that, although the termination fee provision
may have influenced the stockholder vote, there were 'no structurally or
situationally coercive factors' that made an otherwise valid fee provision
impermissibly coercive in this setting.") (footnote omitted).
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of electing to go with another bidder, rather than with the
merger partner chosen by the board, and not from any
uneasiness with the mega-mergers themselves. This is
apparent in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals
Co.2 where Phelps Dodge (which desired to merge with

Cyprus) sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Cyprus
and Asarco from consummating their pending stock-forstock mega-merger. It argued that several deal protection
provisions were invalid: (i) a provision in the "no
solicitation" section that prevented Cyprus from having
discussions with a competing bidder (a "no talk") and (ii)
the amount of the termination fees (6.3% of the value of the
target).258 Chancellor Chandler rejected Cyprus and Asarco's
argument, based on Time, that each firm had no duty to
talk to a competing bidder, because they were engaged in a
strategic merger not involving a sale of either company. He
reasoned that, while a board of a firm agreeing to a merger
has no duty to negotiate with a third party bidder, it must
make an informed decision not to negotiate. A "no talk"
provision prevents the board from exercising its fiduciary
duty of becoming informed: he called it the "legal equivalent
of willful blindness."259 Despite his dissatisfaction with the
"no-talk" clause and with the amount of the fee ("I think 6.3
percent certainly seems to stretch the definition of range of
reasonableness and probably stretches the definition
beyond the breaking point."), however, he declined to grant
the temporary injunction because the shareholders of
Cyprus/Asarco were about to vote on their merger and
because Phelps had already adequately publicized its
alternative to them.260
257. 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, *2 (Del. Ch. 1999).
258. See id. at *4-*5.
259. See id. at 4 ("No-talk provisions, thus, in my view, are troubling
precisely because they prevent a board from meeting its duty to make an
informed judgment with respect to even considering whether to negotiate with a
third party."); id. ("Now, this should not be understood to suggest that Cyprus
or Asarco were legally required to or even should have negotiated, privately or
otherwise, with Phelps Dodge. It is to say, rather, that they simply should not
have completely foreclosed the opportunity to do so, as this is the legal
equivalent of willful blindness, a blindness that may constitute a breach of a
board's duty of care; that is, the duty to take care to be informed of all material
information reasonably available.").
260. Id. at *6 ("I also need not rescue the shareholders from losing out on a
premium bid, as they can simply vote down the Cyprus/Asarco transaction
which is scheduled to be voted on this Thursday. When such self-help measures
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In a more factually complex case that also involved a
third party attempting to break up a strategic stock-forstock merger, a different Chancery Court judge cast further
doubt on the "no talk" clause common in a "no solicitation"
covenant. In ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp,2"' Capital Re
agreed to a merger with ACE and, in the merger
agreement, to a standard "no solicitation" provision with a
"fiduciary out" that, as was customary, required Capital
Re's board to receive "written advice of its outside legal
counsel" before exercising the "out." If the merger
agreement were not terminated in accordance with its
terms, ACE was essentially guaranteed a successful Capital
Re shareholder vote: it already held 12.3% of Capital Re
stock and had obtained shareholder agreements from other
Capital Re shareholders holding 33.5% of the stock to vote
to approve the merger, which agreements were terminable
only if the merger agreement itself were properly
terminated. When the value of ACE stock fell prior to the
merger's closing and when another bidder emerged, offering
more per Capital Re share than ACE's consideration, the
Capital Re board exercised its fiduciary out, held
discussions with the other bidder, XL Capital, and
terminated the merger agreement. A bidding war between
ACE and XL Capital ensued, with ACE finally asking the
Chancery Court to enjoin Capital Re from terminating the
merger agreement because the Capital Re board had failed
to receive written advice from counsel before exercising the
fiduciary out (as required by the "no solicitation" covenant).
One of ACE's arguments was that no counsel would give
this opinion unless Capital Re had entered an auction or
Revlon mode (which arguably was not the case here).
From one perspective, the ACE court, in denying the
preliminary injunction, was consistent with established
Delaware law, particularly with Revlon and Unocal. Indeed,
are clearly available and when the arsenals of both parties have been unleashed
so as to fully and completely educate the shareholders of their choices, it is not
for this Court to ride to their rescue."). The Court also suggested that Phelps
could purchase the combined Cyprus/Asarco-a Time reasoning. Following the
decision, the Cyprus/Asarco merger was terminated, and Phelps Dodge acquired
Cyprus and Grupo Industrial Minera Mexico SA (a Mexican company)
purchased Asarco. See Elisabeth Malldn, A Copper King in Mexico, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 8, 1999, at 124E10; Carlos Tejada & Nikhil Deogun, Phelps Dodge to
Acquire Cyprus Amax, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1999, at A3.
261. 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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Capital Re argued that granting ACE's requested relief
would "chill an ongoing auction and potentially deprive

Capital Re stockholders of the opportunity to take
advantage of an offer significantly more valuable than the
merger," contending that its board had entered a Revlon
mode. Capital Re's desire to promote the auction required it
to exercise the "out" for, without a proper termination of the
merger agreement, it would be forced to merge with ACE,

not necessarily the bidder providing the highest value to
Capital Re's shareholders. The court, however, did not rest
its decision simply upon Capital Re's Revlon argument.
Rather, it suggested that any clause in a merger agreement
that would lock the shareholders into the transaction or,
put another way, would prevent the Capital Re board from
terminating the transaction so as to give shareholders the
choice to accept or reject the deal was an act improperly
preclusive of shareholder choice under Unocal.2 '
From a broader perspective, Chancellor Strine echoed a
disapproval of certain aspects of deal protection clauses
that Chancellor Chandler had expressed in Phelps Dodge
and that was not necessarily limited to either a Revlon
situation or one suggesting Unocal preclusiveness."
Indeed, drawing inspiration from a recent law review

262. See id. at 106 ("It is quite another thing for a board of directors to enter
into a merger agreement that precludes the board from considering any other
offers unless a lawyer is willing to sign an opinion indicating that his client
board is 'required' to consider that offer in the less than precise corporate law
context of a merger agreement that does not implicate Revlon but may preclude
other transactions in manner that raises eyebrows under Unocal.") (footnotes
omitted); id. at 107 ("More fundamentally, one would think that there would be
limited circumstances in which a board could prudently place itself in the
position of not being able to entertain and consider a superior proposal to a
transaction dependent on a stockholder vote. The circumstances in this case
would not seem to be of that nature, because the board's inability to consider
another offer in effect precludes the stockholders (including the 33.5% holders)
from accepting another offer."); id. at 108 ("Absent an escape clause, the Merger
Agreement guarantees the success of the merger vote and precludes any other
alternative, no matter how much more lucrative to the Capital Re stockholders
and no matter whether the Capital Re board itself prefers the other alternative.
As a practical matter, it might therefore be possible to construct a plausible
argument that a no-escape Merger Agreement that locks up the necessary votes
constitutes an unreasonable preclusive and coercive defensive obstacle within
the meaning of Unocal.") (footnotes omitted).
263. Indeed, Chancellor Strine cited with approval Chancellor Chandler's
opinion in Phelps Dodge. See Phelps Dodge, 1999 Del. Ch. Lexis 202, at 31
n.46.
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article offering courts guidance on when to invalidate
contracts (albeit an article focusing on a Revlon situation)2
he suggested that, while a board can contractually agree
not to solicit other bidders ("It is one thing for a board of
directors to agree not to play footsie with other potential
bidders or to stir up an auction. That type of restriction is
perfectly understandable, if not necessary, if good faith
business transactions are to be encouraged."), it cannot
make the exercise of its fiduciary duties dependent upon a
third party's (here a lawyer's) approval. 65 The Chancellor
observed that a "fiduciary out" dependent for its application
by the board upon a non-board member's opinion amounted
to the board's abdication of its responsibilities.266 Even more
broadly, he stated that a board would violate its duty of
care by not leaving itself with a broad "out" in a merger
agreement to consider more favorable offers.26'
It is open to question whether, and to what extent,
these cases announce a new line of Delaware jurisprudence
regarding deal protection provisions.2" The language of
Phelps Dodge and ACE disapproving the provisions was
broad, but the result in the first was consistent with Time
and in the second with Revlon and Unocal, and both
involved a competitive bidding situation. Several days
following ACE, moreover, Chancellor Steele observed in
264. See generally Paul R. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law
Analysis ForPreclusive CorporateLock-Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1999).
265. Ace Ltd., 747 A.2d at 106 ("But in another sense, the provision is much
more pernicious in that it involves an abdication by the board of its duty to
determine what its own fiduciary obligations require at precisely that time in
the life of the company in which the board's own judgment is most important.").
266. See id. at 107 n.37 (citing Quickturn Graphics Design System v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. Ch. 1998)).
267. See id. at 31 ("In this context where the board is making a critical
decision affecting stockholder ownership and voting rights, it is especially
important that it negotiate with care and retain sufficient flexibility to ensure
that the stockholders are not unfairly coerced into accepting a less than optimal
exchange for their shares."); see also id. at 33-34 ('These fiduciary
responsibilities are of special importance in situations where a board is entering
into a transaction as significant as a merger affecting stockholder ownership
rights. For that (sometimes unspoken) reason, our law has subordinated the
contract rights of third party suitors to stockholders' interests in not being
improperly subjected to a fundamental corporate transaction as a result of a
fiduciary breach by the board.") (footnote omitted).
268. See, e.g., Stephen A. Radin, Talking About Talk: No Talk And
Fiduciary Out Provisions in DelawareAfter Phelps Dodge, CapitalRe And 1XC,
11 Bus. & SEC. LIT. 1 (2000).
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another case that "no talk" provisions "are common in
merger agreements and do not imply some automatic
breach of fiduciary duty," although his decision is arguably
consistent with ACE and Phelps Dodge on its facts." 9 At the
very least, the cases indicate judicial uneasiness with, and
the likelihood of more judicial scrutiny of, the provisions,
albeit in a context where the provisions might prevent
shareholders of a merger partner from considering other
offers.
Although experienced M&A lawyers and investment
bankers do not decide upon the mega-mergers, they are
repeat players who often have much more familiarity with
this kind of transaction than do the boards of the merger
partners and who, on account of their experience and
reputation, guide the boards as to market practice in the
deal.270 This practice and contract drafting, which are based
upon the case law on hostile and consensual mergers, have
added to the momentum of the mega-mergers by "locking
in" boards, who are already inclined to follow the lead of a
"visionary" CEO, to these transactions. Merger partners
269. See In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 1999 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 210, at *14 (Del. Ch. 1999). In this case, shareholders of -C
challenged its consensual merger with CBI (with no third party bidder on the
horizon) on the grounds that the board of IXC had violated its fiduciary duties
by agreeing to the merger. With respect to the "no talk" provision, Chancellor
Steele observed that, while IXC did not conduct an auction, it clearly spoke with
numerous potential merger partners before going with CBI, and, further, that it
adopted the "no talk" provision late in the process and in fact retracted the
provision (a retraction that generated no other offers).
270. The foremost example of this legal influence in the M&A area is the
law firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, which specializes in this practice,
and Martin Lipton, perhaps the most preeminent M&A lawyer and one of the
champions of the strategic merger. Not only do Lipton and his colleagues
regularly explain the structure and drafting devices of strategic mergers, see
LIPTON, supra note 49, but he regularly provides to his clients his views on
current M&A activity and developments. See, e.g., Letter of M. Lipton to author
(May 17, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review) (explaining that the
following "merger technology" helps boards to accomplish a strategic merger
without a third party breaking it up: "(1) speed and secrecy in the negotiation
stage, (2) avoiding leaks, (3) a well structured [sic] announcement and rollout
designed to have the analysts and investors recognize the advantages of the
merger, (4) structuring the exchange ratio to avoid or minimize arbitrage
pressure, (5) a merger agreement that prevents an interloper from pooling and
makes it difficult for an interloper to compete without paying a significantly
higher price, (6) compensation, incentive and severance arrangements that
deter an interloper and (7) a structure that gives consummation of the original
deal a significant time advantage over an interloper").
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can, and do, legally walk away from mega-mergers,
sometimes even without triggering any contractual
penalties, 1 but this seldom occurs. " Although Delaware
Chancery Courts are beginning to express some concern
about the effects of the deal protection provisions on the
exercise of fiduciary duties by board members, their focus
has been not on ensuring that a board has the freedom to
resist the momentum of a merger decision itself and even to
rethink it, as it is to allow the board and the shareholders
to consider (or to generate) other merger bids. Accordingly,
the law through both its jurisprudence and practice adds
further impetus to the mega-mergers.
V. How CAN THE MOMENTUM OF MEGA-MERGERS BE
RESISTED?

It is tempting to conclude that nothing short of a
financial or political cataclysm can slow down the
momentum of mega-mergers. Powerful circumstances overdetermine these transactions: massive, and at times
frenzied, restructuring triggered by a revolution in
information technology, the ever-present management
agency problems in large public corporations, behavioral
problems afflicting in varying degrees executives, board
members and investors that encourage them to enter into
or to review these transactions with excessive optimism and
confidence, a media and political climate that has not
placed much critical attention on the transactions, and a
corporate law jurisprudence and practice that have
promoted and reinforced them. With all of these forces
arrayed in support of the mega-merger and with many
individuals benefitting from them, it is not realistic to think
that one action or reform could address all the problems
associated with them. Yet it is important to emphasize that
the goal here is not to eliminate the strategic stock-for-stock
mega-mergers, some of which are without doubt
economically necessary and value enhancing, but simply to
271. Every merger agreement includes a provision for a mutual termination,
which does not trigger any penalties. See, e.g., Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supra
note 227, at A-33.
272. Companies are concerned about wasted expenses and efforts and the
adverse publicity that comes from a reconsidered decision. See Burton &
Tanouye, supra note 82, at Bi (describing the fallout from the mutual
termination of the Monsanto/American Home Products merger).
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counteract the powerful momentum in favor of these
generally value-destroying transactions by introducing
more rationality into the decision-making process of boards
of merging firms.
In this Part, I first propose, and argue for, a reform of
the corporate law governing board decision-making in the
transactions. Law reform is necessary because, as shown in
Part IV, existing law inadequately addresses the problems
arising from, and has actually added to, the momentum of
the mega-mergers. Moreover, this reform is required
because it is a useful way of introducing rationality into a
process distorted by behavioral problems. I thus propose
that courts adopt a new standard for defining the fiduciary
duties of board members of companies engaging in a megamerger and offer jurisprudential support for this standard.
I then contend that the legal reform has a better chance of
succeeding if it is combined with the following reforms, both
non-legal and legal. Shareholder activists need to add the
problem with mega-mergers to their list of corporate actions
demanding more board oversight. Accounting standard
setters should continue with their plans to eliminate an
accounting treatment that favors the stock-for-stock
merger. And the SEC should enhance its current review of
disclosure on board decision-making that is represented in
the companies' proxies seeking shareholder approval for the
mega-mergers.
A. Reform of the Law Governing BoardDecision-Making in
a Mega-Merger
I first propose to enhance the standard governing the
duty of board members in a mega-merger, whether they are
on the board of the company that is the ostensible acquirer
or target of the transaction. I define mega-merger to mean
any merger between two publicly-traded companies where
the size of one merger partner is at least 30%, in terms of
market capitalization, of the other and where the
transaction is conducted primarily as a stock-for-stock
exchange. The proposed standard is the following: when
deciding whether to participate in a mega-merger, a board
would have the burden of establishing that it has
reasonable grounds, supported by particular findings, for
believing that (1) the transaction maximizes shareholder
value and (2) is the best alternative among those currently
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available to the company, particularly the alternative of not
engaging in the mega-merger and remaining independent.
A board would also improve its chances of satisfying this
standard if a majority of its independent directors approved
the transaction.
The standard should apply only to the kind of
transactions between publicly-traded firms that, according
to the economic evidence, are the most damaging to each of
the merging companies: those involving "bet the company"
combinations with a firm of comparable size done primarily
as stock-for-stock exchanges. As a way of defining
comparable size (and of limiting application of the proposed
standard), the standard considers a mega-merger to exist
where one public firm (whether the acquirer or target) has
30% of the market capitalization of the other.27 The
reasoning here is that, if one merger partner is considerably
smaller than the other, the transaction will more likely be a
"sale" than a "partnership" and will have less chance of
resulting in the kind of value losses associated with a megamerger." 4 In a true sale, for example, an acquirer may
increase the likelihood of realizing synergies simply because
it dominates from the outset the combined firm and a target
board has little choice but to negotiate for the highest value
for its shareholders.275 The standard would also be applied
273. A higher figure could be used. See Coates & Subramanian, supra note
6, at 12 n.37 (focusing on a higher figure for mergers of equals), but the 30%
figure is nothing more than an approximation of comparable size and would
constitute a presumptive mega-merger. A party challenging a merger with a
lesser figure (say 25%) would have the burden of showing that the merger in
question effects a major change of the firm's business. As formulated, the
standard makes no reference to size of the companies involved in a merger,
other than to limit its application to public companies. Although the Article has
focused on mega-mergers involving enormous companies, the problems
discussed above could apply to any merger transforming the nature of the two
companies. The public company limitation would establish a baseline size
limitation on companies affected by the new standard, and, I suspect, the
standard will in practice be applied generally in mega-transactions, which stir
up shareholder opposition and pose the most potential for value loss.
274. This is not to say that a merger between a large and small company
(relative to each other) cannot lead to significant value losses for the same
reasons discussed earlier. It is simply that the problems producing these losses
(generally, the non-realization of synergies) are exacerbated in the megamerger context.
275. That is, the "target" board recognizes that, with a dominant acquirer, it
is selling the firm; no argument about a strategic combination makes much
sense. It thus has a legal obligation under Revlon to negotiate for the highest
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only to stock-for-stock mergers, or those that primarily
involve a stock exchange,276 because the behavior-distorting
momentum is most present in these transactions. Cash
transactions are more indicative of a "sale" and, in them,
both boards focus more closely on shareholder value than in
a stock transaction.7 7
The first prong is intended to make the board of each
firm specifically articulate how the proposed transaction
increases shareholder value. The Unocal standard has
clearly inspired this prong: under Unocal, a board needs to
specify the threat a hostile offer poses to corporate policy;278
here the board must articulate how the merger generates
value. Yet the standard here emphasizes even more than
Unocal the particular basis for the board's decision because
of the overwhelming pressure, both within and outside a
firm, on a board to accede to a mega-merger. The emphasis
on specificity and particularity is to discourage the board
from adopting wholesale the generalized conclusions about
"synergies" offered by management and the investment
bankers selected by management.279 The prong does not
mean that the board need engage in independent factfinding and cannot rely upon information concerning and
justifications for the merger presented by management and
others.28 Rather, the standard seeks to encourage the board
premium. Similarly, because of the target's insistence on this premium, the
acquirer board will likely take a more critical view of the transaction.
276. This formulation is necessary so that parties do not try to avoid the
transaction by introducing some cash or non-equity securities into the merger
consideration in order to avoid the application of the new standard. Parties can
do this without losing all the tax advantages of a stock-for-stock merger.
277. See, e.g., Loughran & Vijh, supra note 20, at 1767. Again, the target
board agreeing to a cash merger could hardly make the argument that its
shareholders will continue to participate in the combination (they are being
cashed out!).
278. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
279. Indeed, emphasis on the creation of shareholder value through a
merger is necessary because boards often fail to focus on this paramount issue
in approving mergers. See KPMG, UNLOCK1NG SHAREHOLDER VALUE, supra note
95, at 8 (observing that in its survey only 20% of the respondents cited
"maximizing shareholder value" as the purpose of the transaction).
280. To suggest otherwise would upset the well-established roles of directors
and executives under corporate law, under which directors may rely upon
information presented by management and others. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141 (1974). The reliance, however, must be reasonable and, if circumstances so
demand (as in the case of a mega-merger), board members may well have a duty
to conduct some independent information gathering, or-what is more likely-
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to demand from management, and to test critically for
reliability, concrete data and indicia of value production
resulting from the mega-merger. For example, when
deciding upon a merger, a board should require
management to present specific forecasts of synergies,
whether in cost savings or expansion in economies of scope
or scale, and should then demand that all assumptions
underlying the forecast synergies be exposed and critically
tested for reasonableness and reliability.28 ' Similarly, the
board should question whether management and its
assistants have adequately and reasonably identified to the
best of their abilities all risks arising from the transaction,
particularly
risks
associated
with
harmonizing
management and with not achieving the pre-merger goals
of each company. A court would likely find that a board had
satisfied this standard if there were repeated meetings in
which the board debated the merits of the merger and that,
as a result of meetings, management needed to return to
the board with revised presentations and new information
or projections demanded by the board.
A particularly salient example of the kind of
particularized findings that the board of each company in a
mega-merger
should make
involves
the
merger
consideration, which is fraught with risks for both parties.
It is common in a "merger of equals" to structure the
transaction as one in which one firm (the ostensible
acquirer) gives the other (the target) a fixed ratio of its

to direct managers to produce information for them. Admittedly, this standard
suggests that Delaware courts should be harder on directors in interpreting
their reliance upon management and managements experts than is currently
the trend in Delaware case law. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249
(Del. 2000) (while disallowing challenge to reliance of Disney board on
management expert regarding executive compensation, suggesting that "the
processes of the boards of directors in dealing with [compensation arrangement]
were casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory").
281. Under this standard, the board members must base their decisions only
on specifics of value creation that have been tested by critical questioning about
their methodology. This testing recognizes that management proponents of the
merger are only too ready to put forward numbers, which, given the rapidity of
their preparation and their origin, need to be scrutinized. See Eccles et al.,
supra note 88, at 143 ("Most calculations of synergy value occur under
horrendous conditions: time pressure is intense, information is limited, and
confidentiality must be maintained. Since conditions are so far from ideal, the
managers and board members responsible for the final decision should always
scrutinize the assumptions underlying the numbers.").
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shares in exchange for a share of the target.282 A basic
justification for this consideration structure is that, since
the transaction is a partnership, both parties should share
in its upside and downside and take the percentage of
shares in the combined firm reflecting their respective preownership value, as well as their likely contribution to postmerger synergies. But, under finance theory, the acquirer
would rationally use stock as merger consideration only
when its management believes that its shares are
overvalued or when it has doubts about achieving the
synergies of the future partnership.28 Giving shares
(instead of cash) to target shareholders can actually capture
for the acquirer's shareholders some of the target value (i.e.,
target value is transferred for overinflated acquirer stock)
and/or shift to target shareholders a disproportionate share
of the risk that merger synergies will not be achieved. If,
however, an acquirer's management and board, swept up in
the momentum of the transaction, do not act rationally
despite their belief that its shares are undervalued, they
may give the target's shareholders some of the acquirer's
shareholders' value, as well as a disproportionate amount of
the value to be created from the synergies, in order to
accomplish the transaction.
The board of the target, by contrast, must similarly
evaluate the transaction, although the benefits and harms
received by its shareholders are the opposite of those of the
acquirer's shareholders." This board, moreover, might well
consider negotiating for the various kinds of contractual
mechanisms that can protect its shareholders in the preclosing period, which might be particularly useful if it fears
that the acquirer's shares are overvalued or that market
doubts may surface about the expected merger synergies.
For example, it may negotiate that its shareholders receive
a minimum fixed value of consideration if the price of
acquirer's stock drops below a certain threshold." Here,
282. See ESCHERICH, supra note 9, at 15.
283. See Rappaport & Sirower, supra note 8, at 154.
284. See id. at 156.
285. In merger parlance, this is the "collar" mechanism, which guarantees a
value for the target's shareholders. In cases where a collar is used, the acquirer
often insists on its own protections: if its stock price rises too much, it can "cap"
the value that the target shareholders receive in the exchange so that they do
not receive a disproportionate amount of the perceived merger synergies. See id.
at 154-55. Similarly, an acquirer may agree to provide enough of its shares to
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however, the danger exists that target's management and
board (influenced by their own role in the future combined
enterprise) may accept, or help design, the deal's synergy
story and agree that their shareholders receive an amount
of acquirer stock that does not adequately compensate the
shareholders for the risks of the transaction and target's
contribution to the merger synergies.
Obviously, both acquirer and target boards, with the
help of investment bankers, review these considerations
now." Yet the proliferation of fixed exchange transactions,
as opposed to other consideration structures, and the
infrequence of contractual provisions designed to address
pre-closing risks, such as exchange ratio "collars," 7 in
mega-mergers suggest that the board analysis of these risks
and justification of the agreed-upon consideration are
guarantee a fixed value, but only if it does not have to issue too many shares
(i.e., the buyer allows itself to "walk away" from the transaction if its share
price declines so precipitously that it must issue so many shares to guarantee
the fixed value). See ESCHERICH, supra note 9, at 18. In the mega-mergers, these
collar mechanisms are rare when firms are of relatively equal size because the
argument prevails that they should share equally in the risk. See id. at 17.
Another alternative for the target is to negotiate from the outset that its
shareholders take acquirer shares, at whatever amount is necessary at closing
to guarantee a fixed value. See Rappaport & Sirower, supra note 12, at 152. The
approach is akin to a cash deal in the pre-closing period (where target
shareholders are guaranteed their value), but not in the post-closing period
(where their value depends upon the fortunes of the firm). Yet this structure is
uncommon in the mega-mergers and is used more often when a target firm is
clearly selling itself to the acquirer. See ESCHERICH, supranote 9, at 15.
286. The merger consideration structure is always discussed in the merger
proxy statements, but generally not in a way in which the selected structure is
justified over others. See, e.g., Exxon-Mobil Prospectus, supra note 227, at 1-24
(discussing factors considered by Mobil board, one of which relates to merger
consideration: "(4) the value of the exchange ratio provided for in the merger
agreement relative to the then-current market prices and historical trading
prices of Mobil and Exxon shares over the past year and relative to the stock
price premiums paid in mergers of comparable size as discussed in Goldman
Sachs' selected transaction analysis, that the premium offered in the merger
was within the range of premiums paid in comparable transactions, and that
Mobil's shareholders would hold approximately 30% of the outstanding stock of
the combined company after the merger.").
287. For example, a collar mechanism in a fixed exchange transaction would
provide that, if the value of acquirer's shares fell below some agreed-upon
threshold, target shareholders would receive a "fixed value" amount or "floor,"
i.e., a number of acquirer shares equal to a dollar figure (it could also "cap" the
value an acquirer gives to the target if the acquirer's share price rises too high
after announcement of the transaction and before closing). See ESOHERICH,
supranote 9, at 16.
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inadequate. Under the proposed standard, the board of each
company would have the burden of showing with
particularized findings that the structure of merger
consideration, together with its reliance on management on
this issue, was justified in relation to other consideration
structures.
This first prong represents a significant, although not
revolutionary, change to current law. 8 Under the
application of the duty of care (and business judgment
review by the courts) in the acquisition context, boards
should base their merger decision upon a showing that the
merger increases shareholder value. This is, after all, the
teaching of Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the Delaware
Supreme Court concluded that the board of Trans Union
(the merger target) violated its duty of care because its
members 'were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the
8 9 As a result of this decision, it is now standard
Company.""
for both firms in a mega-merger to obtain fairness opinions
from their respective investment banker about the fairness
of the transaction to their shareholders and about its
potential for value creation."' Yet this jurisprudential
emphasis on a showing of value creation from the
transaction generally applies to the target firm, not the
acquirer, in the merger and loses considerable force in the
"merger of equals" typical of mega-mergers where no sale
288. As noted earlier, Professor Sirower would prefer that board members
demand from management a realistic showing that present value of the merger
benefits exceed its costs, i.e., that the transaction makes sense in net present
value terms. See Rappaport & Sirower, supra note 8, at 152. Despite the
arguments of many legal scholars, courts are unwilling to believe (and usually
reject out of hand) that a board's decision can be reduced to a mathematical
calculation. See, e.g., Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 129
(Del. Ch. 1999) (reaffirming that, in an appraisal proceeding, that there is no
set method of determining fair value of a corporation). Accordingly, it makes
more sense in corporate law jurisprudence to encourage a board to focus on
value creation, rather than to require the adoption of a set procedure, no matter
how much the latter is favored by financial economists.
289. Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
290. See, e.g., Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supra note 227, at 1-39 to 1-49.
Under the federal securities laws, merger parties must not only describe these
opinions, but also specify the reasons for the transaction (and not use
"boilerplate" reasons), which adds an incentive for boards to conclude that value
SEC Form S-4, item 4, available at
arises from the transaction. See
http://www.sec.gov/smbus/ formsls-4htm; see also id., item 3 (cross-referencing
to 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (1999), which requires presentation of a summary in
"plain English").
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occurs. Given the prevalence of these transactions, more
emphasis on the particularity of the board's own findings on
this issue, even if based only on a critical assessment of
information provided by management and investment
bankers, is needed to strengthen the board's ability to resist
the momentum of the transaction by examining critically
all justifications for it.
The second prong would compel the board to justify the
mega-merger against competing strategic alternatives,
particularly the alternative of remaining independent.
Under this prong, the board should articulate why the
transaction is necessary at this time and has the best
chances of success out of these available alternatives."' The
point here is not to make the absurd suggestion that boards
of firms engaging in mega-mergers do not give these issues
consideration in their merger decisions, even though a
board may not always have several transactions to select
from. 92 Rather, the prong is designed to give more weight to
the status quo of not engaging in the mega-merger precisely
at the moment when management is encouraging the board
to abandon these circumstances. Once, that is, the CEO has
proposed a transaction and agreed upon it with his
counterpart in the other firm, the momentum for the
transaction begins to build and the new vision of the
combined firm takes hold among the two firms' decisionmakers.293 In essence, the concept of the status quo begins to
291. This aspect of the proposed standard echoes recommendations of
business practitioners attempting to identify the ingredients of merger success.
See Viscio, supra note 95, at 22 ("Given the risky and challenging nature of
mergers, the burden of proof should be on demonstrating how a potential
merger is the best strategic option facing the company. There must be a good
answer to the question, 'Vhy do we have to merge to achieve our strategic
vision?' ").
292. Boards routinely give as a reason for a merger that it was the best
alternative in the circumstances. See, e.g., Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supra note
227, at 1-22, at 1-24. One wonders, however, how much a factor is remaining
independent for the firm that is the acquirer in the strategic merger. In any
event, when a firm is the target of several bids, Unocal comes into play and
would take precedence over the proposed standard.
293. As discussed above, for psychological and legal reasons, once the board
has agreed upon the transaction and there has been a public announcement of
it, the momentum turns into an avalanche or (in psychological parlance) a
cascade. See SUNSTEIN, GROUP POLARIZATION, supra note 134, at 7-9; see also
DAVID
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change. Yet it is precisely at this moment, before the
merger agreement has been signed, before the deal
protection mechanisms come into play and before the force
of the transaction becomes almost inexorable, that the
board must assume a highly critical view of the merger,
until managers can in effect rebut the presumption that the
merger will destroy value.294 The prong would impose upon
board members the legal position of being presumptive
opponents to or critics of the transaction.
It is important to emphasize the potential importance of
the board activity to be stimulated by this prong in the
dynamics of the merger decision-making. As discussed
earlier, the momentum for the mega-merger is powerful,
originating first from inside (and later from outside) each
firm. The "cascade" of support for the transaction, primarily
caused by managers' advocacy for it, pushes the board to
vote to recommend the deal and to put it to a shareholder
vote.295 If their fiduciary duty obligates board members to
take an opposition stance toward the transaction, this
critical position would not always stop, nor is it meant in
every circumstance to derail, the mega-merger. It could,
however, at least introduce a friction within the board that
could support those board members who might be skeptical
about the transaction but who, for varying reasons, might
not otherwise resist it vigorously, or that would itself
generate board resistance. Even if the legally-encouraged
board opposition did not stop some transactions in their
tracks, it should make them harder for managers to
negotiate, which would help ensure that most risks in the
transaction are identified and rationally addressed.29
(discussing phenomenon of "group polarization").
294. This legal approach seeks to create the kind of critical, opposition
stance that, in the view of merger specialists, could help reduce the number of
value-destroying mergers. Eccles, supra note 88, at 144-45 ("Poke holes in the
arguments and see if they still hold up. What could go wrong? What if the
assumptions about the direction of technology and prices are wrong? What
regulatory changes could make the deal fail, and how likely are they to occur?
How could competitors react to the deal in ways that could hurt you-even if
they hurt themselves as well? Make sure that the group reviewing acquisition
candidates includes strong skeptics with persuasive voices.").
295. See supra note 293.
296. See SUNSTEiN, GROUP POLARiZATION, supra note 134, at 27-28
(suggesting that heterogenous groups are better for decision-making because of
the ability of strong opposing views to offset the tendency of a group to proceed
to an extreme position).
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A board's burden to show that its decision-making
satisfied each prong of the proposed standard would be
furthered by a showing that a majority of independent
directors had made the decision. The ability of independent
directors-who are now a part of U.S. corporate
governance-to increase shareholder value, or at least to
minimize losses of shareholder value, primarily by resisting
and monitoring management is a subject of continuing
It would appear,
theoretical and empirical debate."
nevertheless, that the views of these directors, not
themselves members of management nor those with ties to
the firm apart from their director positions, and thus not
immediately and "internally" predisposed to favor a
proposed mega-merger, regarding the satisfaction of the
proposed standard should be entitled to more court
deference than those of an insider board. This approach of
granting more authority to decisions made by an
independent board, moreover, is well-accepted in Delaware
corporate law, as the Unocal standard demonstrates.298
The limited enhancement of board fiduciary duties in a
mega-merger arising from the proposed standard can draw
upon well-accepted doctrinal support of past decisions of the
Delaware Supreme Court. This Court has typically
increased the standard of director behavior beyond the duty
of care whenever it believes that in a particular situation
self-interested director behavior could adversely affect
decision-making. Indeed, this was a primary justification
for adoption of the Unocal standard.299 Similarly in a megamerger, board members might well accede to a CEO's
promotion of the transaction partly because it would
guarantee their continued involvement in the combined
company. For example, in Paramount Communications v.
Time, Time and Warner proposed to combine their boards,"'
297. Again, the literature on this issue is voluminous. See, e.g., Sanjai
Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999) (discussing both
theoretical and empirical literature on the value of independent directors for
firm performance).
298. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1375 (Del. 1995).
299. Because the board of a company facing a hostile offer might be worried
about maintaining its position, the potential "self-interest" allowed the Court to
move to the intermediate level of review characteristic of Unocal. See Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
300. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1146 (Del. 1989).
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and this strategy, which is common in recent megamergers, is justified on the grounds that a true merger of
equals demands a unification of boards, as well as
shareholders.'O Under the same reasoning and despite
value losses from the transactions, it would strain corporate
law jurisprudence to impose on directors' mega-merger
decisions the burden of the exacting "fairness" standard,
where courts review both the procedural and substantive
fairness of the transaction. °2 That standard of review has
been applied exclusively in transactions (including mergers)
where there is an allegation of a strong conflict of interest
by board members or a controlling shareholder.0 3 Because a
target board's concern with maintaining its directorships
did not justify application of the fairness standard in
Unocal, it could hardly do so in the mega-merger.
The proposed standard can also look for support to
Revlon, even if full application of that doctrine to either
firm involved in a mega-merger would involve too much of a
"leap" under the doctrine as currently formulated.0 4 In the
Revlon line of cases, the Delaware Supreme Court has
emphasized how the enhanced standard of board conduct
and court review arises from the shareholders' dependence
upon the board in "sale of control" transactions. When
shareholders are receiving their final chance at a control
premium (because a change in control is occurring), the
expertise and involvement of the board as negotiators for
the shareholders are critical to ensure that they realize the
maximum premium available for their shares."05 A similar,
although somewhat reverse, reasoning applies in a megamerger. Because these transactions are fraught with
dangers of catastrophic loss of value and are the product of
a momentum afflicting the shareholders themselves, board
scrutiny of, and resistance to, the merger are necessary to
prevent, or at least to limit, a potential disaster to the

301. See, e.g., HERIHY, supranote 7, at 113-14.
302. See generally Cox, supra note 34, at 608-10. The "classic" statement of
this standard in the Delaware law context is Weinberger v. UOP,Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. Ch. 1985).
303. See generally 1 BLOCK, supra note 22, at 377-400.
304. That jurisprudence of simply maximizing shareholder value has been
applied exclusively to changes in control and in the nature of the corporate
enterprise (i.e., a "break-up"). See supra notes 211-12 & accompanying text.
305. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34,
42-44 (Del. 1994).
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shareholders. Just as in Revlon an active board maximizes
shareholders' value through the auction, it would do much
the same here by ensuring that shareholders do not
massively lose value from the transaction.
Moreover, the proposed standard would impose
enhanced duties upon board members until the merger is
closed and in this approach is consistent with the recent
Chancery Court decisions, discussed above, where courts
have criticized deal-protection contractual provisions and
have emphasized the importance of the continuous exercise
of fiduciary duties by board members until consummation
of the merger. The standard would admittedly extend those
decisions out of their potentially narrow application to a
situation of competitive bidding for one firm or market
check on a firm's value. That is, there is an implicit judicial
recognition in these cases that the case law and contractual
provisions based on Time have limited the exercise of
fiduciary duties by board members in mega-mergers once
the boards have signed a merger agreement. The proposed
standard would rely upon this recognition, but would not
limit it to the requirement that board members
(particularly of a firm that has agreed to a merger but that
becomes the object of a third party offer) conduct
discussions with (or even seek) other potential merger
partners than the chosen one. This reading of the cases
simply sanctions the mega-mergers (albeit with different
merger partners)." 6 Rather, the standard would argue that
the fiduciary duty necessary in this situation is the ability
and willingness not to enter into the mega-merger or to pull
out of it without another bidder on the horizon. Application
of the standard, then, might well result in contractual deal
protection provisions pursuant to which there would be a
large "break-up" fee if a merger partner proceeds with an
alternative deal, but a lesser one if the partner pulls out of
the deal itself without pursuing (and agreeing not toyursue
30
for some specified time period) another transaction.

7

306. Another possibility is simply to apply Revlon in all cases whenever a
merger is proposed-i.e., to maximize shareholder value at all costs. This might
work for a true "target" firm, where the board would be under the Revlon duty
in any case, but application of this standard would detract from the board's
ability not simply to have to satisfy short-term shareholders and would even
promote mega-mergers.
307. Current merger agreements allow a termination of the merger
agreement prior to closing, but generally only when something materially
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From a jurisprudential perspective, furthermore, the
application of the new intermediate standard to board
behavior in the mega-merger brings Unocal up to date. The
hostile tender offer, often in leveraged buyout form, was the
innovative transaction of the 1980s, and the development of
the Unocal case law was necessary to spur directors not to
approve passively managers' resistance to hostile offers
that might prevent shareholders from benefitting from a
value-enhancing transaction. While tender offers still occur,
Unocal and its continuing jurisprudence are more than
adequate to deal with innovative management defenses."os
Indeed, it is fair to say that application of Unocal, together
with other pressures, changed board behavior so that it is
now part of the culture of boards not to acquiesce to
management in the takeover context or even in an
0 9 The
underperforming firm that is not the object of a bid."
greatest threat to loss of shareholder value from boards
now, however, is not board passivity in takeovers but in
management mega-merger proposals. But there is no
adequate legal standard available to respond to this threat,
and the proposed standard would enable the courts to fill
this void by forcing boards to assess critically managers'
proposals regarding the relevant "problem" transaction of
today.
It could be objected that the proposed standard, dealing
with shareholder value and strategic alternatives in a
complex business and financial setting, would invite
inappropriate court second-guessing of decisions in which
judges have no competence. Yet courts are certainly
competent to handle the first prong regarding the findings
adverse has happened to the merger partner (or if parties agree or if a condition
to the merger, such as antitrust approval, has not been met). See, e.g., Joshua
Jaffe, Jilted Deal Partners Can Face Ruin, DAILY DEAL, at
www.thedailydeal.com/topstories/A20605-2000Apr5.html
(Apr.
5,
2000)
(discussing the importance of "material adverse change" out for mergers).
Moreover, some break-up fees now have this proposed kind of structure (e.g.,
payment of part or none of break-up fee if no merger with a third party occurs
for a set period following termination of the merger agreement). See, e.g.,
Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supra note 227, at A-36.
308. See supranote 219.
309. What changed board behavior is a complex story, but Unocal had a
major part. See David J. Denis & Timothy A. Kruse, Managerialdiscipline and
corporate restructuringfollowing performance declines, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 391
(2000) (observing that underperforming firms now restructure, and discipline
management, even in the absence of takeovers).
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of the value creation from the mega-merger, for they have
shown themselves to be increasingly experienced with and
sophisticated in valuation issues in other contexts, such as
appraisal and substantive fairness.31 ° The discussion of
strategic business alternatives, particularly mergers, is
familiar to courts, which have reviewed these decisions
under the business judgment standard and which, under
the proposed standard, must simply demand a greater
showing by the board that the mega-merger was the best
strategy in the circumstances, in light of a presumption
that the firm should not engage in the transaction.
If experience under Unocal-also an intermediate
standard of review-is any indication, 1 ' it is not likely that
courts will often and readily substitute their own judgment
for that of the directors on a merger and its alternatives, if
and when a mega-merger decision is challenged. Under
Unocal, a court does not ask whether it considers that a
third party's offer constitutes a threat, but whether the
board has articulated reasonable grounds for the board's
determination that such a threat exists and whether the
response to the threat (if established) is proportional.
Similarly, under the proposed standard a court should defer
to a board's particularized findings about the value of a
mega-merger and about the appropriateness of the
transaction in light of the alternatives. The proposal is
certainly intended to result in more initial court scrutiny of
the mega-mergers, until the standard begins to take effect.
Yet, unlike review under a fairness standard, it is designed
not to place the court's business judgment over that of the
board as it is to ensure that the board has fulfilled its role
of being a "Devil's Advocate" regarding the success of the
transaction.
The proposed standard, moreover, is not intended to
result in increased liability on directors, any more than is
the current case under the application of Unocal or any
standard short of a claim of conflict of interest, lack of good
faith or illegality on a director's part. Indeed, a director's
310. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
311. There the court articulated a standard whereby a judge would have to
review a board's determination how an offer constituted a threat to a corporate
enterprise and whether the response to it was proportional and left it to the
lower Delaware courts to develop the standard, which they have done
successfully. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985).
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failure to satisfy the standard will likely not lead to any
liability, given the availability to corporations of Section
102(b)(7)'s exemption for damages and directors' insurance
and indemnification.312 The standard, however, will affect
board behavior even without an imposition of liability, as
has been demonstrated by Unocal. In practice, shareholders
of a firm involved in a mega-merger and opposing the
transaction will seek an injunction following its
announcement-or at any time before its closing-on the
grounds that the board in question failed to satisfy its
duties under the standard. The board would thus have its
decision-making exposed to scrutiny shortly after having
made the merger decision, or later before closing when it
declines to revisit its merger decision. If the board's
decision-making proves inadequate under the standard, the
merger risks being delayed or even permanently enjoined.
Directors, thus, have an adequate incentive, even without
personal liability, to establish that they have fulfilled, and
continue to fulfill, their position as merger skeptics so as to
ensure that the mega-merger occurs, if it is indeed shown to
their satisfaction to be one of the few transactions that are
value-enhancing.
It could be argued that application of the standard
would lead to unnecessary litigation by giving disgruntled
shareholders (who do not represent a majority of the
shareholders), and their attorneys, a weapon whereby they
could unduly delay mergers and extort value from a
merging firm. There is no question that, in the short term,
the standard is likely to result in more litigation and thus
more costs to firms, as courts elaborate and apply the
standard, which is necessary if the standard is to produce
the desired effect-changed behavior on boards' part. And,
if the proposed standard achieves its goal, there will be
fewer mega-mergers. It is unlikely, however, that, once the
standard takes hold in the law and board behavior, it will
cause undue delay for justifiable mergers or give
opportunistic shareholders undeserved value from a
merging firm. As it is, firms involved in mega-mergers are
now sued under corporate law and federal securities law.313

312. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1999).
313. See, e.g., Moran v. American Online, Inc., No. 17723 (Del. Ch., Jan. 14,
2000) (AOL shareholder challenging AOL/Time Warner merger under state
corporate law); Cohen v. Levin, No. 17719 (Del. Ch., Jan. 10, 2000) (challenge of
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Because the mega-mergers always involve delay (sometimes
considerable) from agreement through consummation,
primarily to obtain the necessary shareholder approval and
the consent of antitrust and other regulatory authorities to
the merger, any additional claims under the proposed
standard can be handled by courts during this period,
particularly because the subject matter of the suit is a very
recent decision by the board. Indeed, rather than helping a
small shareholder group, the suit could benefit all
shareholders by exposing the flawed decision-making of a
board.
It could also be argued that the proposed standard
would do nothing more than lead to "stock" or "boilerplate"
decision-making by boards, which would have no effect on
the mega-mergers. Again, if Unocal is to stand as a model,
this is an unlikely result in the long (although not the
immediate) term, for it is clear that law can change the
culture of board members. In the very long term, the issue
is more complicated, for there is no question that, whenever
a new legal rule is articulated, patterns of behavior change
followed by an inevitable routinization. Lawyers are asked
by their clients for simple guidelines on how to conform
with the rule, and the pressure for standardization is
particularly acute in business transactions where so much
economic value is at stake for the companies involved. The
application of Unocal exemplifies this process, for numerous
books and materials instruct boards on the correct
procedure to follow in erecting defenses to a hostile offer.314
Yet the establishment of routines or simple rules does not
mean that there is no substance to decision-making based
upon them: successful human behavior (i.e., behavior that
allows survival), particularly in complex situations,
generally follows simple patterns or rules. 15 Indeed,
encouraging boards to adopt a different decision-making
routine for the mega-mergers may routinely help raise
issues, such as alternatives to a merger, that are not now
sufficiently placed in the foreground. And it is the strength
of the common law courts to remain vigilant to the dangers

Time Warner shareholder).
314. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 631-1202; LIPTON, supra note 49, at
1-30, 35-46.
315. See Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle
Hypothesis, in QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOmiCS, supranote 144, at 97.
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of routines arising from legal practice and to articulate a
new standard, or to enhance an existing one, where
appropriate: this is clearly what the Delaware Chancery
Courts are now doing in their new scrutiny on deal
protection mechanisms in merger agreements.
Finally and significantly, it may seem doctrinally
inappropriate to propose an enhanced standard of conduct
for board decision-making when the decision is not final: a
mega-merger does not occur unless shareholders of each
company approve the transaction. That is, Unocal's
enhanced scrutiny was justified because a board's defenses
to a hostile offer could prevent shareholders from ever
considering a tender offer.316 The enhanced review
mandated under Blasius317 similarly focuses on situations
where boards undermine the shareholder franchise. 318
Courts also apply the enhanced fairness scrutiny in
situations, such as in freeze-out mergers, where no
shareholder vote is required or where the vote is
meaningless because of the number of votes possessed by
the majority shareholder.319
There is a paternalistic aspect to the proposed
standard. Its justification is that, in the current business
climate with so much momentum for the mega-mergers,
shareholders, even the sophisticated institutional owners,
need some protection from their own tendency to jump
aboard the bandwagon of these transactions. Although
efforts can be made to affect the shareholders' decision, by
the time they vote on the merger the outcome is usually a
foregone conclusion (in the absence of competing offers).32 °
316. See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955.
317. Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
318. See generally Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, 6282 (Del. Ch. 2000) (discussing the continued rationale for Blasius analysis in
light of the fact that application of Unocal can achieve the same results of
protecting the voting franchise since it bars preclusive defensive actions by
boards).
319. Again, the classic example is Weinberger v. VOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
708 (Del. Ch. 1985).
320. One could argue that, by the time of a merger vote, shareholders
disagreeing with a strategic merger have already expressed their disapproval
by selling their shares. Accordingly, no enhanced protection is needed for the
shareholders electing to remain in the capital of the firms involved in the
merger. Such an argument would belittle any role for the board in a merger,
which may agree with some economic analysis, but not with legal realities.
Moreover, the paternalism argument suggests that even shareholders who
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There is thus a need to slow down the momentum at the
point where intervention would be most effective, the
board's
initial
and
continuing
approval
and
recommendation of the merger before a shareholder vote.
This proposal is therefore squarely based on a traditional
understanding of the special fiduciary role of board
members, which lies at the foundation of the board's
fiduciary duties and which makes them stewards for the
shareholders."' It may well be that, as a result of
application of the standard, shareholders may not have the
opportunity to vote on some mega-mergers (although this is
likely to be the case more for shareholders of an ostensible
acquirer than for those of a true target). But there is
nothing jarring about this outcome from a jurisprudential
perspective. Board members direct the management of
firms and shareholders retain the right, at certain times, to
remove them if dissatisfied with their behavior. It is
difficult to understand why rational shareholders would
object to board members who demand from management
hard-nosed justifications for transactions that so frequently
destroy the value of these shareholders.
B. Useful Supplements to the ProposedStandard
The above corporate law reform, like any legal reform,
would benefit if accompanied by other nonlegal and legal
efforts to address the mega-mergers. Indeed, the current
preferred U.S. response to problems with firm management
(that is to say, corporate governance problems) is to awaken
boards of directors to a problem and to encourage them, by
legal and nonlegal means, to resolve it.'22 For example, in
think that the transaction will be value enhancing need protection from their
own errors.
321. See Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1292 (Del. 1998)
("Therefore, we hold that the Delayed Redemption Provision is invalid under
Section 141(a), which confers upon any newly elected board of directors full
power to manage and direct the business and affairs of a Delaware
corporation.") (footnote omitted); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 ("The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise
includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That
duty may not be delegated to the stockholders.") (citation omitted).
322. See, e.g., Roe, Political Preconditions, supra note 140, at 6; see also
Bhagat & Black, supra note 297, at 923-34 (surveying trends in board
independence); Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, Corporate
Performance, and Management Turnover, 54 Bus. LAW. 885 (1999) (reviewing
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the 1980s boards of corporations became less tolerant of
management's absolute resistance to tender offers because
of the case law that enhanced their fiduciary duties in the
takeover situation and because of pressure from
institutional investors who worked with advisory groups to
establish guidelines for director behavior in this situation.
This extralegal or consensual activism designed to
affect the norms of board behavior would not alone be
capable of dealing with-and has not even focused uponthe value-decreasing nature of mega-mergers, any more
than it could have addressed board weaknesses in the
1980s in the absence of court decisions. Yet it can certainly
supplement the proposed legal standard by providing
additional encouragement to boards to evaluate critically
the mega-mergers, to be highly suspicious of managers'
reasons for entering into them and, in general, to do
everything to resist the momentum for the transactions.
Institutional investors and organizations supportive of
them and/or devoted to formulating standards of board
behavior, such as The Conference Board, the Institutional
Shareholder Services, the Investor Responsibility Research
Center, should add this topic to their policy agendas and
begin to address it in their standards of director conduct. 3"
This addition would make particular sense for their
guidelines because many of their topics for board
improvement have been acquisition-related
32 as result of the
context.
offer
hostile
the
in
developments
The focus and publicity that would arise from adding
this issue to those of interest to institutional investors and
the investor organizations would help make board members
additionally aware of the problems associated with megamergers and help counter the overwhelming publicity in
favor of the transactions."' The institutional investor
issues of director ownership).
323. For the most part, current "consensual" standards of corporate
governance are completely silent on the issue of mega-mergers. See, e.g.,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL
IN GLOBAL MARKETS, A REPORT TO THE OECD BY THE BusINEss SECTOR ADVISORY

GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development ed., 1988).
324. See, e.g., Patrick S. McGurn, Companies Continue to Pop Poison Pills in
1999, 14 ISSUE ALERT 1 (No. 5, May 1999) (discussing institutional shareholder
activism regarding poison pill defenses to a takeover).
325. See, e.g., DR. CAROLYN KAY BRONCATO, COMMUNICATING CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE: A DELICATE BALANCE 3 (1997) (discussing as one of the goals of
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activism might also be of assistance to courts as the latter

develop the proposed standard. For through their own
research on board behavior the groups could help identify
what are reasonable grounds for mega-mergers (with
shareholder value in mind) and when a mega-merger is
justified to the exclusion of other alternatives.
As discussed earlier, pooling accounting treatment may
encourage companies to engage in the stock-for-stock megamergers, particularly among those companies that cannot
raise cash through debt financing, and thus to avoid cash
mergers where, as the evidence suggests, parties are more
likely to do a value-enhancing transaction. 8 Accounting
standard setters have proposed to eliminate pooling
treatment in favor of the uniform application of purchase
accounting to all mergers. This development, it has been
suggested, may significantly slow down the wave of stockfor-stock mega-mergers.
Eliminating pooling would contribute to creating a
resistance to the momentum of the mega-mergers and
would thus be a useful addition to the proposed standard. It
would not, however, be a substitute for a change in the law.
As an initial note of caution, much can happen between an
announcement of a reform to accounting standards, such as
the elimination of pooling, by the FASB and its final
implementation: the outcome of FASB's deliberations on
any subject, which are subject to intense lobbying by
industry groups affected by any proposed change, are by no
means certain. 329 The pooling treatment should be
the Global Corporate Governance Research Center to "develop benchmarks and
best practices to attract international investment and manage successfully in
global capital markets").
326. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 38; see also FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,
BUSINEss COMBINATIONS: SUMMIARY OF TENTATIVE BOARD DECISIONS THROUGH

JUNE 2, 1999 (available June 25, 1999) ("Only the purchase method should be

used to account for business combinations (the pooling method is therefore
eliminated).").
328. See SUMMARY OF COMENT LETTERS TO FASB ExPosuRE DRAFT:
BUSINESS COAMINATIONS AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 5 (2000) ("Many respondents

did not specifically answer the question whether all business combinations are
acquisitions but instead put forth public policy arguments for retaining the use
of the pooling method for business combinations-namely, that the availability
of the pooling method is critical to the continuation of the merger and
acquisition activity in the United States.").
329. One has only to remember the controversy surrounding FASB's efforts
to have stock options expensed on the income statement (which did not come to
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eliminated because it encourages at least one irrational
basis in board and shareholder decision-making regarding
the mega-mergers. The popularity of pooling owes much to
the continued focus of parties on the earnings per share
("EPS") number in the income statement, which pooling
treatment (as opposed to purchase accounting) does not
reduce, because it does not result in recognition of goodwill
of the "purchase" that would then have to be amortized,
thus reducing EPS, in the years following the merger. Yet
EPS, like net income itself, is a somewhat illusory number
since it does not reflect the cash-generating results of the
company."' The elimination of pooling may thus reduce in
the long term the number of stock-based mega-mergers that
relied partly for their justification on improving the EPS
number in the combined firm, and also force financial
analysts and investors to evaluate all firms for their cash
results, as they do in some industries. 3 '
fruition) to realize that opponents of any FASB proposal may have the political
muscle to defeat it. Indeed, companies preferring the pooling method-and their
banking and legal hired guns (who make much money from the megamergers)-are beginning to drum up opposition to FASB's effort in the political
arena. See, e.g., Letter of Adam D. Chinn, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Mar.
3, 2000 (on file with the Buffalo Law Review) (arguing that elimination of
pooling will undermine the "psychology of the deal" in mega-mergers of equals
because neither company involved wants to accept that it is being acquired by
another); Martha A. Matthews, Economics of FASB Bid to End Pooling
Consideredby Senate Banking Panel,BNA BANK. DLY., Mar. 6, 2000 (discussing
hearing with testimony of supporters of pooling); Charles Sisk, FASB Draws
High-Tech Industry Flak, DAILY DEAL, at www.thedailydeal.com/topstories/
A15195-2000Feb3.html (Feb. 3, 2000) (reporting on threats of political action by
high-technology firms opposed to the elimination of pooling); see also FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS
BOARD,
News
Release,
available
at
www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/news/NP12600.html
(Dec. 6, 2000)
(revising purchase accounting's treatment of goodwill in acquisitions so as to
undermine much of the effect of the abolition of pooling).
330. That is, depreciation and amortization charges that go into
determining net income do not represent the cash expenditure in a given year;
the purchases to which they are attributable have already occurred.
331. See generally Rick Escherich, J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., Quarterly
Focus: Pooling versus purchase accounting: does goodwill really matter? (Apr.
23, 1999). See also Elizabeth MacDonald, Pooling's End Won't Clobber M&A
Activity, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1999, at Cl; GABRIELLE NAPOLrrANO & ABBY
JOSEPH COHEN, PURCHASE VERSUS POOLING: THE DEBATE ON BUSINESS
COMBINATIONS 1, (May 28, 1999) (observing that elimination of pooling will
adversely affect mergers in some industries). Naturally, this does not mean to
suggest that, if firms fear that pooling will be eliminated, they may not rush to
take advantage of it in order to benefit from the investor focus on EPS. On the
other hand, it is not as if purchase accounting eliminates manipulation of EPS
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Disclosure under the federal securities laws will also

support the proposed standard without any additional
modifications of these laws. Pursuant to securities laws,
companies already make considerable disclosure in their
proxy statements about a mega-merger, their reasons for it
and the risks presented by it."32 In particular, these laws
require companies to discuss in detail the decision-making
history of the merger, generally with emphasis on meetings
between, and the views of, senior executives of the merging
firms."' If, in line with the proposed standard, an enhanced
duty is placed on the board of each firm to justify a megamerger, it follows that the disclosure in the Form S-4s
and/or merger proxy statements will have to include more
information about the board's specific articulation of the
value-enhancing aspects of the transaction and its weighing
of the transaction in light of alternatives, particularly the
alternative of not engaging in the transaction. In reviewing,
and commenting upon, the disclosure documents, moreover,
the SEC staff could take a more aggressive position in
challenging the basis, and requiring specific support, for
statements about the benefits and risks of a mega-merger.
This SEC position would encourage the board in its exercise
of its fiduciary duty under the proposed standard.
Much of the force of the federal securities laws comes
not just from the mandated disclosure but also through
liability under these laws. Because the federal securities
laws penalize companies and directors for non-disclosure
and misrepresentation of material facts in their merger
disclosure documents, they add weight to a proposal
enhancing board duties. If, for example, board members do
not adopt the critical position toward management's megamerger proposal required by the proposed standard, their
conduct risks being actionable under both corporate law
and/or the federal securities laws. That is, a board that
does not take an opposition stance toward executives in the
merger decision is likely to approve for dissemination a
registration or proxy statement that either is misleading
in the acquisition context. See, e.g., Elizabeth MacDonald, Merging Firms Are
Renouncing R&D Write-Off, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1999, at Cl (discussing
practice of acquiring firms writing-off much of acquired research and
development expenses in the year of the acquisition, rather than over a longer
period, which made the firm's results look better in ensuing years).
332. See supra notes 188, 191, 227, 290.
333. See, e.g., Exxon/Mobil Prospectus, supranote 227, at 1-14 to 1-19.
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because it suggests that the board was more active and
critical than was in fact the case, or shows that the board
was not appropriately active, which would be a "roadmap"
for a violation of fiduciary duty.
It would, in fact, be encouraging to draw some support
from federal securities laws for resistance to the megamergers because a recent SEC rule change has, in a
misguided way, promoted stock-for-stock transactions. In
1999, the SEC significantly amended the rules governing
tender offers in order to put offers that use stock as
consideration on equal footing with cash offers." 5 Before the
rule change, it was difficult to use stock as tender offer
consideration for a number of reasons. Because a stock
offering had to be registered under the Securities Act of
1933, the timing necessary for SEC review of the offering
would generally exceed the short period for a tender offer.
Moreover, restrictions on statements by a company making
a stock offering under that Act would interfere with the
publicity necessary to gather shareholder interest and
support in a tender offer. 36 All this meant in effect that a
stock tender offer could commence only upon effectiveness
of a registration statement for the offered stock, i.e.,
following completion of SEC review of that statement. The
rule change gives companies the choice of using stock or
cash in an offer by easing restrictions on statements by a
company that is using stock as tender offer consideration
and by permitting such a company to make the offer
conditional on effectiveness of the registration statement
regarding the offered securities. 37 The outcome of this rule
change, however, is to further the use of stock in a two-step

334. Under Santa Fe v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), it is inappropriate for
federal securities laws to interfere with corporate governance, which is a subject
of State law. However, these laws in the merger context do what they do in
many cases: indirectly deter inappropriate board behavior by giving the board a
choice of either disclosing that it has acted inappropriately or misstating that it
conducted its decision-making in the proper manner. It should be noted that the
corporate law duty of disclosure would have this same effect. See generally 1
BLOCK, supranote 22, at 499-538.
335. See Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications,
supra note 192.
336. See id. at 61,410-11.
337. See id. at 61,411-13, 61,419-20; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.162, 165, 166 (2000)
(rules on communications regarding mergers before effective date of registration
statement, on conditionality of offer prior to effectiveness).
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merger, which can only facilitate the mega-merger trend 3
VI. CONCLUSION

A week rarely passes now without the announcement of
a new mega-merger. Generally, the business media,
adopting CEOs' "spin" on the transaction, present the
merger as likely to result in new synergies and hitherto
unimagined connections between companies and portray
the CEOs as visionaries. Enormous companies often appear
almost overnight in the spotlight, having grown
tremendously from previous mergers. Politicians have
remained mainly silent about the phenomenon of the megamergers in this era of prosperity and full employment,
which
contrasts
sharply
with
their
widespread
condemnation of the LBOs of the 1980s.
Lost in the euphoria of the mega-mergers is the reality
that most of these transactions are value-decreasing both
for the acquirer's shareholders and for those of the target
companies who hold onto the acquirer's shares. The
financial and economic evidence overwhelmingly suggests
that companies destroy shareholder value in these stockfor-stock transactions. For primarily behavioral and
psychological reasons, CEOs are not realistic about the
possibilities of success in the mega-mergers, and, for
generally the same reasons, boards of directors, financial
analysts and investors go along with them, which generates
an almost irresistible momentum for the transactions.
Law does little to slow down, and in fact promotes, the
mega-mergers. In the absence of competing bidders for one
or the other of the merger partners, the standard of court
review of board decision-making on the transactions is the
highly deferential business judgment examination, which
focuses simply on the information-gathering process of the
board's decision. In an ironic and perverse outcome,
moreover, the case law of the 1980s on board duties in
hostile transactions (which were uniformly value
enhancing) encouraged parties to engage in stock-for-stock
mega-mergers. Taking their guidance from this case law,
338. See, e.g., Yvette Kantrow, Reluctant Trailblazer, DAILY DEAL, at
www.thedailydeal.com/features/diary (Feb. 23, 2000) (discussing initial use of
SEC "fast track" rules for stock tender offers in Computer Associates'
acquisition of Cullinet Software).
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practicing corporate lawyers have surrounded the megamerger with many deal-protection provisions that add to
the transaction's momentum by making it difficult for the
board to reevaluate the deal, once it has made the decision
to enter into a merger.
This Article argues that the law must impose an
enhanced standard of board conduct in approving the megamerger in order to address the significant problem
transaction of the 1990s and of the beginning of the new
millennium and to counter legally the momentum of the
mega-mergers. The standard would compel a board to
articulate particular grounds for believing that the megamerger maximizes shareholder value and to justify that the
transaction is the best alternative among those available to
the company, particularly the status quo of not engaging in
the transaction. This legal change is no panacea for the
mega-mergers and should be accompanied by other
nonlegal and legal actions that would support it and slow
down the momentum of these transactions. The proposed
standard will not bring every mega-merger before courts or
transform judges into merger experts. It is designed only to
force board members to be an opposing, critical group to a
transaction that has all the force of CEO popularity and
support behind it, as well as (once announced) media and
investor pressure, a group that would squarely raise and
face the potentially negative evidence about the deal and
resist the mega-merger. If the standard succeeds in
bringing sobriety about the mega-mergers into boards in
this intoxicating time, and, frankly, in halting their trend,
its benefits should outweigh its costs.

